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ABSTRACT
Friendship played an outsized role in ancient political thought in comparison to medieval and
modern political philosophies. Most modern scholarship has paid relatively little attention to the
role of friendship in ancient political philosophy. Recently, however, scholars are increasingly
beginning to investigate classical conceptions of friendship. My dissertation joins this growing
interest by examining the importance of friendship in the political thought of Socrates and
Aristotle. Specifically, I analyze the divergent approaches that Socrates and Aristotle take to
politics and trace these distinct approaches to their differing conceptions of friendship. Through
an examination of two Platonic dialogues—the Lysis and the Gorgias—I make the case that
Socrates has a largely negative conception of friendship, according to which all friendships are
based upon a metaphysical lack or need. This negative understanding of friendship causes him
to adopt a negative, abstentious approach to politics. In contrast, in the Nicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle presents a conception of friendship that is based not upon deficiency and need, but
instead upon the mutual recognition of each other’s complementary virtues. Aristotle’s positive
account of friendship ensures that he does not take a negative, abstentious approach to politics,
but instead seeks to use his philosophic insight to impact politics and orient it toward the good.

vi

INTRODUCTION. POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND FRIENDSHIP
Friendship and Politics
The topic of friendship has recently seen a resurgence of scholarly interest. No less than eight
monographs in the past few years have been devoted to this topic, and a fair number of such
recent publications make recourse to the writings on friendship that date from classical antiquity
to help further their own inquiries into the concept of friendship.1 Interestingly, while political
philosophers of antiquity, such as Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero all discuss the concept of
friendship in detail, it fell out of favor as a source of inquiry with the coming of the Christian era.
Lorraine Smith Pangle argues that Christianity’s call to “devote one’s heart as completely as
possible to God, and to regard all men as brothers” may be the cause of this eclipse.2 According
to Pangle, this new conception of the way social relations ought to be ordered “made the
existence of private, exclusive, and passionate attachments to individual human beings seem
inherently questionable,” unless ordered toward marriage and family life.3 Through much of the
Middle Ages, friendship seems to have been less important as a topic of inquiry than it had been

1

See, P.E. Digeser, Friendship Reconsidered: What it Means and How it Matters to Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2016); Alexander Nehamas, On Friendship (New York: Basic Books, 2016) Ann Ward,
Contemplating Friendship in Aristotle’s Ethics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016); Filippa
Modesto, Dante’s Idea of Friendship: The Transformation of a Classical Concept (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2015); Gregg Lambert, Philosophy After Friendship: Deleuze’s’ Conceptual Personae (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 2017); Seow Hon Tan, Justice as Friendship: A Theory of Law, (New York:
Routledge, 2015); John von Heyking, The Form of Politics: Aristotle and Plato on Friendship (Montreal: McGillQueens University Press, 2016); Alicia J. Batten, Friendship and Benefaction in James (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2017).
2
Lorraine Smith Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 2.
3

Ibid.; Cf., David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) esp.
156–167; But see, Constant J. Mews and Neville Chiavaroli, “The Latin West” in Friendship: A History, ed.
Barbara Caine (New York: Routledge, 2014) 73, who argue that while there was a profound shift in the
understanding of friendship from the Classical period to the Medieval period, “classical traditions of friendship
never completely disappeared.”
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during the classical period. Though it enjoyed a mild resurgence in the Renaissance era in the
writings of Michel de Montaigne and Francis Bacon, after the Enlightenment, it again fell into
desuetude.4
This history may go some way to explaining the resurgence of interest in friendship. If
Christianity is responsible for channeling the love of friendship into marriage, it may be that the
recent breakdown of the family goes some way to explaining the renewed interest in friendship:
as the social unit in which individuals found completion begins to break down, people may begin
looking to friendship elsewhere to fulfill that lacuna. Alternatively, it may be that people are
responding to the inability of social contract theories to explain deep commitments. Perhaps as
abstract rights and duties begin to be perceived as no longer capable of providing a solid
foundation for politics, people are turning to friendship to afford this foundation.5 Whatever the
reason, friendship has long been perceived as holding out the possibility of providing completion
to man.6 To what extent can friendship provide an antidote to what seems to be a prevailing
sense of anomie and isolation in our society? Should friendship figure more prominently in our
political life? Was the eclipse of friendship as a basis of political order a salutary development
or a problematic one?

Montaigne, “Of Friendship,” in The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald Frame (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1976); Francis Bacon, “Of Friendship,” in Francis Bacon: Essays and New Atlantis (New York:
Walter J. Black, 1942). Pangle writes that “the devaluation of friendship is the result of a decisive new tun in
philosophy that occurred in the years immediately after the publications of Montaigne’s and Bacon’s essays…. For
it was early in the next century that Thomas Hobbes began to develop his powerful reinterpretation of human nature
as directed neither to friendship nor to virtue” Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship, 3.
4

5

Ruth Abbey, “Review Essay: On Friendship.” Review of Politics 79 no. 4 (2017): 695–707.

6

See for example, Aristophanes’ speech in the Symposium (Sym. 189a2–193d6).
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The purpose of this dissertation is to enter into the discussion surrounding the above
questions through an analysis of Plato’s Lysis and Gorgias, as well as books VIII and IX of
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Both Socrates and Aristotle inquire into the character of
friendship, its relation to politics, and what our stance toward it ought to be, and for the most
part, both wrestle with the same questions and themes. Indeed, Aristotle’s indebtedness to
Socrates in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics is evident, as he develops many of the
themes articulated in the Lysis. Despite the different conclusions that Socrates and Aristotle
reach, both provide invaluable insights into the extent to which friendship should inform our
political life.

The City and the Philosopher
Socrates’ death at the hands of his political community, famously recounted in Plato’s Apology,
illustrates the inherent tension that seems to exist between the philosopher’s devotion to a life of
contemplation and the political community. Socrates’ famous assertion that “the unexamined
life is not worth living” generates criticism both among the Athenian political elite, and among
the poets, who point out that his life of constant inquiry calls into question the conventional
practices of Athens (Apol. 38a6–7). The tension between philosophy and the polis pervades
much of subsequent philosophy, with the result that many political philosophers since Socrates—

3

particularly in the modern era—have recognized this tension and sought to reduce it in various
ways.7
This theme of the tension between philosophy and politics pervades Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics as well—albeit in a nuanced form—and has recently been the focus of a
renewed interest in Aristotle’s Ethics.8 However, in contrast to Socrates, Aristotle makes his
peace with politics. Not only does Aristotle devote an entire treatise—the Politics—to the
different possible regimes and the manner in which such regimes might be improved, but he also
famously collected constitutions alleging that these collections of laws and regime types would
be of good use to those who are capable of determining which laws would be beneficial for the
various types of regimes (1181b8–10). As a result, some have persuasively argued that the
Politics is intended to be the counterpart to the Ethics, and that the one is meant to lead
seamlessly into the other.9
Furthermore, Aristotle’s interest in politics was not limited to strictly theoretical concerns
but extended to practical engagement with politics. Aristotle’s relation to the Macedonian rulers

For example, Georg W. F. Hegel contrasts Socrates’ discovery and devotion to the principle of subjectivity with
the objective Greek customary morality. The Philosophy of History (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1956 [1837]), 269. Hegel
goes on to reconcile the principle of subjectivity with objective morality through what he terms the “absolute and
universal law.” Ibid., 255. Similarly, Jean-Jacques Rousseau despite being estranged from his native city-state of
Geneva and describing himself as the “solitary walker,” seeks to legitimate the civil order through the notion of
adherence to the “general will.” See, The Social Contract trans. and ed. by Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, [1762] 1997), Bk 1. This theme is reiterated throughout the history of Western
philosophy. The philosopher is presented as largely alienated from the political regime and, through some sort of
devotion to an abstract rule, is able to reconcile his subjective will with that of the political community.
7

See, Richard Bodéüs, The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s ‘Ethics’ trans. by Jan Edward Garrett. (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1993); Aristide Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics: Virtue, Rhetoric, and Political
Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); Ronna Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates:
On the Nicomachean Ethics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008).
8

9

A. W. H. Adkins, “The Connection Between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” Political Theory, 12 (1984): 29–41.
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has long been acknowledged—in particular his relationship with Alexander the Great, whom he
was hired to tutor in 343 BC. While the exact extent to which Aristotle acted as a political
advisor to Alexander is debated, most scholars agree that Aristotle had an influence on
Alexander’s political and ethical undertakings.10 Whatever the extent to which his advice had a
practical impact on Alexander’s policies, scholars generally agree that Aristotle was politically
active. Thus, in contrast to Socrates, who eschewed the practice of politics as an enterprise that
entailed the exercise of injustice (Cf. Apol. 31d–32e.) and inquired into political matters only to
show the inherent limits of politics, Aristotle inquired into and engaged in the practice of politics
in a concrete manner.
How is it that Aristotle alleviated the tension between politics and philosophy in a way
that Socrates chose not to? Can it be that Aristotle was simply more of a realist than Socrates
when it comes to political life? Did Aristotle understand the harsh necessities of politics and
condone them in a way that Socrates did not? Many political interpretations of Aristotle’s Ethics
have adopted precisely this argument.11 Leo Strauss and others have put forward an
interpretation according to which Aristotle recognized the tension between philosophy and

Carnes Lord relates that while “it seems highly likely that [Aristotle] was more active politically on behalf of
Macedon … it appears that the traditional picture of Aristotle as a close associate and admirer of Alexander and his
works is, at best, very overdrawn.” “Introduction” in Aristotle’s Politics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013),
viii. Paul Cartledge relates that Aristotle gave Alexander a copy of the Iliad, and that Alexander carried his
“Aristotle-annotated text” with him on his expedition to Asia. Alexander was said to be “so attached to it that at
night he allegedly slept with it—and a dagger—under his pillow.” Alexander the Great: The Hunt for a New Past
(New York: Overlook Press, 2004), 227. For a full overview of the relations between Aristotle and Alexander, see
Victor Ehrenberg, Alexander and the Greeks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938), 62–102.
10

11

N. D. Arora and S. S. Awasthy, Political Theory and Political Thought (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications,
2007), 77: “The two major streams along which the whole Western political thought keeps marching on are: (i)
political idealism or as one may see [sic] political philosophy, and (ii) political realism, or as one may call it political
science. Plato represents political idealism, and Aristotle represents political realism.”
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politics, but sought to alleviate it in various ways, all the while maintaining the superiority of the
philosophical life.12 According to this interpretation, Aristotle’s concern with the political
community was primarily practical—he recognized that the philosopher’s good is in some way
dependent on the political community and, as a result, he attempted to foster a favorable
disposition towards philosophy among the educated political class.13 In essence, the “Straussian
interpretation” of the Ethics holds that at best Aristotle’s presentation of the moral virtues was
intended to point out that they are merely a pale imitation of the philosophical life of
contemplation, while at worst, his presentation may simply be an elaborate ruse, the goal of
which was to ensure that the city is made safe for philosophy.
The standard “Straussian reading” of the Ethics has much to offer. According to this
reading, Aristotle sought to present the life of moral virtue so as to emphasize its nobility, while
also exposing its limitations. In this way, the well-bred Greek gentleman (καλοσκάγαθος), if he
is a sufficiently attentive reader, will recognize that the true benefit of moral virtue is that it
points beyond itself toward philosophical virtue, which is self-sufficient and capable of being

12

See, Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964); Harry V. Jaffa Aristotelianism and
Thomism: A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1979); Aristide Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics; Ronna Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates.
13

Allan Bloom argues that the fundamental problem of politics lies in determining how the wisdom of the
philosophers may come to influence the gentlemen who have power. In his commentary on the Republic, Bloom
notes that the first very scene of the Republic (327a–328b), in which Polemarchus orders his slave to catch up with
Socrates as he is leaving the Piraeus exemplifies the fundamental political problem: “Power is in the hands of the
gentlemen, who are not philosophers. They can command the services of the many, and their strength is such that
they always hold the philosophers in their grasp. Therefore, it is part of the philosophers’ self-interest to come to
terms with them. The question becomes: to what extent can the philosophers influence the gentlemen?”
“Interpretive Essay” in The Republic of Plato, (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 312.
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practiced alone.14 This interpretation accords nicely with the general consensus that perceives
Socrates as the idealist who doggedly pursues the good and holds Aristotle to be the realist who
moderates his pursuit of the good in order to concern himself with political matters.15
While there is certainly an element of truth to the idealist/realist dichotomy that scholars
have imposed on Socrates and Aristotle, I will argue that their differing evaluations of political
life stem instead from their different conceptions of friendship. While the interpretation of
Aristotle’s Ethics described above provides much purchase, its greatest difficulty is that it
struggles to incorporate much of books VIII and IX into the overall inquiry of the book. These
books, both of which deal with friendship, are largely treated by the standard Straussian
approach as an exhortation preparing the reader for Aristotle’s somewhat startling claim that the
philosophical life is the happiest life.16 In contrast, I will argue that these two books, which
together comprise a fifth of the entirety of the Ethics, entail a direct response to Socrates’ inquiry
into friendship in the Lysis, and are meant to make clear the deficiencies of Socrates’
understanding of friendship, as well as of his approach to politics as described in the Gorgias.

Aristide Tessitore writes, “Aristotle attempts to offer guidance for those who are disposed to an active life of
political involvement … [while] at the same time … point[ing] his most gifted students to … contemplate something
of the radical and more fully satisfying character of the philosophic life.” Reading Aristotle’s Ethics, 20.
14

Leo Strauss seems to suggest as much, when he writes “The only reason why not Socrates but Aristotle became
the founder of political science is that Socrates who spent his life in the unending ascent to the idea of the good and
in awakening others to that ascent, lacked for this reason the leisure not only for political activity but even for
founding political science.” The City and Man, 29. Robert C. Bartlett argues that the “‘best regime’” of Books VII
and VIII of Aristotle’s Politics, the classic of premodern political science, shows Aristotle to be in no sense naïve or
that he knows full well the ways of the world.” “The ‘Realism’ of Classical Political Science” American Journal of
Political Science 38 no. 2 (1994), 382.
15

This position is encapsulated nicely by the following statement from Aristide Tessitore: “Aristotle’s treatment of
friendship in Books VIII and IX … prepares readers for his concluding endorsement of the rare but simply best way
of life available to human beings. His subsequent demotion of the life of moral virtue in light of the superior
happiness afforded by the contemplative pleasures of philosophy is perhaps less strange and less jarring because it is
prefaced with a consideration of friendship.” Reading Aristotle’s Ethics, 95.
16
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As I will make clear, Socrates had a largely negative understanding of friendship, according to
which friendship acts as an impediment to one’s advancement toward what is good. It is this
understanding that causes Socrates to treat philosophy and the pursuit of the good as occurring
outside of the political realm. In contrast, Aristotle had a positive conception of friendship. This
positive view, I will argue, caused Aristotle to present politics in a favorable light and enabled
him to use philosophy as a measure that can order the political realm toward the good.

Friendship, Necessity, and the Polis
It may perhaps, seem odd to explain the differing stances that Socrates and Aristotle take toward
the polis as the result of their differing concepts of friendship. Friendship seems, at first glance,
to be decidedly non-political. Neither Plato nor Aristotle discuss friendship at length in their
most obviously political works.17 Furthermore, contemporary conventional understanding of
friendship seems to suggest that it is more fundamental than politics. Not only are friendships
able to transcend political boundaries (and, in fact, often do), but our understanding of political
relations ordinarily entails concepts of rights and duties that seem to be foreign to our conception
of friendship. Perhaps as a result, friendship seems to be pre-political. This raises the question:
if friendship is pre-political, does it impact politics? The answer, I hope to make clear, is: yes,
the pre-political has a fundamental bearing on politics.

17

Friendship is not treated at length in either Plato’s Republic or the Laws, nor is it treated in Aristotle’s Politics.

8

Both Socrates and Aristotle point out, that it is precisely pre-political relationships—
specifically, relationships developed to fulfill a felt need, or lack—that give rise to the polis.18 In
Book II of the Republic, Socrates relates to Adeimantus that a city “comes into being because
each of us isn’t self-sufficient but is in need of much” (Rep. 369b6–7). What follows is an
analysis of the way in which different parts of the city come together to provide one another with
various necessary goods. Aristotle’s account of the development of the polis appears to be
similar to that of Socrates. The polis seems to emerge from a variety of parts that come together
to counter necessity. The most basic unit of the polis, states Aristotle, is the individual, who
joins with other individuals to form the household. This is done to provide “for the needs of
daily life,” as these individuals “cannot exist without one another.” In turn, several households
come together to form a village, so as to provide for the sake of “non-daily needs.” Finally, the
“complete community, arising from several villages, is the city” (1252a26–30). Thus, Socrates
and Aristotle both suggest that the polis has its origin in the pre-political relationships that are
ordered toward countering necessity.
There is, however, a subtle difference between Socrates’ account of the city’s formation,
and that of Aristotle. While Socrates is quite clear that the city arises from the pre-political
relationships that are ordered toward countering necessity, Aristotle’s account goes beyond this.
Indeed, as Aristotle presents it, both the daily and non-daily necessities are countered at the level
of the household and the village respectively, and the city—the complete community—comes
into being “for the sake of living well” (1252a30). However, Aristotle remains silent about what

18

Cf. Plato, Republic 369b6–7; Aristotle, Politics 1252a25–b13.
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it is that causes the city to be ordered towards this end. As a result, it seems that for Aristotle
there is some force other than a desire to relieve man’s estate that orders the city towards living
well.
I hope to show that the differences between Socrates and Aristotle have their roots in
their disparate understandings of friendship. If the pre-political relationship of friendship has its
basis in a felt need or lack, then Socrates is correct: the entirety of the political community is
founded on pre-political relationships of desire and need. Political communities are, at bottom,
little more than economic associations meant to provide for man’s necessities. Friendship and
political community are, in the end, little more than arrangements of convenience designed to
facilitate mutual, utilitarian advantage; only the desire to overcome the harsh necessities of
nature causes human beings to form communities. However, if individuals are liable to enter
into friendships with one another wholly independent of need, then Aristotle’s account may be
correct. Political communities have their basis in pre-political relationships that are based not on
lack but on an appreciation of another’s virtues or goodness. Political communities are ordered
toward an end that is more noble than mere utilitarian advantage.
It is precisely this difference in understanding of friendship that causes Socrates and
Aristotle to take differing approaches to the political realm. Socrates’ belief that friendship, and
by extension the political realm, has its basis in necessity, causes him to take a negative,
abstentious approach to politics. Placing philosophy in the service of politics would be a
degrading and humiliating exercise that is beneath the dignity of the philosopher. In contrast,
Aristotle’s understanding of friendship and politics as based on self-sufficiency and a recognition
of another’s virtues, allows philosophy to play the crucial function of ennobling politics;
10

philosophy can have a positive guiding impact on politics. For Aristotle, friendship grants
dignity to politics, a dignity that relationships based on necessity alone do not provide. Viewed
in this perspective, the concept of friendship developed in the Ethics not only affects politics but
may be precisely that which prompts Aristotle to offer the practical, political advice contained in
the Politics.
The following four chapters proceed in a comparative manner. In Chapter 1, I detail
Socrates’ understanding of friendship as presented in the Lysis. I make the case that the Lysis
ought to be read as Plato’s subtle critique of Socrates’ conception of friendship. Plato presents
Socrates as using eristic arguments and sophisms, while engaging his youngest interlocutors in
the entirety of the Platonic corpus—Menexenus and Lysis—in a discussion concerning the
definition of friendship. At one point, Plato presents Socrates as adopting a sophistic argument
that is strikingly similar to an argument used by the two sophists, Euthydemus and
Dionysodorus, in the Euthydemus. Plato’s ultimate critique, I argue, is that Socrates collapses
the distinction between friendship and eros, such that friendship and eros are both characterized
by a felt need or desire. According to Socrates, there is no such thing as a friendship based on
self-sufficiency and an appreciation that two people may have of one another’s good qualities. I
show that Plato adopts this presentation of Socrates’ understanding of friendship not only to
intimate that Socrates is incorrect in suggesting that all friendship has its basis in need, but also
to point to the dangers that attend his conception of friendship.
Chapter 2 presents the political implications of Socrates’ conception of friendship by
examining the Apology and the Gorgias. The Apology shows Socrates’ relation to the practice of
politics to be one of negation and abstention. As he attests in his defense speech, Socrates never
11

puts forward a positive teaching, but instead always goes around to the citizens of Athens
questioning their settled convictions and exposing their ignorance. The result, I argue, is an
approach to politics that is entirely negative or dissolvent of people’s opinions. Not only is
Socrates’ approach entirely negative, but it is abstentious as well. In his defense speech,
Socrates claims that he entirely avoids the practice of politics due to its incompatibility with
justice. While Socrates does not explain in his defense speech precisely why he believes the
practice of politics to be incompatible with justice, this connection is made clear in the Gorgias
and, as I make clear, hinges directly on Socrates’ understanding of friendship. At a critical
juncture of the dialogue, Socrates directs his interlocutor, Callicles, away from the practice of
politics precisely on the basis of a definition of friendship that had been proposed—but found
wanting—in the Lysis. I show that for Socrates the conventional practice of politics depends on
a false conception of justice and friendship.
The third chapter analyzes Aristotle’s discussion of friendship in Book VIII of the Ethics
in light of his understanding of the virtue of magnanimity. I argue that Aristotle’s friendship of
the good is ultimately intended to describe the friendship between two magnanimous individuals.
Turning first to Aristotle’s presentation of magnanimity in the Posterior Analytics, in which
Aristotle suggests that there may be two types of magnanimity—one that is political and another
that is philosophical—I show that Aristotle views the virtue of magnanimity to be problematic.
The two types of individuals who are held up as being potentially magnanimous are presented as
being self-sufficient and aware of the honor and respect they deserve. Nevertheless, when they
fail to attain the honors they rightly deserve, they tend to act in a socially destructive manner. I
go on to argue that Aristotle’s presentation of magnanimity in the Ethics is intended to suggest
12

that the cure for the socially destructive tendencies of such magnanimous individuals is
friendship. If the magnanimous philosopher were to befriend the magnanimous politician, they
would not only temper one another’s socially destructive tendencies, but their alliance—the
alliance of power and wisdom—would be capable of bestowing great benefits on the political
realm.
While Chapter 3 shows that Aristotle’s friendship of the good is intended to describe
friendship between two magnanimous individuals, Chapter 4 explains why it is that such
individuals will choose to befriend one another. Aristotle recognizes that philosophers are not
likely to become friends with individuals who hold positions of power, as those in power may
well have had to engage in nefarious tactics to attain their position and therefore cannot be
described as virtuous or good. Nevertheless, in Book IX Aristotle uses a protreptic address to
convince the philosopher to engage with the statesman. As I make clear, Aristotle induces the
philosopher to interact with and to activate the statesman’s potential for virtue. In this way,
Aristotle ensures that philosophy will have an indirect, guiding effect on the practice of politics.
In the conclusion, I examine the extent to which the distinct understandings of friendship
developed by Socrates and Aristotle can be of use in our own practice of politics. I hope to show
that Aristotle’s conception of friendship can provide a solid foundation for politics that endows it
with a certain level of dignity. Nevertheless, I emphasize that neither Socrates nor Aristotle
believe that friendship can provide people with the completion that they may desire. While
Aristotle differs from Socrates in recognizing friendship as a positive good that is not based on a
metaphysical lack or need, he emphasizes that the pleasures associated with friendship can
distract us from the practice of our most complete, or most divine, activity—the activity of
13

contemplation. Last, I examine some of the practical consequences of Aristotle’s understanding
of friendship and magnanimity. What role ought the virtue of magnanimity play in the practice
of modern politics? Are magnanimity and the friendship associated with it antithetical to modern
liberal democracy’s commitment to egalitarianism and the rule of law? I argue that Aristotle’s
analysis of magnanimity and friendship remains not only relevant, but crucial, to the practice of
politics today.

14

CHAPTER ONE. SOCRATIC FRIENDSHIP AND MAN’S
DESIRE FOR THE GOOD: LYSIS

In his Second Letter, Plato informs us that his writings present a Socrates “become young and
beautiful” (Letters 2.314c). If this is the case, Plato’s writings present at least some difficulty in
distinguishing the true “historical” Socrates from the Socrates made young and beautiful. This
difficulty is only heightened by Socrates’ well-known self-deprecation and irony. Thus, not only
do we receive a portrait of Socrates that is potentially highly idealized, but we are further
hampered in our efforts to attain a portrait of the “real” Socrates due to his dissembling
dialectics. However, Plato chooses to write four dialogues in narrative form (The Republic,
Lysis, The Lovers, and Charmides), in which Socrates himself conveys not only the
conversations in which he engages, but his activities and reflections as well. As a result, although
these dialogues may not obviate the problem of distinguishing the “historical” Socrates from the
Socrates made young and beautiful, they may enable us to distinguish more clearly Socrates’
dialectical arguments from his true intentions.1 Thus, these dialogues provide us with a window

The distinction between Socrates’ outward statements (dialectical or otherwise) and his intentions is made most
clear toward the end of the Lysis. After recounting the various arguments raised throughout the dialogue, Socrates
comments, “If nothing among these is a friend, I no longer know what to say” (222e9). However, immediately after
this, he suggests to the reader, “But as I said these things, I already had in mind to set in motion someone else
among the older fellows” (223a1). While Socrates expresses dismay, it seems that he is not as much at a loss, as he
lets on to his interlocutors. On the importance of the narrated dialogues see, Catherine Zuckert, Plato’s
Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 19; Leo Strauss,
On Plato’s “Symposium,” ed. and with a foreword by Seth Benardete (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2001),
186.
1
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into Socrates’ character in a way that most other dialogues do not, granting us a particularly clear
picture of who Plato believed Socrates to be.
Despite the fact that the Lysis has been called the Platonic dialogue on friendship, what it
teaches about friendship has been highly contested. Some scholars have argued that it is simply
aporetic and contains no positive teaching. Pointing to Socrates’ last line of the dialogue, in
which he concludes, “What he who is a friend is we have not yet been able to discover” (Lys.
223b9–10),2 these scholars maintain that the Lysis is one of Plato’s earlier dialogues and presents
a failed attempt at defining friendship.3 Others maintain that amidst the false starts and
inconclusive arguments, the Lysis does present a coherent account of friendship or, at the very
least, points toward what a friend is.4 Still others, such as David Bolotin, have pointed toward
the inconclusive ending of the dialogue in order to show that it contains a teaching pertaining to
man’s metaphysical neediness. According to this argument, Plato holds that all friendship and
desire have their roots in man’s need for completion.5

All citations to the Lysis are taken from David Bolotin’s interpretation unless otherwise noted. Plato’s Dialogue on
Friendship: An Interpretation of the Lysis with a New Translation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979).
2

W. R. M. Lamb in the introduction to his translation of the Lysis notes that “Socrates is content to lead his young
friend into a maze of analogical reasoning, from which neither of them can find any certain egress.” Plato III, Loeb
Classics (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1975), 3. Similarly, George Grote, notes: “To multiply defective
explanations, and to indicate why each is defective, is the whole business of the dialogue.” Plato, and the Other
Companions of Sokrates, vol. II (London: John Murray, 1867), 186.
3

Lorraine Smith Pangle comments: “Plato may provide the reader with the outlines of compelling arguments that,
though facilely rejected, are not refuted” Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship, 21. James M. Rhodes points to
the subtitle of the dialogue, “On Philia: Obstetric,” and concludes that “Socrates is practicing the midwife’s art.
Socrates will not give us a propositional ‘theory of philia.’ Rather, the ‘pregnant’ characters in the play and we
ourselves need to be delivered of the virtue of friendly love” (“Platonic Philia and Political Order” in Friendship
and Politics, ed. by John von Heyking and Richard Avramenko [University of Notre Dame Press, 2008], 25–26).
4

Bolotin, Plato’s Dialogue on Friendship. In my analysis of the dialogue, I am deeply indebted to Bolotin’s superb
interpretation of the dialogue. However, I seek to further Bolotin’s analysis by pointing to some of the deficiencies
in Socrates’ arguments, which suggest that Plato may have been subtly critiquing Socrates.
5
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What is it about this dialogue that lends itself to such different, even contradictory,
interpretations? Part of the reason is that at least some of the arguments raised and eventually
refuted by Socrates, are neither fully fleshed out nor conclusively refuted. In fact, one of the
possible definitions of friendship that Socrates raises is hardly even explored. As a result of the
dialogue’s elementary and, at times, even specious arguments, some scholars in the nineteenth
century went so far as to label it spurious, contending that Plato could not have written
something containing so many eristic arguments.6 Today, the authenticity of the Lysis is no
longer disputed but is by and large agreed to be a genuine work.7 However, the difficulty posed
by the sophistic arguments remains: Why would Plato present Socrates as failing to properly
refute arguments and engaging in sophistic arguments, all while speaking to what are likely the
youngest interlocutors in the entire Platonic corpus?
Diogenes Laertius relates that “on hearing Plato read the Lysis, Socrates exclaimed, ‘By
Heracles, what a number of lies this young man is telling about me!’”8 To assume that
Diogenes’ recounting of Socrates’ reaction to the dialogue is accurate would not prove Plato’s
depiction of Socrates to be erroneous. However, assuming its truth would point to a difference of
opinion between Plato and Socrates on the topic of friendship. It is my contention that Plato
intends for the dialogue to elucidate the disagreement between himself and Socrates on the topic
of friendship. To this end, Plato writes the dialogue in such a way that it both points toward a

Cf. Friedrich Ast, Platon’s Leben und Schriften (Leipzig: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1816) 428–34; Joseph
Socher, Uber Platons Schriften (Munich: Ignaz Joseph Lentner, 1820), 137–44.
6

7

Cf. Robert G. Hoerber, “Plato’s Lysis,” Phronesis 4 no. 1 (1959): 15.

8

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, ed. by James Miller and trans. by Pamela Mensch (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2018) Bk. III, 35.
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more complete understanding of friendship, while also revealing a deficiency in Socrates’
understanding of friendship. Specifically, Plato shows that in his haste to direct the young
toward a life of contemplation, Socrates fails to give the concept of friendship the proper regard
it deserves; a failure that has extremely negative political consequences. As a result, I contend
that Plato presents Socrates as raising serious arguments, but as rejecting them in a facile,
sophistic manner.
In what follows, I will first turn to the prologue of the Lysis to show the way in which it
provides the key to uncovering Plato’s intentions. Next, I will catalogue Socrates’ use of eristic
and sophistic arguments throughout the dialogue, suggesting that Plato intends to point to
deficiencies in Socrates’ understanding of friendship. Specifically, I will argue that Plato
suggests Socrates is too quick to conclude that all friendship has its basis in need in the same
way as erotic love. In addition, I will show that through this process, Plato leaves enough of a
trail from which one can develop a fully coherent understanding of friendship.9 I will close with
some remarks concerning the implications that this dialogue has for Socrates’ approach to
politics in general.

The Introduction: Panops, Hermes, and a Sleight of Hand
The Lysis begins by introducing the reader to characters and details that seem superfluous to
what appears to be the dialogue’s main inquiry: what is friendship? Socrates relates, “I was on
my way from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, along the road outside the wall” (203a1–2).

9

It is precisely this trail that Aristotle picks up on in Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics.
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Both the Academy and the Lyceum are located outside of the walls of the city; the Academy to
the north, and the Lyceum to the south-east. Socrates is therefore taking the circuitous route
outside and around the city rather than choosing to go directly through the city itself. While we
are not told why Socrates makes this choice, we are told that the road he was walking along was
“outside the wall and close under the wall itself,” and it is here that he chances upon
Hippothales, Ctesippus, and some other youths outside the palaestra near the spring of Panops
(203a 2–7).10 Panops, whose full name is Argus Panoptes, was the name of a local deity, whose
name means all-seeing. According to Greek mythology, Panops was famous for his watchful
gaze. Thus, the dialogue takes place near the edge of the city under watchful eyes.
Hippothales tries to induce Socrates to come inside the palaestra and talk with them.
Plato seems purposefully to direct our attention to the location in which the conversation about
friendship will take place, describing it as “a kind of enclosure set against the wall” and
informing us that it was “built recently” (203b7–204a3). A palaestra is a place of instruction in
both wrestling and other matters. Thus, the setting of the dialogue on friendship is a place of
instruction—together the disputants will wrestle with one another, in an attempt to come to a
conclusion as to who or what a friend is.11 The fact that Socrates needs to enter the palaestra to
engage in the discussion concerning friendship may suggest that he himself is in need of
instruction. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that Hippothales informs Socrates that the
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The entirety of this dialogue, in which Socrates fails to find a definition of friendship, occurs at the very edge of
the city. This fact may be suggestive of Socrates’ relation to the city and to politics in general. In contrast, the
Phaedrus—a dialogue concerning eros—occurs well-outside the city.
On the connection between wrestling and philosophy, see Clinton DeBevoise Corcoran, “Wrestling and the Fair
Fight in Plato,” in Topography and Deep Structure in Plato: The Construction of Place in the Dialogues (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2016), 119–151.
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teacher at the palaestra is Socrates’ “companion” “and praiser—Miccus” (204a7). Socrates
responds with an oath and relates that “the man is not an inferior one, but a capable sophist”
(204a8–9). That the dialogue on friendship occurs in a place of instruction under the guidance of
an instructor suggests that Socrates is not in an unambiguous position of superiority in this
dialogue. Of course, Miccus does not instruct the participants of the conversation, but the fact
that he is mentioned in the prologue and is recognized by Socrates as “a capable sophist” may
suggest that Socrates’ understanding is in some way deficient.12
Hippothales suggests that Socrates pass time with the group. He proposes that the group
might share their speeches with him and that, together, they could observe the “good-looking”
boys. Hippothales thus sets up the invitation as one in which all will share in the good things
equally. Hippothales’ invitation tells us that he has a relatively sanguine view of friendship.
Indeed, the idea that they might share their speeches with Socrates brings to mind the adage that
will come to impact the conversation later: “Friends have all things in common” (cf. 207c9–11).
In contrast, Socrates’ response indicates the opposite. While interested, he replies that he would
prefer first to hear “what terms [he is] to enter on and who the good-looking one is” (204b1–2).
Socrates’ wariness of friendship is on display already at the beginning of the dialogue. He will
not accept Hippothales’ friendly invitation without knowing “the terms” he is to enter on;
Socrates suspects that friendships involve a quid pro quo and are not something simply
gratuitous or given solely for the sake of the other.

Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe, commenting on the passage in question, note that while the term ‘sophist’ is
ordinarily used in a derogatory sense, here “the term seems to be used in a purely descriptive way; and that … is the
point: Miccus professes, and teaches, wisdom, and wisdom or knowledge will be one of the chief themes of the main
part of the dialogue” (Plato’s Lysis [Cambridge University Press, 2005], 4n2).
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While Socrates’ skepticism may be disconcerting, Plato points out that it is not—at least
in this case—completely unwarranted, as it soon becomes clear that Hippothales likely does have
an ulterior motive in inviting Socrates to join the group. Hippothales is quickly revealed to be
“in love” (ἔρωτος) with one of the good-looking ones. Indeed, when Socrates pushes him to
reveal who he believes the good-looking one to be, Hippothales blushes, apparently out of
modesty or bashfulness. Socrates then tells Hippothales that he can see that Hippothales is not
only in love, but that he is “far along the way in love already” (204b8–9). Thus, the dialogue on
friendship begins with a young man who is in love. In fact, the term “love” (ἔρως) enters into the
discussion prior to the term “friend” (φίλος). Thus, the structure of the dialogue seems implicitly
to attest that for Socrates love takes primacy over friendship. Socrates continues, making note of
his knowledge of erotic matters: “I am inferior and useless in other things, but this has somehow
been given to me from a god—to be able quickly to recognize both a lover and a beloved”
(204b9–c2). Socrates refers to his divine gift and suggests that his knowledge of erotic matters is
his only area of expertise. Later on, Socrates will tell us that he has no knowledge of what a
friend is. Given Socrates’ distinction between friendship and erotic love, we may wonder
whether Socrates is useless when it comes to friendship, or whether perhaps his sole fixation on
erotic love causes him to run roughshod over the concept of friendship.
Socrates points out that his capacity to recognize lover and beloved is a useful one. In
response, Hippothales blushes “still much more” (204c3). This time however, it is not clear that
he blushes from bashfulness alone; perhaps Hippothales blushes from the shame of having his
friendly invitation to Socrates uncovered as having an ulterior motive; enlisting his help in
discerning whether his beloved is endeared toward him.
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In any case, Ctessipus breaks in, noting that all this false modesty is a little much coming
from a man who is so in love with the young boy, Lysis, that he constantly sings his praises,
much to the annoyance of his friends. Ctessipus goes on to detail how Hippothales sings songs
of praise about Lysis that include songs regarding Lysis’ family’s past exploits, and his family’s
mythical connection to the gods. When Socrates hears this, he rebukes Hippothales strongly
declaring his actions to be “ridiculous.” He notes, “Whoever is wise in love-matters … does not
praise his beloved before he catches him” (206a2–3), for in doing so, the lover simply fills the
beloved with “proud thoughts and bragging,” making the beloved “harder to capture” (206a4–5).
After this, Hippothales finally fesses up to his ulterior motives in conversing with Socrates,
noting, “It’s because of these things, Socrates, that I’m consulting with you. And if you have
anything else, give your advice as to what to say in conversation or what to do so that someone
might become endeared to his favorite” (206c1–4). Socrates agrees to make a “display” of what
it is Hippothales needs to say to Lysis to ensure his love is requited, and the group begins to
design a scheme whereby they may induce Lysis into conversation.
It is at this point that we are informed that the dialogue on friendship is taking place
during the Hermaea, a festival in honor of the god Hermes. Hermes was not only the patron of
the palaestra, but he was also known as the god of tricks who would commit thefts and other
shameful acts, the god who transgressed boundaries, and the god who would outwit other gods in
order to help human beings.13 In fact, it is precisely this penchant for crossing boundaries that
allows Socrates and the other older youths to associate with Lysis. As part of their scheming,
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Hippothales notes that “since they’re observing the Hermaea, the youths and the boys are
mingled in the same place” (207d1–3). The rules, or boundaries, surrounding appropriate
relations are relaxed during the Hermaea, allowing the older youth to associate with the younger
boys.14 Thus, the setting for the dialogue has been carefully constructed: the very dialogue in
which Plato is scrutinizing Socrates’ understanding of friendship occurs during a festival in
honor of a deity who deceives other deities in order to help humans transgress their limits.
That the dialogue occurs during the Hermaea is significant not only because of Hermes’
status as the god who helps human beings transgress their limits, but also due to Hermes’ relation
with Panops. As will be recalled, at the very beginning of the dialogue, Socrates relates that he
was stopped near the “spring of Panops.” The references to Panops and Hermes—the only
references to deities (aside from oaths) in the entire dialogue—is not accidental. As it turns out,
the two deities both figure prominently in the Greek myth of Io. To appreciate the full
significance of these mythical allusions to the dialogue, it will be useful briefly to recap the myth
of Io. According to Greek mythology, Zeus had attempted to seduce Io, the beautiful daughter of
the river god. When she resisted his charms, Zeus covered the earth with a dark cloud, grabbed
Io, and raped her. Seeing the cloud and suspecting that her husband was being unfaithful, Hera
hurried to earth to investigate. Upon her approach, Zeus transformed Io into a white heifer to
cover up his infidelity. However, Hera sensed that Zeus was being unfaithful and asked to be
given the cow as a gift. Hera then gave Argus Panoptes (Panops)—a deity whose one hundred
eyes never all slept at the same time—the task of guarding Io, to ensure that she did not

Catherine Zuckert notes that Socrates’ entry into the palaestra is itself a transgression of boundaries, as only the
older youth were allowed to mingle with the boys, not adults such as Socrates. Plato’s Philosophers, 513.
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transform from a cow back into a deity. After some time, Zeus took pity on Io and sent Hermes
to rescue her. To do so, Hermes tricked Argus Panoptes by telling him incredibly long tales until
he fell asleep, at which point he cut off Panoptes’ head, setting Io free.15
Why would Plato allude to this story—a story recounting the primordial crime of the first
murder among the gods—in the dialogue concerning friendship? As the remainder of the
dialogue indicates, Socrates effects a similar transformation. Through the use of sophistic
arguments, Socrates manages to transform friendship into love under the watchful eyes of Plato.

A False Start
When the group enters the palaestra, Socrates relates that the boys are all dressed up, playing
knucklebones, a game of chance. The fact that these boys are all dressed up and seem to take
their game of chance quite seriously may indicate that friendship in general, or at least nonintentional friendship, is taken much too seriously. The scene also reinforces the fact that the
boys in the palaestra are quite young. The boys’ young age makes Socrates’ subsequent
conversation with them all the more scandalous. Indeed, in what follows, he engages in a
conversation with the boys that can be broken up into three parts: First, he speaks with both
Lysis and his friend Menexenus as to the nature and purpose of their friendship. Next, he speaks
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with Lysis alone, questioning the love Lysis’ parents have for him. Last, he again speaks with
both Lysis and Menexenus as to who or what a friend is. In the course of the latter two portions
of the conversation, however, Socrates makes use of a variety of questionable claims and eristic
arguments. These claims and arguments are being used to question not only the young boys’
relationship with one another, but also their other relationships, such as those they have with
their parents and with the city itself. Socrates seems to be using sophisms and eristic arguments
to undermine the children’s existing attachments. Based on the depiction of Socrates in this
dialogue, one gets the sense that the charge of corruption of the youth in the Apology may not
have been unwarranted.
The conversation begins with a false start. Once Lysis and Menexenus have come over to
join the conversation—a mini-drama itself, which requires the more forthright Menexenus to join
the group first before his more bashful friend Lysis summons the courage to join them—Socrates
begins by asking them which one of them is older. Thus, rather than beginning the inquiry into
friendship with a “what is” question, as Socrates is prone to do in other dialogues, he begins by
exposing a quality of friendship.16 Indeed, the question posed is seemingly designed to uncover
a source of conflict between the two young boys, who are of roughly the same age. Menexenus
confirms this, stating, “We dispute about that” (207b13). Socrates’ question suggests that he
seems already to have some idea of what friendship is. Socrates continues to ask questions that

David B. Robinson notes that the Lysis “is one of five short Platonic dialogues which address themselves entirely
to a question of definition. Besides the Lysis these dialogues are the Charmides, Laches, Hippias Major, and
Euthyphro; all of these ask a question of the type ‘What is x?’ and make this question their sole concern” (“Plato’s
Lysis: The Structural Problem,” Illinois Classical Studies 11 no. 1/2 [1986]: 63). While I agree with Robinson that
the dialogue does seek a definition of friendship, I am of the opinion that the dramatic activity surrounding the
question suggests that the purpose of the dialogue is not simply to define what friendship is.
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bring out the competitive nature of their friendship, including who is more noble (γενναιότερος)
and who more beautiful (καλλίων). Last, he asks them about their wealth. Citing the wellknown adage, he states, “Well the things of friends are said to be in common, so you [two] won’t
differ in … respect [to wealth], if indeed you [two] are speaking the truth about your friendship”
(207c9–11). Both Lysis and Menexenus agree. Doubt has already been raised implicitly earlier
on in the dialogue as to whether friends have all things in common, and it seems that Socrates is
pursuing this line of inquiry. As friends who are similar to one another in age and nobility, Lysis
and Menexenus naturally compete with one another, and while it is certainly possible for them
also to compete about who is more wealthy, the boys seem to be sufficiently well-born to
recognize that competition in such matters is unseemly. Thus, Socrates’ probing questions have
uncovered that at the heart of their friendship lies a desire in each of them to strive after what is
good for themselves. Socrates is about to pursue further the inquiry into whether all things are
held in common by asking them “which one was juster and wiser,” but is interrupted when
Menexenus is called away (207d1–4).
The question of which of the two boys is juster and wiser, which Socrates was about to
ask, is a potentially fruitful avenue of inquiry for who or what a friend is. Indeed, are justice and
wisdom, like age and nobility, things about which friends compete? Socrates sought to frame the
question in a compound manner—“I was attempting to question them as to which one was juster
and wiser” (207d1–4)—thereby giving the boys the option to agree that while the one is more
just, the other is wiser. In this way, justice and wisdom would not be like the other things about
which friends compete. Indeed, the two would not simply strive against one another in a bid to
outdo each other, as they do when they argue about who is older, or more noble, but would
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instead recognize each other’s strengths. Perhaps, their differing strengths could even be
recognized as complementary.17 The complementarity of Lysis and Menexenus is intimated at
various points of the dialogue. Recall, for example, that the bashful Lysis would not join the
group until the more forthright Menexenus had joined (207a3–b5). Similarly, later in the
conversation, after Lysis volunteers to take over for Menexenus after Socrates perplexes him,
Socrates notes, “Since I wished to give Menexenus a rest and was also pleased by [Lysis’] love
of wisdom [φιλοσοφία], I turned to Lysis and began to make my arguments to him” (213d8–e1).
Plato draws our attention to the fact that the brash Menexenus and the bashful but wise Lysis
have complementary strengths. However, Socrates is frustrated in his attempt to ask which one
is “juster and wiser,” as Menexenus is called away “to supervise the sacred rites” as part of the
Hermaea (207d–4). Hermes, the god of tricks and transgression of boundaries, requires a
sacrificial victim before the inquiry into what friendship is can continue.

Socratic Sophisms and a Sacrificial Victim
At this point, the conversation takes a sharp turn. From the conversation that follows, it seems
that the sacrificial victim that Hermes requires if he is to help man transgress his boundaries and
have a share of the divine lot, is Lysis’ friendships. Indeed, rather than an inquiry designed to
discover the complementarity of Lysis and Menexenus, Socrates’ line of questioning makes
Lysis begin to question all of his existing friendships. In stark contrast to Hippothales’ love
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opinion, concerning what a friend is.”
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songs, which speak of the exploits of Lysis’ family, Socrates immediately sets Lysis against his
family. First, by means of a faulty argument, Socrates intimates that Lysis’ parents do not love
him. He begins by asking Lysis whether his parents love him, and whether they want him to be
happy. Lysis predictably answers that of course his parents love him and want him to be happy.
Next, Socrates asks him, whether it would be possible to be happy if one were a slave, “and if it
were not possible for him to do anything he desired” (207e1–3). When Lysis answers no,
Socrates, asks whether his parents, therefore, allow him to do whatever he desires, since he avers
that they want him to be happy. Of course, Lysis relates that they do prevent him from doing a
great number of things. Socrates drives the point home by purposefully asking Lysis about
various activities that he knows his parents will not allow him to do, such as riding his father’s
chariots in a competition, driving the mules, or even ruling over himself. Socrates further elicits
from Lysis that his parents trust hirelings or slaves with these tasks, while they prevent Lysis
himself from undertaking them. It seems that Socrates’ point in pursuing this line of questions is
to suggest to Lysis that his parents do not love him and seek to prevent him from doing what he
desires. Socrates seems purposefully to be driving Lysis to resent his parents on the grounds that
they don’t love him.
However, this line of questioning, as well as the implied conclusion are obviously false.
It is not true that if Lysis’ parents desire him to be happy, they would allow him to do whatever
he wants. Following one’s desires, whatever they happen to be, does not lead to happiness. This
is made eminently clear in the Republic, where Socrates depicts the tyrannical soul as a
destructively desirous soul that acts against its own wishes by following its every desire (Rep.
579a–c). Lysis likely does not recognize what is at stake philosophically in Socrates’ line of
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argumentation, and instead asserts in conformity with what is conventionally appropriate, that his
parents prevent him from engaging in various activities because he is not yet old enough for
these tasks. Socrates, however, skillfully directs Lysis away from the topic of age and leads him
to recognize that it is because of his lack of understanding that his parents prevent him from
racing chariots and driving the mule team. Whereas they grant him autonomy in such things as
reading, writing, playing the lyre, and other activities of which he has an understanding, they
deny him autonomy in other activities, in which he lacks understanding.
Socrates continues, using Lysis’ recognition that his parents prevent him from engaging
in various activities to suggest that as soon as his father recognizes that Lysis is not only capable,
but superior to his father in the things he is currently prevented from doing, then his father will
trust Lysis to manage both his father and his father’s estate. At this point, Socrates begins to
straightforwardly appeal to Lysis’ ambition and desires. Not only will his father entrust his
estate to him, but his neighbor will do so as well, once he believes Lysis’ household management
skills to be better than his own. In fact, once Lysis has the requisite skill and knowledge, the
Athenians will hand over the keys of the city to him—the only thing preventing Lysis from
ruling in the city is that he does not yet have the knowledge. Socrates concludes:
With regard to the things in which we become prudent, everyone—
Greeks as well as barbarians, and both men and women—will entrust
them to us…. But with regard to those things in which we don’t acquire
good sense, no one will entrust [them to us] … but everyone will obstruct
us as much as is in his power—not merely aliens, but even our father and
mother and whatever may be more closely or akin to us than they are.
(210a9- c3).
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Good sense, Socrates argues, is all that is required for one to rule over all. Of course, Socrates’
argumentation fails to acknowledge the possibility that others may not recognize Lysis’ good
sense. Good sense alone is not enough to obtain power. However, what is most striking is
Socrates’ statement that to the extent we do not have good sense, “everyone will obstruct us as
much as is in his power.” One could charitably interpret Socrates’ overall intention in this part
of the dialogue to be an attempt to make Lysis recognize his own deficiency and thereby spur
him toward self-improvement and the acquisition of “good sense.” However, this particular line
of the argument seems to cast doubt on this interpretation, as it introduces an antagonistic
element to all of Lysis’ relationships that would seem to be unnecessary if Socrates’ sole
intention was to cause Lysis to recognize his deficiency. The implication is that no one loves
another for his own sake, but only in so far as he has good sense and will be beneficial.
Thus far, Socrates has appealed to Lysis’ competitive and ambitious nature to cause him
radically to question his existing relationships and to view them all in terms of utility and need.
However, after having fed Lysis’ vanity and ambition, Socrates cuts him down to size. He
relates, “Now, therefore, not even your father loves you, nor does anyone else love anyone else
insofar as he is useless” (210c8–9). Friendship, Socrates argues, depends upon wisdom. If Lysis
becomes wise, he will be useful and good, but if he fails to do so “no one else will be your
friend, and neither will your father, nor your mother, nor your own kinsmen” (210d2–4). It is
important to note that according to Socrates, not only will his father and his mother not love him,
but his entire political community will disown him. While the main point is to humble Lysis, we
can see here that Socrates’ understanding of friendship is somewhat problematic, as political
friendships are equated with the love parents have for their children, with no distinction.
30

At this point in the conversation, Lysis has been shown to have knowledge in some areas
(reading, writing, and playing the lyre), and lacking knowledge in others (chariot racing and
mule driving). However, Socrates drives home Lysis’ lack of wisdom by means of another
fallacious argument, which ends with the conclusion that Lysis does not have any knowledge.
He asks Lysis, “Is it possible … for someone to think big, in regard to those matters in which
he’s not yet thinking?” (210d4 – 5). Lysis responds that it would be impossible. Socrates
follows up by stating (not asking), “And if you require a teacher, you’re not yet thoughtful”
(210d6–7). When Lysis concurs, Socrates concludes that “your thoughts are not [too] big, if
indeed you’re still thoughtless” (210d7–8).
In making this argument, Socrates is engaging in a deliberate sophism, in the same way
and regarding the same topic as the sophists did in the Euthydemus. It will be helpful to relate
the scene from the Euthydemus to emphasize the similarity between the way Socrates proceeds
and the way the sophists do. In the Euthydemus, two sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus,
heckle a young boy named Cleinias with eristic arguments, designed to tangle him up in knots,
by equivocating on the term “to learn.” Euthydemus asks Cleinias whether those who learn are
the wise or the ignorant. No matter which way Cleinias answers, the two sophists are able to
refute him. When Cleinias first answers that the wise learn, the sophists point to the fact that
those students who learn from their teachers are “unlearned” at the time of their learning.
However, when Cleinias agrees that the ignorant are the ones who learn, the sophists
immediately point out that when the teacher dictates things, it is the wise boys, rather than the
unlearned boys, who learn the dictation. Thus, no matter what Cleinias answers, the sophists are
able to refute him. After this display of sophistry, Socrates consoles Cleinias:
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Our two visitors are pointing out this very thing, that you did not realize
that people use the word “learn” not only in the situation in which a
person who has no knowledge of a thing in the beginning acquires it
later, but also when he who has this knowledge already uses it to inspect
the same thing…. Now this, as they are pointing out, had escaped your
notice—that the same word is applied to opposite sorts of men, to both
the man who knows and the man who does not…. These things are the
frivolous part of study … and I call these things “frivolity” because even
if a man were to learn many or even all such things, he would be none the
wiser as to how matters stand (277e4–278b5).

By equivocating on the term “to learn,” the sophists have refuted Cleinias. It is precisely this
same tactic that Socrates uses against Lysis. The statement, “if you require a teacher, you’re not
yet thoughtful,” can be both true and false depending on what the term “thoughtful” (φρονεῖν)
means. The ambiguity of the term renders Socrates’ question sophistic, as it can mean both “to
understand” and “to think.” Indeed, if thoughtful means “to understand,” then it would be
correct to state that the fact that Lysis needs a teacher means he does not yet “understand.”
However, if thoughtful simply means “to think,” then the syllogism would be incorrect. It is not
true that simply because Lysis needs a teacher, he does not yet “think.” Αs Benjamin Rider
points out, “A student spends a lot of time thinking about his subject; he just thinks deficiently
and needs a teacher to help him understand it.”18 Socrates equivocates on the term φρονεῖν in a
manner that is strikingly similar to the way the sophists equivocate on the term “to learn.”
After this sophism, the demonstration is finished. Socrates has made Lysis recognize that
he is not wise. In addition, he has caused him to question his existing relationships—primarily,
but not exclusively, his relationship with his parents. At this point, Socrates looks over at
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Hippothales and nearly blurts out, “This, Hippothales, is how one needs to converse with his
favorite, by humbling him and drawing in his sails instead of puffing him up and spoiling him, as
you do” (210e3–6). Hippothales’ gratification of Lysis through constant songs of praise only has
the effect of spoiling him and leads to vanity. To “catch” one’s beloved, Socrates shows, it is
necessary to shake him from his complacency and show him that he is not, in fact, self-sufficient.
Why does Plato present Socrates as using sophistic arguments to make his point?
According to James Rhodes, Socrates is not being serious either when he questions whether the
boy’s parents love him or when he suggests that all friendships stem from the utility they obtain.
Rhodes argues that, instead, these arguments are simply a dialectic ploy meant to “bamboozle”
Lysis and are part of a larger attempt to correct a moral failing on the part of Lysis. He writes,
“when we mean to take the wind out of a person’s sails, we need not resolve that every word we
utter be true. It suffices to contrive that our speech, true or false, will deflate our victim.”19
Thus, according to Rhodes, Socrates uses sophistic arguments simply to cut Lysis down to size
and cause him to recognize that utility cannot be the basis of friendship.20 While this is possible,
it seems to me to be only a partial answer, as it fails to account for why sophistic arguments are
necessary for this purpose. Presumably, Socrates would be capable of constructing non-sophistic
arguments that have the effect of belittling Lysis. Furthermore, it fails to account for the striking
similarity between Socrates’ approach and the approach adopted by the sophists in the
Euthydemus; Plato goes out of his way to a draw a parallel between these two dialogues.
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To avoid this problem, Benjamin Rider argues that Socrates makes use of sophistic
arguments in an effort to draw Lysis into the philosophic life. Focusing on Lysis’ competitive
character, Rider argues that Socrates uses Lysis’ penchant for eristic games by raising
“interesting and worthy problems,” so as to encourage him to apply his “skills in competitive
argument to doing real philosophy.”21 While this may seem to be a plausible interpretation, one
of the difficulties with it—one with which Rider does not contend—is that it is not clear that
Lysis is ever led to pursue “real philosophy” or the life of contemplation.22 If Lysis has not been
led to pursue the life of contemplation, but has instead simply been led to question his existing
relationships, Socrates may be acting in a reckless fashion; a recklessness that the end of the
dialogue intimates.23
The recklessness of Socrates’ activity is revealed more immediately when Menexenus
rejoins the conversation. Upon his return, Lysis turns to Socrates and whispers to him, asking
him to repeat the conversation to Menexenus. Presumably Lysis desires Menexenus to go
through the same humiliating experience he has just undergone. Socrates counsels Lysis to tell
Menexenus himself, instructing him to remember everything clearly: “Try, then … to remember
it as well as possible, so you can tell him everything clearly. And if you forget any of it, ask me
again, when you first happen to come across me” (211a10–3). Curiously, this type of
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Right near the end of the dialogue (223a2–a7), Socrates narrates that the boys’ attendants came “like some
daemons” and “bade them to leave for home.” Socrates relates that he and the boys had an altercation with the
attendants and “tried to drive them away.” Socrates’ conversation has led the boys to chafe under the authority set
over them by their parents.
23

34

regurgitative teaching is not in keeping with Socrates’ ordinary style, which is to consider the
character and soul-type of his interlocutor.24 Might Plato be suggesting that Socrates is too quick
to disabuse the young of their existing conceptions of friendship? In any case, the fact that
Socrates’ conversation with Lysis has had an effect on him becomes clear when Lysis reveals
that his overriding concern is for Socrates to “chasten” Menexenus. As Bolotin notes, “In order
to overcome his own humiliation, he arranges by stealth to have the returning Menexenus
chastened, and not just ridiculed, in his presence. This is no mere continuation of their friendly
rivalry. Lysis’ action, while playful and harmless enough, contains the seeds of betrayal.”25 It
seems that Socrates’ earlier conversation has, in fact, caused Lysis to turn on his friend.26

What Is Friendship?
Socrates agrees to Lysis’ demand that he converse with Menexenus and initiates the conversation
by delivering a long speech about his desire to have a friend. He congratulates the boys on their
friendship, noting, “I am so far from the possession that I don’t even know the manner in which
one becomes a friend of another” (212a3–4). Socrates’ disclamation of any knowledge regarding
friendship sits in stark contrast with his claim to have a divine dispensation concerning erotic
matters. At this point, friendship and erotic love seem still to be clearly distinguished, although
24
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Bolotin defends Socrates from this charge, noting that Lysis’ desire to chasten Menexenus reveals that their
“juvenile friendship was not innocent. We may assume that the shortcomings of their friendship would have come
to light eventually with or without the intervention of Socrates” (Bolotin, 106–7). It’s not clear to me that this
provides an adequate defense for Socrates’ behavior, as it underplays the extent to which Socrates’ earlier
conversation with Lysis prompted Lysis’ desire to chasten Menexenus. Furthermore, Socrates encourages, or
stokes, Lysis’ desire for punishment by pointing to Menexenus’ “contentious” character (211c3–5).
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Socrates’ disquisition concerning his desire to have a friend may perhaps foreshadow Socrates’
conflation of the two terms, given the association of erotic love with desire.
Calling on Menexenus’ “expertise” in friendship, Socrates asks him the following
question: “When someone loves (φιλῇ) someone, which one becomes a friend (φίλος) of the
other, the loving (φιλῶν) of the loved (φιλουμένου), or the loved (φιλούμενος) of the loving
(φιλοῦτος)? Or is there no difference?” (212a10 – b2). What seems to be straightforward
question is in fact a minefield of ambiguity. As A. W. Price points out, Socrates’ initial
interaction with Menexenus contains three senses, or usages, of the term φίλος:
(i) Reciprocal and equivalent to our ‘friend’; usually conveyed by a pair
of correlative pronouns (212a6, c8), once by a conjunction of the active
and passive moods of the verb philein (213a6 – 7), and once simply by
the plural ‘the philoi’ (213a7). (ii) Neuter and passive, meaning ‘dear’;
often followed by a personal dative (most explicitly at 212e6, and
introduced by a list of philo-compounds (for instance, ‘horse-lover’,
‘dog-lover’, 212d5 – 7). (iii) Masculine and active, meaning ‘fond’; often
followed by a genitive (most explicitly at 213b5–6).27

This dizzying array of different usages of the term φίλος allows Socrates to switch between the
various meanings of the term throughout his first colloquy with Menexenus, leading to their
failure to adequately define what a friend is.
Menexenus answers that in his opinion it makes no difference which of the two loves the
other, so long as one of the two individuals loves the other, the two will both become friends.
Socrates notes that this cannot be. Using the verb φιλεῖν, Socrates notes that it is possible for
one to love and not be loved in return. To explicate this, he provides the example of a lover
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(ἐραστής) who, even though he loves (φιλοῦντες) as much as possible, supposes that he is not
loved in return (οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι). While Socrates’ example seems to be simply a particularly
acute case of non-reciprocal friendship, Socrates’ use of the term ἐραστής is significant, as it
connotes a more passionate love bound up with desire than the term φίλος ordinarily implies. As
will be made clear, Socrates’ use of this term is not simply to provide an acute example of nonreciprocal love, but it again foreshadows the way in which the ordinary sense of the term
friendship or φιλία will ultimately be transformed into ἔρως by the end of the dialogue. In any
case, because it would be ridiculous to say that there is friendship between the ἐραστής and his
indifferent beloved, Socrates and Menexenus temporarily conclude that love must be reciprocal.
Shortly afterwards, Socrates notes that it would then be improper to call those who love
inanimate objects lovers. Using the masculine noun φίλοι, Socrates asks whether the poet Solon
was lying when he said, “Prosperous is he who has children as friends (φίλοι), together with
single-hoofed horses, Dogs for the hunt, and a guest-friend in a foreign land?” (212e3–4). Using
the masculine noun, Socrates is able to show that in everyday discourse, people speak—in a
colloquial way—of being friends with inanimate objects: lovers of dogs, lovers of wine, or lovers
of wisdom. Assuming that Solon did not speak incorrectly, they tentatively conclude, now using
the neuter noun, that “that which is loved … is a friend (φίλον) to the lover … whether it loves or
even if it hates” (212e6–8). According to this account, “it’s not the one who loves who is a
friend but the loved one” (213a5–6). However, this definition proves to be obviously
problematic as well, as it leads to the conclusion that “many … are loved by their enemies and
hated by their friends” (213a8–b2). Socrates and Menexenus agree that this conclusion is
absurd, but given the way Socrates has framed the question, no path forward is evident.
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Socrates suggests that they turn away from the semantic difficulties associated with the
concept of friendship and seek help from the poets instead. Doing so clears the way to get at the
ground of friendship. Indeed, the poets assert that “always a god leads [the one who is] like to
[the one who is] like” (214a8). Thus, for the poets, the gods are the cause of friendship, and they
lead those who are alike to become friends. Ostensibly, Socrates turns to the poets because they
are, “as it were, our fathers in wisdom and our guides” (214a1–2). However, a short while later,
Socrates will invoke a second poet, Hesiod, in support of a completely contradictory principle:
those who are most alike to one another, are “most filled with envy, love of victory, and hatred
toward each other,” while those most unlike one another are filled with friendship (215d1–4).
According to Socrates’ interpretation of Hesiod’s poetry, those who are opposite will be friends.
If fathers are, indeed, like the poets as Socrates suggests, they would also say contradictory
things (cf. NE 1180a19–29). Socrates’ point in invoking the poets as “our fathers in wisdom”
seems to be a further attempt to undermine Lysis’ trust in his parents; neither a parent’s love nor
the veracity of his claims ought to be taken as a matter of trust. Instead, recourse to philosophy
is necessary.
Perhaps, as a result of the unreliability of the poets, Socrates invokes the authority of
certain philosophers “who converse and write about nature and the whole” in support of the
contention that “like is always necessarily a friend to its like” (214b2–6).28 However, in bringing
up these philosophers, Socrates engages in a somewhat curious dance regarding how they should
react to the statement that like is a friend to like. He notes, first, that perhaps the philosophers
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only speak well in half of what they say, because it would be impossible for those who are
wicked to be friends with one another, as they would do injustice to one another. Next, he
alternatively suggests that perhaps the philosophers speak well in all of what they say, “only we
don’t understand them” (214b8–10). Why would Plato present Socrates as uncertain of the
soundness of the philosophers’ statement? Could it be that Plato is suggesting that Socrates does
not understand these philosophers? In the Phaedo, when he recounts Socrates’ famous turn from
investigations concerning nature and the whole to what is distinctively human, Plato tells us that
Socrates had “no natural aptitude” for natural philosophy (Phaedo 96c1–2). Similarly, in the
Metaphysics, Aristotle informs us that Socrates ignored the study of nature (Meta. 987b1–4).29 It
may be that by presenting Socrates as unsure of the philosophers’ statement, Plato is pointing to
a flaw in Socrates’ intellectual capacity, which influences his understanding of friendship.30
In any case, accepting that the wicked cannot be friends with one another—as they are at
variance with even themselves—Socrates and the boys posit that the philosophers must mean
that it is the good who are friends to one another. However, Socrates complicates this possibility
as well, asking, “Is he who is like, insofar as he is like, a friend to his like, and is such a one
useful to such a one?” (214e 6–7). This difficulty cuts to the heart of the dialogue. By
juxtaposing “the good” with “the useful,” Socrates is able to uncover the fundamental question
concerning friendship. Is it possible to have a friendship that is based solely on self-sufficiency,
where both parties to the friendship admire and love one another for their own sake? Or, are all

Specifically, Aristotle writes, “Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the
world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on
definitions” (Meta. 987b1–4).
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friendships rooted in deficiency and need? The difficulty is that in so far as a person is good, he
would be self-sufficient and would not be in need of any other individual. As Socrates notes,
“Would anything whatsoever which is like anything whatsoever have the power to hold out any
benefit to it, or to do it any harm, which that couldn’t also do itself to itself?” (214e8–10). A
completely self-sufficient individual, Socrates suggests, would have no need of anyone else and,
hence, would have no reason to treasure another individual. Because it would be absurd to claim
that friendship exists among those who do not treasure one another, Socrates and Menexenus
conclude that the basis of friendship cannot be the extent to which the parties are the same.
At this point, Socrates tries to take another tack and suggests that two individuals who are
good might be friends with one another, insofar as they are good and not insofar as they are
alike. The idea seems to be that two people who are good, but nevertheless differ in some other
respect, may be friends. However, Socrates quickly points out that the difficulty with this
proposition is, again, that as self-sufficient individuals who are “in want of nothing,” these good
individuals would have no reason to treasure one another, and as such would not love one
another (215a7–9). As a result, because such individuals have no use for one another, they
would not be friends. In his earlier conversation with Lysis alone, Socrates had suggested that
all of Lysis’ friends—including his parents and fellow citizens—are friends with him only to the
extent to which he is useful. Now, Socrates again asserts that it is need that causes one to
befriend another. Before he turns to the next possibility of who may be friends, Socrates asks
Lysis, “Consider then, where we have gone astray. Are we somehow being deceived in the
whole?” (214c3–4). Plato again seems to draw our attention to the fact that Socrates may not
have a full grasp of “the whole,” or that his knowledge is only partial. Perhaps there is
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something in the saying of the “wisest ones” who study “nature and the whole” that Socrates
does not fully understand.31
Socrates now brings up another possibility for the basis of friendship, noting that he once
heard someone say, “that what is like was most hostile to its like, and that those who are good
[were most hostile] to the good” (215c4–7). According to this understanding of friendship, it is
precisely those who are most unlike who will be friends with each other; the poor and the
wealthy will be friends, as will the weak and the strong. In fact, according to Socrates’ source,
the principle that all opposites desire one another extends to all of nature, such that “what is dry
desires [something] wet, [and] what is cold [something] hot” (215e3–5). In contrast, those who
are alike can derive no use or advantage from one another and are not friends.
Socrates asks Menexenus whether this “oppositional” account of friendship seems to be a
correct understanding of friendship. When Menexenus agrees, Socrates immediately points to
the obvious difficulty with this conception of friendship: if opposites are friends, then it would be
the case that an enemy—the opposite of a friend—would be “a friend to the friend” (216b3–4). It
would, of course, be absurd to claim that an enemy is a friend. However, the proposition that all
opposites desire one another, would seem to entail this conclusion. As a result of this absurd, but

In Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Empedocles is mentioned as the proponent of the view that “like aims at
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Aristotle specifically critiques the Socratic thesis that “no one acts contrary to what is best while supposing that he is
so acting” (1145b26–27). In this discussion, Aristotle notes that a person may know the words of something but be
ignorant of what they mean. Such an individual, Aristotle comments “merely speaks, as a drunk man states the
sayings of Empedocles” (1147b12–13). It may be that Aristotle is suggesting that Socrates fails to understand the
sayings of Empedocles.
31

41

logically necessary consequence, Socrates concludes that the “oppositional” account of
friendship is incorrect: friendship does not exist between opposite entities.
However, in his depiction of this exchange, Plato seems to present Socrates as being
much too quick to dismiss the “oppositional” conception of friendship. Indeed, in bringing up
the refutation of the “oppositional” conception of friendship, Socrates asks, won’t the “all-wise
men, the ones skilled in contradicting, be pleased to leap upon us straightway and ask whether
hatred isn’t most opposite to friendship?” (216a8–b1). Plato seems to go out of his way to
emphasize that only eristic debaters and the “all-wise” who are “skilled in contradicting” would
try to exploit this linguistic difficulty rather than get to the root of what the “oppositional”
conception of friendship entails.32 Plato suggests that by accepting the linguistic objection,
Socrates is, in fact, acting like one of these eristic all-wise men who are skilled in contradicting.
Given the failure of the two previous definitions, Socrates now proposes his own
definition, suggesting that “whatever is neither good nor bad may thus at some times become a
friend of the good” (216c2–4). He continues noting:
I am really dizzy myself from the perplexity of the argument, and I’m
afraid—as the old saying goes—that what is beautiful is a friend. It
seems, at any rate, like something soft, smooth, and sleek. And that is
why, perhaps, it easily slides past us and gives us the slip, inasmuch as it
is such. (216c5–d2).

A number of indicators suggest that this is not simply another definition, but is, in fact, a turning
point in the dialogue. First, Socrates’ definition drops the requirement that the friendship be
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reciprocal. He only states that “whatever is neither good nor bad” becomes a friend of the good;
he does not state that the good becomes a friend in return. Furthermore, Socrates recognizes that
friendship has been giving them the slip and admits that the perplexity of the argument has left
him dizzy. In fact, he’s so dizzy that he is afraid “that what is beautiful (τό καλόν) is a friend.”
Why would Socrates be “afraid” of this possibility? The answer, I believe, is that by suggesting
that the beautiful is a friend, Socrates is admitting defeat as to the question of what “friendship”
is. At this point in the dialogue, Socrates is beginning to lay the groundwork for transforming
friendship into erotic love. Indeed, in the Symposium Socrates recounts how Diotima sought to
initiate him into erotic matters by explaining to him how the beautiful acts as a spur to
philosophical contemplation of the form of the good and the beautiful (Sym. 210a4–b6). Diotima
develops a “ladder of love,” whereby one’s initial encounter with the beautiful in the form of a
particular person gives way to increasingly abstract encounters with the class of beautiful things,
until at last one contemplates the form of the beautiful. As we will see, Socrates’ suggested
definition of friendship is very much akin to this “ladder of love.”
Socrates finally elaborates on his definition of friendship. Noting that he is speaking “as
a diviner”—we are not told whether his divination comes from a friendly source or not33—he
states that “whatever is neither good nor bad is a friend of the beautiful and good” (216d3–8). By
finding a middle category—a neutral state between good and bad—Socrates avoids the
difficulties that beset the previous definitions of friendship. Of course, it is precisely the

Ordinarily, when Socrates attributes his actions to a divine cause, we are told that the source is his “divine sign.”
Furthermore, Socrates notes that the “divine sign” only ever tells “me to turn away from what I’m about to do, but
never prescribes anything” (Theages 128d3–4). This suggests that in this particular instance, Socrates is not
speaking under the influence of his divine sign.
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existence of this neutral, middle state that Diotima discloses to Socrates in the Symposium.
Diotima tells Socrates that Eros (the δαίμων of desire) is something between the good and the
bad, or between the beautiful and the ugly (Symposium 202b1–5). This parallel seems further to
indicate that the transformation from friendship to erotic love is underway.
At this point, none of the logical problems that hindered the previous definitions of
friendship threaten to undermine Socrates’ proposed definition. However, it is not yet clear why
the neutral would seek out the good. This difficulty is brought out when Socrates analogizes
human desire for friendship or love to the human body’s desire for the medical art. A healthy
body has no need of the medical art due to its “sufficient” condition (217a6). It is only insofar as
the body is diseased that it seeks out the medical art. Socrates emphasizes, however, that when
the disease is in its initial stages the body itself remains neutral—it has not yet become bad. As a
result, the body (neutral) seeks the medical art (good) because of the presence of a disease (bad).
Similarly, an individual only has need of the good when some evil is present, causing it to desire
the good. However, if the evil has been allowed to fester and caused the individual to become
bad, it “deprives [him] of the desire, at the same time as the friendship, of the good,” because
what is good cannot be a friend of what is bad (217b7–c1; emphasis added). At this point, we
can see Socrates effecting the transformation of friendship into erotic love, as he strings together
desire (characteristic of ἔρως) and friendship, indicating that Socrates believes them to be in
some way related.
Next, Socrates extends this formulation to an individual’s relation to wisdom. Neither
those who are already wise nor those who are so ignorant as to be bad would love wisdom.
Instead, it is only those “who while having this evil, ignorance, are not yet senseless or stupid as
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a result of it, but still regard themselves as not knowing whatever they don’t know. And so
therefore, the ones who are not yet either good nor bad love wisdom” (218a7–b2). Why would
Socrates extend his formula of “the neutral being a friend to the good” to cover the one who is
partially ignorant as being a friend to wisdom? The obvious answer is that he is holding up the
philosophic life and the pursuit of wisdom as that which can most fulfill one’s desire for the
good. However, in making this argument, he is also walking back an argument he had earlier
made to Lysis. During the earlier part of his conversation with Lysis, Socrates made the
sophistic argument that one either has knowledge, or one does not. Socrates belittled Lysis in
front of Hippothales by suggesting that Lysis did not have knowledge. By walking back this
argument, Socrates is showing how it was necessary for him to belittle Lysis, in order to make
him aware of his ignorance. It is only once Lysis becomes cognizant of his ignorance that he
may be impelled to the pursuit of wisdom.
In any case, Socrates concludes that they have “discovered that which is the friend…. For
we assert … that whatever is neither bad nor good is itself, because of the presence of an evil a
friend of the good” (218b8–c3), and he rejoices as a result. However, Socrates’ happiness at
having discovered “that which is the friend” is short-lived, as “some most strange suspicion
came over me—from where, I don’t know—that things we had agreed to were not true” (218c7–
9). Socrates explains that the difficulty with this definition of friendship is that all friendships
are entered into “for the sake of something” (218d8–9). Just as the body (which is neutral)
becomes friends with the medical art (which is good) for the sake of health (which is also good),
so a friend becomes a friend for the sake of a further friend. Socrates establishes a “ladder of
friendship” that is strikingly similar to the “ladder of love” that Diotima develops in the
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Symposium. Of course, the implication is that no one becomes a friend to another for the sake of
the other individual, but only insofar as that person can spur him on to higher friendships.
Socrates notes that it is necessary “for us to renounce going on like this or else to arrive at some
beginning principle,” so that they might “come to that which is a friend in the first place”
(219c).34 Just as all the beautiful objects one encounters on the ascent up the “ladder of love” are
pursued only for the sake of contemplating the “beautiful itself” (Sym. 211d1), so the ordinary
friendships that one has are for the sake of the “first friend.”
In contrast to the Symposium, however, Socrates concludes not only that the lower
objects on the “ladder” are for the sake of the “first friend,” but that they are, in fact, phantoms of
the “first friend.” Ordinary friends cannot even be considered friends as they are, in fact,
“deceiving us,” as they are qualitatively different from the first friend (219d1–5). Socrates’
denunciation of ordinary friendship seems especially harsh. However, immediately after this,
Socrates employs an analogy that pulls back on this harsh appraisal of friendship. He notes that
upon discovering that his son has drunk hemlock, a father who “values his son more highly than
all his other possessions” would treasure not only wine, which acts as an antidote to hemlock, but
also the jar that carries the wine (219d5–220a1). These things are treasured, not for any intrinsic
value they have, but only insofar as they are useful for the final good of healing the son. A father
who recognizes the instrumental value of the wine and the jar, values them correctly. In the
same way, an individual who recognizes the instrumental value of his ordinary friendships will
value them correctly.
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Why would Socrates first suggest that ordinary friendships involve only deceptive
phantom friends, and then indicate that these friendships have the potential to be useful?
Through this juxtaposition, Socrates seems to be suggesting that while friendships have the
potential to spur one on to higher friendships, and ultimately to the contemplative life, they are
also potentially debilitating. If a friendship leads to a sense of complacency, or a false sense of
self-sufficiency, the friendship will act as an impediment to the philosophic life. Thus, to the
extent that any friendship is not directed toward the “first friend,” that is toward the good, it is a
phantom image of friendship. Socrates’ implicit lesson here seems to be that friendship ought to
impel one toward the good, and that friendships are never for their own sake.
While Socrates’ introduction of the “first friend” theory calls into question many existing
friendships, there is a logical difficulty with his introduction of the first friend theory as well.
Indeed, this theory violates one of the principles established earlier; like cannot be a friend to its
like. By formulating the “ladder of friendship” in such a way that the body (neutral) becomes a
friend with the medical art (good), and that the medical art accepts the friendship for the sake of
health (good), Socrates intimates that the medical art (good) desires health (good). Of course,
because health and the medical art are both “good,” this would be a case of like becoming a
friend to its like, which they had previously asserted to be impossible. While Socrates
recognizes this problem, he states “this I allow to go by” (219b7–9).35 Why would Socrates
allow this to go by? Whereas previously he invoked the violation of this principle as a reason to
discard a definition of friendship (214e6–215a5), now this violation is allowed to go by. It
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seems that Plato is, again, suggesting that Socrates is less interested in getting to the root of what
friendship is than in driving forward a definition of friendship—a definition that encompasses
friendship within the ambit of erotic love.
By establishing that the “first friend” is the only true friend, Socrates has made clear that
all friendship aims at the good, and that it does so because of the presence of something bad; all
friendship has its roots in some deficiency or need. To explore whether this is, in fact, the only
basis of friendship, Socrates engages in a thought experiment. First, he asks whether “that which
is good is a friend” (220b7–8). When Menexenus agrees, Socrates follows up with the following
hypothetical question: Supposing that what is bad did not afflict us, would the good still be
useful to us? If it is, in fact, the case that the “first friend” is a friend solely on account of the
evils present in us, it would seem to be “of no use itself for its own sake” (220d7–8). When
Menexenus responds that based on what has been said, it doesn’t appear that the first friend
would remain a friend to us in the absence of evil, Socrates responds with an oath. He asks
whether in such a situation all desires would cease as well. Indeed, if that which is bad ceases to
exist, would there still be hunger, thirst, or other desires?
The question, of course, cannot be answered, and Socrates—in recognition of this fact—
asks, “Is the question ludicrous—what will be or will not be then? For who knows?” (221a1–6).
What we do know, he suggests, is that even now it is possible for those with desires to desire in a
manner that is beneficial for them (good desires), or in a manner that is detrimental to them (bad
desires). For example, someone might have a desire for healthy foods or for unhealthy foods.
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As a result, if all bad things ceased to exist, only good desires would remain.36 Having come to
the conclusion that there may still be desires in the absence of evil, Socrates asks whether “it is
possible for one who desires and who loves passionately (ἐρῶντα) not to love (φιλεῖν) [as a
friend] that which he desires and loves passionately?” When Menexenus answers that this would
not be possible, Socrates concludes that “there will be, then, as it seems, some [things that are]
friends, even if evils cease to be” (221b3–10). At this point, it seems that Socrates has found a
basis for friendship that is not dependent on some evil, although it does have its basis in desire,
and is therefore not distinguishable from erotic love.
Socrates picks up this thread of the argument, asking, “Is desire … really a cause of
friendship?” (221d3–6). Securing Menexenus’ agreement, Socrates asks whether it is the case
that “that which desires desires whatever it is in want of?” and, if so, whether “what is in want,
[is,] therefore, a friend of that which it is in want of?” (221d8–e3). Menexenus agrees to both
questions. At this point, Socrates has secured the boys’ agreement that all friendships have their
basis in some perceived want or lack. Recall that the background assumption of Socrates’
investigation at this point is that there is a basis for friendship independent of any evil. Thus, the
want or lack that desire is responding to cannot be considered to be bad. In any case, Socrates
continues, addressing Menexenus and Lysis by name, and tells them that it appears “passionate
love, friendship and desire happen to be for what is akin” (221e4–6). Now, this is a curious
statement. Why would one have a desire for what is akin [οἰκείον]? The difficulty resolves
itself when we understand that the term “οἰκείον” can also be translated as “one’s own.” Thus,

Specifically, Socrates states, “There will be, then, whatever desires are neither good nor bad, even if the things
which are bad cease to be” (221b5–7).
36
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one desires what is “one’s own.” As David Bolotin notes, the desire discussed here is not “like
any desire or need, to acquire what belongs naturally to a single human being; instead, the desire
or longing of each being is to belong to a larger whole of which he is merely a part.”37 Socrates
notes that if Menexenus and Lysis are friends, they are “by nature in some way akin to each
other” (221e7–8). If they are friends, Menexenus and Lysis belong to one another in some way;
together they make up a composite whole.38 Both Menexenus and Lysis agree to this statement.
It is perhaps not surprising that they do, as it seems to confirm that their friendship has its basis
in nature.
Socrates concludes, “If someone desires another, boys, or loves him passionately, he
would never desire, nor love passionately, nor love [as a friend] unless he happened to be akin in
some way to his passionately beloved” (222a1–3). This time only Menexenus agrees, whereas
Lysis falls silent. Socrates’ statement—which broadens those who are “akin” to include not only
those who are friends but also those who love passionately—seems to have prompted Lysis to
ponder Hippothales’ passionate love for him. Whether or not Lysis takes Socrates statement this
way, it seems that Hippothales certainly does, for when he hears Socrates state that because it is
“necessary for us to love what is akin by nature” it is necessary “for the passionate lover, who is
genuine, and not pretended, to be loved by his favorite(s),” he “radiate[s] all sorts of colors as a
result of his pleasure” (222a6–b3). At this point, it seems clear that Socrates has completed the
transformation of friendship into passionate love. He has made clear that just as it is necessary
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for one to return the friendship (φιλία) of one who is akin by nature, it is equally necessary for
one to return the love (ἔρως) of one who is akin by nature.
At this point, Socrates narrates to the reader that he “wish[ed] to examine the argument
[for himself]” (222b4–5). Two things are important about this narration. First, Socrates
expressly states that he now wishes to examine the argument for himself. This suggests that
previously, he was pursuing the argument, not for his own sake, but for the sake of his
interlocutors. Perhaps Socrates has been conducting the argument in a particular way to lead the
boys to this understanding of friendship. Second, Plato draws our attention to the fact that
Socrates is in some way curious about the argument that friends might be “akin” to one another,
or that he does not yet fully understand the argument, and therefore wishes to examine it further.
Socrates turns to Lysis and Menexenus and states:
If what is akin differs in some respect from the like, we might be saying
something, in my opinion, concerning what a friend is. But if it happens
that like and akin are the same, it isn’t easy to reject the previous
argument, which says that what is like is useless to its like insofar as
there is likeness. (222b4–9).

Conceding that they are “drunk” from the argument, Socrates suggests that they simply grant and
declare that “what is akin is something other than the like” (222c1–4). Thus, they do not even
investigate whether this is, in fact, the case, but simply assume it. Again, Plato seems to be
hinting at sloppy reasoning by Socrates. Socrates continues, “Shall we also, then, posit that what
is good is akin to everyone, and that what is bad is alien? Or else [shall we posit] that what is bad
is akin to the bad; that what is good is akin to the good; and that whatever is neither good nor bad
is akin to whatever is neither good nor bad?” (222c4–8). The boys opt for the latter, and
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Socrates notes that this leads them back to the difficulties that plagued their earlier definitions of
friendship; the bad and unjust will be friends with each other, no less than the good.
Socrates continues, suggesting that they avoid this difficulty by restricting what is akin to
what is good—thereby excluding those who are bad. However, he quickly notes that this avenue
also would not work, as “on this point, too, we supposed that we had refuted ourselves” (222d8).
However, as Bolotin points out, the refutation that the good cannot be friends to the good was
refuted only on the supposition that the good were self-sufficient, and therefore would be of no
use to each other. As it is, the present argument rests on the presupposition that those who are
akin are also good, and yet are not in every respect alike (222c1–3). Thus, it is not clear that the
previous refutation holds as applied to the present argument. Could it not be that two individuals
who are akin (or who belong to each other), are both good—and yet are good each in his own
way, or according to his own nature?
Socrates initially began the conversation with Menexenus and Lysis by asking which of
them was “juster and wiser.” It was earlier posited that this was a potentially fruitful line of
inquiry, as it allowed the boys the option of suggesting that one of them was more just, while the
other was wiser. Furthermore, it was noted that throughout the dialogue Menexenus is presented
as the more spirited or forthright of the two, while Lysis is presented as the more thoughtful. If
the virtues of justice and wisdom are both within the class of what is good, each boy would be
self-sufficient in his respective field, and yet they would not be identical to one another. As a
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result, despite the fact that the two boys are both good and self-sufficient, they would
nevertheless still be useful to one another.39

Friendship and Desire
Socrates’ assumption that the earlier refutation suffices to dispose of the proposed definition of
friendship without re-examining it ensures that they do not discover a friendship between two
self-sufficient individuals that is independent of need. Thus, the inquiry seems to conclude in a
state of aporia. However, it is not the case that the dialogue is wholly without any development
whatsoever. Indeed, one fundamental change that occurs throughout the course of the dialogue
is the character development of Lysis. Socrates’ interrogation on the nature of friendship has had
an effect on Lysis, such that he begins not only to question his existing friendships, but also to
recognize the benefit of erotic relationships. While no proposed definition of friendship is ever
successfully maintained, throughout the course of the dialogue Socrates has transformed
friendship into erotic love. Lysis has come to recognize that he suffers from some sort of
metaphysical lack or need, which only the good, or the “first friend” can fulfill. Socrates
suggests that to the extent that Lysis’ ordinary friendships—his friendship with Menexenus, his
friendship with his parents, or even the more extended friendship he has with the other members
of his polis—leave him feeling sufficient and complacent, they are “phantom friends” that
impede his access to the good. By forcing Lysis to confront and recognize that at their root all
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his friendships are, in some way, based in desire, Socrates turns him toward “erotic love” and,
therefore, toward the good.
That it seems to have been Socrates’ goal to turn Lysis toward “erotic love” and the good
from start of their conversation is borne out by the end of the dialogue. He concludes the inquiry
into friendship by recounting the proposed definitions of friendship they have put forward—a
method he rejects elsewhere.40 He lists nearly every definition of friendship that they have
proposed, noting that “I, at least, don’t remember any more because of their multitude—if
nothing among these is a friend, I no longer know what to say” (222e7–9). Thus, Socrates seems
to suggest that he is at a loss. However, Plato has Socrates narrate to the reader the following:
“But as I said these things, I already had in mind to set in motion someone else among the older
fellows” (223a1–2). Socrates is not nearly as much at a loss as he lets on, but is, in fact, very
much in control of the argument. What precisely is it that Socrates has in mind to set in motion
among the older fellows? While we are never explicitly informed as to what Socrates has in
mind, the preceding action of the dialogue leaves little room for doubt. Socrates has prepared
Lysis for passionate love by causing him to question his existing friendships and inculcating in
him a desire for the good. Given that Socrates views ἕρως as an impetus to philosophic
contemplation, it seems that what Socrates has in mind is to bring Lysis and one of the older
fellows together. In this way, the Lysis can be seen as a prelude to the Symposium, with its focus
on ἔρώς.41
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Throughout the dialogue, not only has Plato shown Socrates to be somewhat hasty and
too quick to dismiss possible definitions of friendship, he has also shown him to have engaged in
a rather reckless manner. Socrates is seen to have used a variety of sophistic arguments to
undermine the friendships of perhaps the youngest interlocutors in the entire Platonic corpus.42
Indeed, first, Socrates indicated to Lysis that a person is only happy if he follows his desires,
regardless of what those desires may be (207e1–3). Next, he intimated that Lysis’ parents only
love him to the extent he is useful (210d2–4). Finally, in an effort to belittle Lysis, Socrates
employed a specious argument that equivocated on the term “to understand,” showing him that
he knows nothing (210d4–8).43 Socrates seems to have been depicted as a rather irresponsible
individual.
One might want to absolve Socrates of his recklessness, given that his intention appears
to have been to awaken in Lysis a desire for the good and to spur him to the contemplative life.
However, Plato draws our attention to the fact that the dialogue does not have such a happy
ending. Before Socrates can “set in motion someone else among the older fellows” as he had
intended, the attendants and brothers of Menexenus and Lysis come forward “like some
daemons,” to bring the boys home (223a1–4). Socrates relates that “we and those standing
around tried to drive them away” (223a6–7). The scene is striking, in that it is the only time in
all the Platonic dialogues that Socrates is depicted as engaging in something more than a verbal
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dispute. As Bolotin notes, “Socrates directed or at least assisted Lysis and Menexenus in a
rebellion against the guardians appointed by their fathers.”44 This little rebellion makes clear the
effect that Socrates’ discussion has had on the boys. While Socrates has sought to initiate the
boys into the philosophic life, in the process of doing so, he has instilled in them a spirit of
rebellion. By finding that friendship has no basis apart from desire, Socrates has devalued
existing attachments and friendships, including the friendships that exist between a parent and a
child, and thereby the friendships that provide the foundation for traditional authority. The
rebellion with which the Lysis ends points toward the difficulty that Socrates’ approach poses to
traditional authority and, by extension, to political cohesion. Ultimately, the rebellion is
unsuccessful; the attendants, we are told, were impervious to reason, as they “had been drinking
quite a bit at the Hermaea” (223a8–b2). Hermes, the god of tricks, appears once again to have
frustrated Socrates’ intentions.
Given Socrates’ inability to match Lysis with one of the older fellows, we are left
wondering about Lysis’ fate. On the one hand, Lysis has been led to awareness of his own
insufficiency, an awareness that leaves him desirous of completion—a completion that perhaps
only philosophic contemplation and the pursuit of the truth can attain. On the other hand,
Socrates has also instilled within Lysis a rebellious streak that causes him to be dismissive of
existing friendships. These two outcomes suggest that Plato is aware of the dangers of Socrates’
approach. The Socratic approach, he suggests, may lead an individual to pursue the
contemplative life. However, it may equally induce a hubris that is destructive of the friendships
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that are at the basis of political life.45 The name of the dialogue itself suggests as much. “Lysis”
(Λυσις) can be translated both as “to loosen” and “to destroy.”46 Thus, while Socrates seeks to
loosen Lysis from the strictures and standards of the city, he is at the same time destroying his
pre-existing friendships in a way that may be harmful to the health of the polis.
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CHAPTER TWO. SOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

In his Seventh Letter, Plato relates that he gave up on the reformation of politics because he
found political reformation to be impossible without friends (Sev. Let. 325d). For Plato,
friendship seems to be a sine qua non for political action. This is noteworthy, in that it suggests
that Plato’s depiction of the Socratic approach to friendship has implications for politics. What
does Socrates’ treatment of friendship tell us about his relationship to politics? We have seen
that in the Lysis, Plato presents Socrates as running roughshod over the phenomenon of
friendship: he transforms it into erotic desire. Socrates takes his interlocutors’ friendships—
which were thought (perhaps erroneously) to be full and self-sufficient—and substitutes for them
something that has its basis in desire, lack, or incompleteness. In the Lysis, Socrates does not
ever discover a definition of friendship that entails an appreciation between two people solely for
the other’s good qualities. Nevertheless, at the end of the dialogue, Socrates indicates that he
considers himself to be the boys’ friend. Through the process of refuting the boys, Socrates has,
in some way, become their friend. In addition, we have seen that Plato seems to be skeptical of
Socrates’ approach to friendship. Not only does he seem to point to an oversight or
misunderstanding in Socrates’ understanding of friendship, but he also indicates that dangerous
political effects attend the Socratic approach to friendship. The rebellion that Socrates inspires at
the end of the dialogue is indicative of this, and it hints at the deleterious effect that Socrates’
understanding of friendship can have on politics.
Having uncovered Socrates’ understanding of friendship by way of a close analysis of the
Lysis, it is now necessary to explicate the way that this understanding impacts his approach to
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politics. In contrast to his presentation of Socrates’ conception of friendship, which covers only
a single dialogue, Plato’s depiction of the Socratic approach to politics is covered in a variety of
dialogues, each of which reveals only an aspect of this approach.1 The two dialogues that are
most apposite for uncovering Socrates’ relationship to the political community are the Apology
and the Gorgias.2 In the course of his trial, recounted in the Apology, Socrates documents his
relationship with the polis. As will be made clear, the Apology shows that Socrates’ interaction
with the political community is essentially one of negation and abstention. However, the trial
takes place in a very public manner, in front of an audience consisting of five hundred jurors,
who are largely hostile to Socrates’ way of life. As a result, the reasons adduced by Socrates in
defense of his peculiar stance toward the political community do not convey the totality of the
reasons for his seemingly antagonistic relation to the political community. Thus, while the
Apology provides a succinct overview detailing the facts of Socrates’ relationship to the political
realm, it does not adequately get to the heart of why the facts are the way they are.
In order to get to the heart of why Socrates’ stance toward political life is one of negation
and abstention, it is necessary to turn to the Gorgias. Not only does the Gorgias allude to and

Leo Strauss comments, “The individual dialogue is not a chapter from an encyclopaedia of the philosophic sciences
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venture to say, abstracts from something that is most important to the subject matter of the dialogue.” The City and
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foreshadow Socrates’ trial and death numerous times, but it also deals with the same theme as
the Apology. Socrates’ way of life is explicitly put at issue and is contrasted with the active life
of politics.3 However, in contrast to the highly public character of the Apology in which the
political community makes Socrates’ way of life the focus of debate, the Gorgias is a private
discussion among learned individuals, including one of the leading rhetoricians of the time, in
which Socrates himself puts his way of life under discussion. It is in this private setting amongst
learned individuals that Socrates feels free to uncover what “he professes and teaches,” or “who
he is” (Gor. 447–d).4 As Socrates makes clear, it is his opinion on the nature of friendship that
causes his approach to the conventional practice of politics to be one of avoidance and
negativity.

The Apology: A Life of Principled Abstention
In the Gorgias, Socrates tells Chaerephon to begin the conversation with the great sophist
Gorgias by asking him “who he is” (447d). By means of this question, Socrates aims to
determine Gorgias’ relation to the polis. Socrates points out that based on the craft in which an
individual engages, one can easily determine what he ought to be called and what his function is
in the polis. By asking this question, Socrates indicates (as does the remainder of the dialogue)
that the rhetoricians’ relation to the polis is questionable. However, we may equally ask the
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same question of Socrates himself: “Who is he?” What is Socrates’ relation to the polis? Does
the philosopher have a defined role in the city, similar to that of any other craftsman? An
examination of the Apology does not definitively answer these questions. However, it does
reveal two essential characteristics about Socrates’ way of life that point toward an answer:
Socrates’ way of life is both private and negative. Socrates abstains from a public role in the
city, and when a public role is forced upon him, his public activity is essentially negative in
character.
In the course of his trial, Socrates explains his way of life as a kind of divine mission
designed to reveal the paucity of human wisdom. He recounts his perplexity at the fact that, in
response to a question posed by Chaerephon, the oracle at Delphi stated there was none wiser
than Socrates (21a).5 Why, Socrates wonders, would the oracle make this statement, given that
he was, in fact, very conscious of his lack of wisdom? Socrates states that as a result of his
perplexity he set out to test the oracle’s statement by speaking to the politicians, poets, and
craftsmen of the city, to test their wisdom. Socrates relates that those most reputed to be wise
among these three classes turned out to be ignorant of the “greatest things” (22d).6 In fact, after

All citations to the Apology will be taken from Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West’s translation in Four Texts
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speaking to one of the politicians, Socrates tells the jurors that he reasoned with himself as
follows:
I am wiser than this human being. For probably neither of us knows
anything noble and good, but he supposes he knows something when he
does not know, while I, just as I do not know, do not even suppose that I
do. I am likely to be a little bit wiser than he in this very thing: that
whatever I do not know, I do not even suppose I know. (21d).

Socrates has no knowledge of the “greatest things” and is eminently aware of his ignorance. As
a result, he concludes that, paradoxically, he is the wisest.
In recounting his activities, Socrates reveals that the entire approach he adopts is
negative. This emphasis on negativity is consistent with what are held to be Plato’s early
dialogues, in which Socrates employs dialectical argumentation to dissolve his interlocutors’
opinions about the various virtues. In none of these early dialogues does Socrates ever arrive at a
definition of the virtues. As Dana Villa notes, Socrates does not claim to have any knowledge of
the virtues. Instead, all his energies “are devoted to dissolving the crust of convention and the
hubristic claim to moral expertise.”7 Thus, the Socratic method seems to be entirely negative.8
In the Apology, after emphasizing that he possesses no knowledge of the “greatest
things,” Socrates argues that his negativity and his practice of dissolving his fellow citizens’
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opinions nevertheless benefits his fellow citizens. He states that as a result of his divine mission,
“I always do your business, going to each of you privately, as a father or an older brother might
do, persuading you to care for virtue” (31b). By forcing them to examine their opinions
concerning the “greatest things,” Socrates exposes his fellow citizens’ ignorance, purges them of
their opinions, and opens them up to the possibility of true knowledge by perplexing them, or
leading them to a state of confusion.9 What is revealing about Socrates’ statement is that it
shows not only the negative character of his teaching, but also the private form it takes. Socrates
dissolves his fellow citizens’ opinions, and he does so by going around to each of them privately,
and by “being a busybody in private” (31c).10
The negative, private approach that Socrates adopts ensures that he does not involve
himself in the democratic institutions of Athens. Instead, he purposefully seeks to avoid political
activity (31c–d). By Athenian standards, Socrates’ choice is, at best, peculiar. Indeed, in
choosing to eschew public life, Socrates is acting in a way that is not only contrary to what was
customary for Athenians, but in a way that was decried as unpatriotic. For example, in his
famous Funeral Oration, Pericles describes the public life of the Athenian citizens as follows:
“Here each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as
well…. We do not say that man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own
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business; we say that he has no business here at all.”11 Socrates’ private, abstentious approach
seems to be directly contrary to the Athenian ideals posited by Pericles.
Why would Socrates choose to proceed in a purely private manner that is contrary to the
ideals and practices of his polis? Much of the extant literature emphasizing Socrates’ negative
and abstentious relation to the polis in the Apology suggests that his stance towards politics stems
from his unique moral integrity and a commitment to avoiding injustice. In fact, this reading of
the Apology has become so ubiquitous that its characterization of Socrates’ stance toward the
polis has been labeled “Socratic Citizenship.”12 This commentarial tradition suggests that
Socrates resolves the tension between his commitment to justice and the seemingly unavoidable
injustice required by politics by abjuring the practice of politics. Scholars point to Socrates’ own
argument for political abstention:
Know well, men of Athens, if I had long ago attempted to be politically
active, I would long ago have perished, and I would have benefitted
neither you nor myself…. For there is no human being who will preserve
his life if he genuinely opposes either you or any other multitude and
prevents many unjust and unlawful things from happening in the city.
Rather, if someone who really fights for the just is going to preserve
himself even for a short time, it is necessary for him to lead a private
rather than a public life. (31d–32a).13
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Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin, 1972), 147.

See e.g., George Kateb, “Socratic Integrity,” in Nomos XL: Integrity and Conscience, 40, (1998): 77–112; Villa,
Socratic Citizenship.
12

13

See e.g., Kateb, “Socratic Integrity,” 82; Villa, Socratic Citizenship, 25–26.
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Socrates seems to ground his abstention from politics in the belief that one cannot be politically
involved while being committed to justice, without endangering his own life. Socrates’ moral
integrity would seem to require political abstention.
Political abstention, however, is not always possible. As a result, those who emphasize
Socrates’ moral integrity and commitment to justice posit that when political action is
unavoidable, Socrates maintains that it is best to act in an almost entirely negative fashion, so as
to avoid being complicit in injustice. Pointing to the two instances Socrates mentions where he
was forced to involve himself in politics, these scholars maintain that Socrates chooses the
negative stances of dissent and noncompliance in order to avoid being a party to acts of injustice.
The first example Socrates provides is when he was elected by lot to serve on the Council, the
administrative body overseeing the domestic political affairs of the city during Athens’
democratic period. Socrates was elected during the Peloponnesian war and, as part of his duties,
was called upon to judge the conduct of ten generals who had been accused of neglecting their
duties during the war.14 Socrates relates that although the Council wished to judge the ten
generals “as a group,” which was contrary to Athenian law, he alone opposed the Council and
voted against their action (32b). Thus, George Kateb concludes that “Socrates risks life and

Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West relate the events that comprise the background to Socrates’ political
activity: “Two years before the end of the [Peloponnesian] war, in 406, the Athenians won a major victory in a naval
battle fought near the Aegean island of Arginusae. However, on account of the confusion following the battle and a
storm that arose afterwards, the disabled ships and the Athenians still at the scene of the battle, both alive and dead,
could not be rescued as the ten generals had intended. When the generals returned to Athens, eight of them were
accused by Theramenes, an unscrupulous and ambitious politician, of neglecting their duty…. Theramenes cleverly
manipulated the Assembly of the people, and it was led to condemn the eight to death as a group, although it was
evident that many or perhaps all of them were innocent of wrongdoing. Socrates … maintained that such a
procedure was against the law on the ground that the generals should have been tried separately. His protest was
ineffectual, for his fellow prytanes easily yielded to the loud threats of the politicians and the Assembly.” Four
Texts, 84 n. 58.
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freedom in situations in which no one else does. He stands alone, as one person, as his naked
moral self. He has only himself to fall back on. His courage is for the sake of refusing to be an
instrument of injustice.”15 Thus, Socrates’ negative morality mandates that he oppose the unjust
political action of the Council by choosing to dissent boldly from their action. Although
Socrates’ dissent may be ineffectual, Kateb concludes that he would rather maintain his moral
integrity than lend support to their injustice.
The second example where Socrates acts in a negative manner is the arrest of Leon the
Salaminian, which occurred during the oligarchic reign of the Thirty Tyrants. He relates that the
Thirty ordered him and four others to arrest Leon, a man reputed to be perfectly just, and bring
him from Salamis to die.16 Socrates relates, “That government, as strong as it was, did not shock
me into doing anything unjust…. The other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I
departed and went home. And perhaps I would have died because of this, if that government had
not been quickly overthrown” (Apol. 32d). Here, rather than engage in what he considers to be
an unjust act, Socrates refuses to comply with the order. Dana Villa writes that Socrates’
noncompliance bespeaks “the seriousness with which he takes the imperative of avoiding
injustice, while reflecting the awareness of how the life of active citizenship … constantly
generates injustice.”17 Avoidance of injustice may seem to be the primary driver of Socrates’
negative and abstentious relation to politics.
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George Kateb, “Socratic Integrity” 84.

Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West note that “the arrest and execution without trial of Leon, who was reputed
to be a perfectly just man, was one of the harshest of the many injustices committed by the oligarchy.” Four Texts,
84 n. 59.
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Based on Socrates’ stance toward politics, advocates of the “Socratic Citizenship”
interpretation suggest that Socrates evinces a type of citizenship that is “moderately alienated”
from the polis. For the most part, these readings emphasize that it is Socrates’ commitment to
avoiding injustice that leads him toward a politics of abstention and negation. For example,
Hannah Arendt argues that Socrates’ approach to politics paralyzes political action. For Arendt,
Socrates’ negative, dissolvent approach to politics “slows people down in their potentially unjust
pursuits.”18 Similarly, George Kateb argues that when Socrates “engages in worldly action in
acts of citizenship, his whole concern is to avoid injustice.”19 And Dana Villa suggests that “the
avoidance of injustice, where the sense of injustice is plain and reflects widely held standards, is
the heart of Socratic virtue.”20 According to these commentators, Socrates’ strong commitment
to avoiding injustice leads to a “moderately alienated citizenship” that is inherently skeptical of
existing claims to justice. While not each of these scholars agrees that Socratic Citizenship is
possible, or desirable,21 all see in the figure of Socrates the archetype of a politics of negation
and abstention that is based on the avoidance of injustice.
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Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture,” Social Research 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1971): 423.
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Kateb, “Socratic Integrity,” 80.
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Villa, Socratic Citizenship, 27.

Dana Villa emphasizes his disagreement with Hannah Arendt. He writes that for Arendt, “Socrates cannot serve
as a model of citizenship, philosophical or otherwise, precisely because his care for his soul undermines the citizens’
care for the (public) world. Socratic conscience is, at bottom, self-interest.” Villa counters this by posting that
Socratic citizenship is a salutary orientation toward the world of politics whereby “one best pursues one’s
responsibility to the world, to the claims of citizenship, by cultivating a certain distance between the self and the
passions and energies of the demos.” Socratic Citizenship, 52–53. Thus, for Villa, Socrates’ private actions have a
public benefit. However, Socrates never states that he intends to benefit the city as a whole. To be sure, he likens
himself to a gadfly who has been “set upon the city by the god, as though upon a great and well-born horse” (Apol.
30e). However, he follows this up by reverting to a non-collectivist description of his mission, stating, “I awaken
and persuade and reproach each one of you” (ibid., 30e–31a). The remainder of this chapter will argue that
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The notion that Socrates’ stance to politics stems from a desire to avoid injustice is, as far
as it goes, correct. However, it fails to present the full picture of why Socrates employs the
stance toward politics that he does. It is noteworthy that in the Apology, no definition of either
justice or injustice is ever advanced. Furthermore, in this same dialogue, Socrates never claims
that his abstention from political activity results from a clash between his commitment to
avoiding injustice and the inevitable injustice that the practice of politics involves. Instead, he
notes that his abstention is a product of the daimonic voice:
The cause of this [abstention from politics] is what you have heard me
speak of many times and in many places, that something divine and
daimonic comes to me, a voice…. This is something which began for me
in childhood: a sort of voice comes, and whenever it comes, it always
turns me away from whatever I am about to do, but never turns me
forward. This is what opposes my political activity. (31c3–d6).

It is the daimonic voice that is specifically credited as opposing Socrates’ political activity.
Socrates’ avoidance of injustice seems to be simply an effect of the daimonion’s counsel to
abstain from politics.
If the daimonion is Socrates’ individuated conscience as numerous scholars have
suggested, then it is possible that Socrates’ desire to avoidance injustice is simply the product of
his daimonion, or conscience.22 However, a number of factors indicate that the relation between

Socrates’ negative and private approach stems from a concern that the city interferes with the health of the soul, or
that there is a disharmony between the city and the soul.
The central role that Socrates’ daimonion plays in the Apology, along with the relatively scant information we
receive about it in the entirety of the Platonic corpus, has led to much academic speculation over what precisely
Socrates’ daimonion is. Today, most scholars assume, in accordance with Hegel, that the daimonion represents
Socrates’ individuated conscience. See G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane,
vol. 1, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), 421–25. For a contrary perspective, which emphasizes the
religious character of the Socratic daimonion, see Vlastos, Socrates, 158. References to Socrates’ daimonion in the
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Socrates’ daimonion and his desire to avoid injustice are somewhat more complex. First, while
the daimonion is cited as being the cause of Socrates’ abstention from political activity,
Socrates’ contention that one cannot both act justly and preserve one’s own life while engaging
in political activity is only cited as evidence that the daimonion’s opposition is “altogether
noble” (31d, emphasis added).23 He does not cite this fact as the cause of his abstention for
political activity. In fact, in introducing the two examples from his own life that show that one
cannot be both committed to opposing injustice and be politically active without endangering
one’s life, Socrates states, “I for my part will offer great proofs of these things for you—not
speeches, but what you honor, deeds” (32a; emphasis in original). He goes on to say, “I will tell
you vulgar things, typical of the law courts, but true” (32a–b). While the examples that Socrates
provides of his commitment to moral integrity are honorable according to Athenian standards,
they are in his estimation vulgar and paltry.24
Socrates’ depiction of the Athenian conception of justice as vulgar, combined with the
fact that the Apology contains no definition of justice raises the questions: what is Socrates’ real
reason for abstaining from politics? Why does the daimonion oppose his involvement in
politics? And, what is Socrates’ conception of justice? The platonic corpus as a whole provides
little information about Socrates’ daimonion. However, the Gorgias does offer a suggestion as

works of Plato include Apology 31c–d; 40a–c, Euthyphro 3b, Republic 496c, Thaeatetus 151a, Phaedrus 224b–c,
Euthydemus 272e, and Theages 128d–131a.
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The noble (γενναῖος) is an important term and in the Hippias Major its definition proves elusive.

Later in his defense speech, Socrates again subtly implies that he values speech over deeds: “If I say that this even
happens to be a very great good for a human being—to make speeches every day about virtue and the other things
about which you hear me conversing and examining both myself and others—and that the unexamined life is not
worth living for a human being, you will be persuaded by me still less when I say these things” (Apol. 38a). As I
will make clear, the distinction between speech and deed becomes an important theme in the Gorgias.
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to why Socrates’ daimonion may oppose his involvement in politics. As noted above, the
Gorgias, like the Apology, deals with Socrates’ relation to the polis, but it does so in a more
private setting, among learned intellectuals. In the Gorgias, Socrates claims, in what appears to
be a stark contrast with the Apology, that he is the only person in all of Athens who practices
politics (Gorg. 521d). While on the face of it, Socrates’ claim appears to contradict the negative
and abstentious stance he takes towards politics in the Apology, the claim makes sense in light of
the Gorgias’ teaching concerning friendship and justice. Specifically, the Gorgias shows that
the Socratic understanding of friendship affects Socrates’ approach to politics, rendering it an
exclusively negative and private matter.

The Gorgias Part I: Phantom Friends and Phantom Politics
The Gorgias is ordinarily considered to be Plato’s dialogue concerning rhetoric.
However, a closer look reveals that the dialogue is nearly equally concerned with friendship and
justice, or the way one ought to treat a friend.25 The Gorgias is divided into two parts. In the
first part, Socrates engages with the well-known sophist Gorgias and his pupil Polus, who are
visiting Athens; in the second part, he converses with Callicles, the Athenian at whose house
Gorgias and Polus are staying. While their conversations cover similar topics, Socrates treats his

Roger Duncan notes, “As far as I can determine insufficient attention has been paid, in the interpretation of the
Gorgias, to the role of φιλία, particularly as it features in that third and longest section of the dialogue where
Socrates and Callicles confront each other.” “Philia in the Gorgias,” Apeiron 8 no. 1 (1974): 23–25. The
prominence of the theme of friendship in the Gorgias would be unsurprising if the narrative setting places it as
occurring immediately after the Lysis, as Catherine Zuckert argues. Plato’s Philosophers, 8–9. If Zuckert is correct,
we can surmise that in the Gorgias Plato works out how Socrates’ understanding of friendship articulated in the
Lysis impacts his relation to the political realm.
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interlocutors very differently. At the end of the first part of the dialogue, he seems to send Polus
back into the city, armed with a rhetoric designed to challenge the city’s conventions. In
contrast, toward the end of the second half of the dialogue, Callicles is counseled to avoid the
conventional practice of politics altogether. The disparate treatment Socrates affords his
interlocutors has long been the source of scholarly debate. I will argue that the difference in
approach Socrates takes with his interlocutors stems from his understanding of friendship.
Furthermore, I will show that Socrates’ understanding of friendship also makes sense of
Socrates’ negative approach to politics and his abstention from the conventional practice of
politics. An analysis of Socrates’ discussion with Polus reveals that Socrates’ understanding of
friendship necessitates a negative approach to politics, in which rhetoric is used to purge the city
of injustice. However, Socrates also invokes friendship as grounds for Callicles to avoid the
conventional practice of politics altogether. Thus, the Gorgias explains that friendship lies
behind both Socrates’ negative and his abstentious approach toward politics.26
The connection between the themes of rhetoric and friendship comes to the fore near the
beginning of the dialogue. Socrates and Chaerephon arrive late at Callicles’ house, and Callicles
states, “In war and battle, they say, one must take part in this manner” (447a). We soon learn
that Gorgias, a sophist visiting from Leontini, has been regaling the crowd inside with rhetoric,
and that Socrates and Chaerephon have come too late to hear the display of the speeches.
Callicles’ remark suggests that rhetoric is war—that is, rhetoric necessarily contains a conflict in

It might reasonably be questioned how Socrates’ understanding of friendship causes him both to counsel Polus to
return to the city and use rhetoric to purge it of injustice and to counsel Callicles to avoid politics altogether. As I
hope to make clear, Socrates’ ability to argue in this way hinges upon the different character of each of his
interlocutors. While neither Polus nor Callicles is impervious to shame, Callicles proves to be much less sensitive to
shame than does Polus.
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which one side emerges victorious. Socrates responds with his own proverb, “Oh, so have we
then come, as the saying goes, after the feast and too late?” (447a). In contrast to Callicles’
statement, the proverb quoted by Socrates implies that rhetoric is not like war but is more like a
feast of which all friends can partake. The opening colloquy sets up the fundamental question of
the dialogue: Is rhetoric akin to war with its clash of opposing interests, or is it more like a feast
shared among friends that leaves everyone satisfied?
Socrates informs Callicles that he would prefer to skip the feast and learn instead from
Gorgias “what the power of the man’s art is, and what it is that he professes and teaches” (447c).
What is the power of Gorgianic rhetoric? Socrates wishes to know to what extent rhetoric can
truly reconcile opposing interests and satisfy all parties.27 To begin the inquiry, Socrates
instructs Chaerephon to ask Gorgias “who he is” (447d). Perhaps in a bid to put on his own
display, Polus interjects with an oath, “By Zeus, Chaerephon, test me, if you wish!” (448a).
Chaerephon obliges and asks Polus what it is that Gorgias ought to be called; just as one who
knows the art of medicine is called a doctor, and one experienced in the art of painting is called a
painter, so Chaerephon wishes to know, on the basis of Gorgias’ art, what he should be called.
As noted above, the question of who Gorgias is has to do with his relation to the city—what is
Gorgias’ contribution to the city? Or, how does he fit into the whole?28 In providing the example

Seth Benardete notes, “The issue in the background of the Gorgias is very simple. If Gorgianic rhetoric has the
power Gorgias claims for it, it would necessarily follow that the best city in speech of the Republic could be realized
anywhere on earth and at any time.” The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991), 5.
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Gorgias was a famous rhetorician who traveled from city to city selling his knowledge. Teresa Morgan, “Rhetoric
and Education,” in A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, ed. Ian Worthington (West Sussex: Blackwell, 2010), 304. The
question of Gorgias’ relation to the city is, therefore, apposite, as the manner in which Gorgias practices his craft
transcends political boundaries and loyalties. Later on, Gorgias will claim that rhetoric ought to be used justly and
for the benefit of friends (456a–457c).
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of a doctor and a painter, Chaerephon—perhaps unwittingly—anticipates Socrates’ discussion
with Gorgias and gets to the heart of the dialogue. Is rhetoric akin to the knowledge of a doctor
or is it merely an experience or skill that imitates reality?
Polus responds with comic prolixity, saying nearly nothing.29 He simply praises Gorgias’
art as “the best,” without saying what it consists of. However, Polus does choose between the
two options provided by Chaerephon, “knowledge” and “experience,” noting that art is simply
experience, and that art (as experience) conquers chance (448c).30 Polus suggests that in the
absence of the skills obtained through experience, our lives would proceed according to the
vagaries of fortune. According to Polus, rhetoric is one of the skills that can conquer chance. At
this point, Socrates interjects, noting that Polus has engaged in rhetoric—that is, he has simply
praised Gorgias’ art, without answering what it is. Socrates knows enough about rhetoric to
know that it consists in assigning blame and praise, and that it commonly does so without
knowledge of its object. Because of Polus’ failure, Socrates begins to engage Gorgias directly.
After quickly establishing that the art he practices is rhetoric and that, as such, Gorgias can
rightly be called a rhetor, Socrates asks him, “what of the things that are (τα ὄντα), does rhetoric
happen to be about?” “About what … is it a science?” (449d). By characterizing Gorgias’
practice in this way, Socrates skillfully shifts the category under which rhetoric falls from art to
science, and from experience to knowledge.31 By shifting rhetoric’s categorization in this way,

“Chaerephon, many arts have been discovered among men experimentally through experiences. For experience
causes our life to proceed by art, whereas inexperience causes it to proceed by chance. Of each of these arts, various
men variously partake of various ones, and the best men partake of the best; among these is Gorgias here, and he has
a share in the finest of the arts” (448c).
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Socrates suggests that he wants to probe the extent to which Gorgias’ practice is directed towards
truth or towards “the things that are.”
Gorgias responds that rhetoric concerns speeches and, when pressed to follow up with
more specificity, Gorgias states in a manner reminiscent of Polus’ vacuous response, that the
rhetoric of speeches is concerned with “the greatest of human affairs … and the best” (451d).
Socrates points out that opinions vary on what is “the greatest of human affairs,” and to illustrate
he quotes a quatrain from a popular drinking song, which enumerates the various goods people
claim are best: “‘Being healthy is best, and second is to have become beautiful and third’ as the
poet who wrote the song says, ‘is being wealthy without fraud’” (451e). However, Socrates
omits portions from the song. The full quotation concerning the second good is “to have become
beautiful in one’s nature.” In addition, Socrates completely omits the song’s fourth good,
namely, “to be in the prime of youth with friends.”32 Both of these omissions are significant
because, as I will make clear, they go to the heart of the issue of the Gorgias: to what extent is
rhetoric akin to a war, and to what extent is it akin to a feast shared by friends?
Gorgias responds that rhetoric has the power to obtain all the goods mentioned by
Socrates in the drinking song. Rhetoric is “able to persuade by speeches” in any political setting,

This shift is purposeful, and it betrays Socrates’ efforts to discover whether rhetoric is capable of aiming towards
what is, or towards truth. Based on the manner in which Socrates appears to try and redirect rhetoric towards the
things “that are,” some scholars have suggested that Socrates’ purpose is to reform rhetoric. See Devin Stauffer, The
Unity of Plato’s ‘Gorgias’: Rhetoric, Justice and the Philosophic Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006).
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E. R. Dodds provides the full quatrain. He remarks that “the fourth item is omitted by Plato, since it does not
depend on any τέχνη.” Plato Gorgias: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon,
1959), 200. However, Dodds does not comment on Socrates’ incomplete quotation of the second good. My own
view is that Socrates’ omission of the fourth good is meant to raise the question of what role friendship ought to play
in political life. On Socrates’ incomplete quotation of the second good, see n. 59 and accompanying text below.
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enabling one to obtain power over the artisans who produce health, beauty, and wealth (452e).
Gorgias thus sets up rhetoric as architectonic; it is able to command all other arts and sciences
and is able to satisfy all bodily desires. However, rhetoric’s relation to friendship—the fourth
good of the drinking song that was left unstated by Socrates—remains open. Is friendship a
good like health, beauty, and wealth, which can be obtained through rhetoric? Or is friendship
something altogether different? Rhetoric’s relation to friendship will soon be raised directly by
Gorgias himself.
Perhaps as a result of Gorgias’ response, Socrates shifts the category again, adopting the
language of art: “You’re saying that rhetoric is a craftsman of persuasion” (453a; emphasis
added). It seems that while Socrates is willing to grant Gorgias the benefit of the doubt in
describing it as a science, Gorgias’ response causes Socrates to relegate it again to the status of
art. By switching the status of rhetoric from art, to science, and back again, Socrates signals his
ambivalence about the status of rhetoric; it may theoretically be possible for rhetoric to be a
science, but as described by Gorgias, rhetoric is at most an art.
The notion that rhetoric is concerned with persuasion is not precise enough for Socrates.
He notes that while he has a suspicion as to what Gorgias means with this notion, he would like
to ask Gorgias to clarify it for him by responding to his questions. The reason he chooses to
proceed in this manner rather than stating his suspicion outright is, according Socrates, “not on
account of you, [Gorgias], but on account of the argument, in order that it may go forward so as
to make what is being talked about as manifest as possible to us” (453c). Socrates declares,
perhaps somewhat rudely, that his concern is not for Gorgias, but rather for the truth of the
argument. Socrates’ primary interest in speaking with Gorgias, is not to improve Gorgias in
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some way, but is instead self-interest.33 Socrates’ own good—that is, his inquiry into the power
of rhetoric—rather than a concern for Gorgias’ good, is the primary driver of the conversation.34
A short while later, Socrates will state forthrightly that he would rather be refuted if he were to
say something false than refute another’s false statement, for “it is a greater good to be released
oneself from the greatest evil than to release another” (458a).
Upon prompting, Gorgias makes clear that rhetoric is about “persuasion in law courts and
in other mobs … and about those things that are just and unjust” (454b). Socrates indicates that
this is precisely the suspicion he had, but that he had asked for clarity, “not on account of you”
(i.e., not for Gorgias’ interest), but instead so that the argument can “be brought to a conclusion
in a consequential manner” (454c). Again, Socrates makes clear that he is pursuing the argument
for his own sake, or to attain truth. This time, however, after noting that he is pursuing the
argument for the sake of truth, and not for Gorgias’ sake, Socrates adds, “so that we may not
become accustomed to guessing and hastily snatching up each other’s words” (454c). Socrates
makes clear that while his primary concern is with the truth, he would like to remain on friendly
terms with Gorgias. Socrates is exploring the main theme of the dialogue: What is the power of
Gorgianic rhetoric? Can Gorgianic rhetoric be directed toward the truth (Socrates’ interest) and
at the same time maintain friendships?
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Some have argued that the self-interest displayed by Socrates is related to his trial. According to this line of
argument Socrates is seeking to reform rhetoric so as to make his trial proceed favorably. See, Devin Stauffer, The
Unity of the Gorgias.
This primary concern for one’s own good is echoed in the Charmides, “I am examining the argument mainly for
my own sake, but also, perhaps, for that of my other intimates” (166c7–d4).
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Having made clear to Gorgias that he would like their conversation to proceed in a
friendly manner and wants to aim at the truth, Socrates continues his questioning, extricating
from Gorgias the concession that rhetoric, in contrast to didactic persuasion, “provides belief
without knowing” (454e). Socrates concludes by diplomatically stating the conclusion to their
colloquy: “The rhetor, therefore, is not didactic with law courts and the other mobs about just
and unjust things, but persuasive only; for he would not be able, I suppose, to teach so large a
mob such great matters in a short time” (455a).35 Upon Gorgias’ acceptance of this summary,
Socrates once again presses Gorgias to define precisely what it is that rhetoric is able to obtain.
Surely, it is engineers and architects (those with knowledge), not rhetors, who are responsible for
the walls and harbors of the city. Therefore, concerning what—aside from the just and unjust—
does rhetoric give counsel? (455d). Gorgias counters by noting that it is the rhetors, rather than
the craftsmen, who are responsible for the “coming into being” of walls, harbors, and the like.
Socrates does not dispute Gorgias’ claim, but encourages him, noting that rhetoric “appears to
me as a power demonic in greatness” (456a).
Gorgias responds to this flattery by giving in to his propensity for loquacity and delivers
a disquisition on the benefits and purpose of rhetoric, a disquisition that will make clear his
confused understanding of rhetoric. Socrates subtly points out that gratification or flattery leads
another into error. By encouraging or gratifying him, Socrates goads Gorgias into delivering a
long disquisition on the powers of rhetoric. As it turns out, it is precisely this disquisition that
brings to light Gorgias’ confused and contradictory understanding of rhetoric.

James Nichols writes of Socrates’ remark, “Could one imagine a more tactful way of bringing up the rhetor’s lack
of concern for conveying knowledge about issues of justice?” Plato Gorgias, 37 n. 28.
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In order to prove the power of rhetoric, Gorgias points to his ability to persuade those
unwilling to do what is best. He notes that he has gone with doctors to visit the sick and, while
the doctors are at times unable to persuade unwilling patients to take their medicine, Gorgias,
using the power of rhetoric, is able to persuade these patients to take their medicine, for their
own benefit. Rhetoric is, therefore, all-powerful, and can be used to ensure that people
undertake what is good for them, even if they don’t recognize it as good (456b). Yet, despite this
power, Gorgias quickly cautions that it should be used only against one’s enemies, not against
one’s friends and family. Just as one who has become skilled in boxing ought not use those
skills to “beat … his father and mother or some other relative or friend” but ought instead to use
those skills against “enemies and doers of injustice,” so rhetoric ought to be used in the same
manner (456d–456e). In this statement, Gorgias exposes his understanding of justice—an
understanding that calls to mind Polemarchus’ definition of justice in the Republic: one ought to
do good to friends and harm enemies.
Three fundamental and connected themes emerge from Gorgias’ disquisition: the good,
justice, and friendship. Gorgias’ statement that rhetoric can persuade those who are unwilling to
take their medicine reveals a recognition that rhetoric can and should be aimed toward the good.
However, Gorgias also displays a devotion to friendship, or the principle that one ought to be
loyal to one’s own. Tellingly, however, Gorgias allies justice only to friendship, and not to the
good. Indeed, he asserts it would be unjust to use rhetoric against one’s friends.36 The rhetor is
placed in somewhat of a quandary. According to Gorgias’ description, the rhetorician has two
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We can be skeptical of the extent to which Gorgias, as a traveling rhetorician who sells his wares to the highest
bidder, truly believes in the existence of justice and friendship. See above at n. 28 and accompanying text.
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incompatible goals. On the one hand, the rhetor is capable of administering treatment to his
patients, ensuring that those who are unwilling to do what is best for them, will nonetheless do
so. On the other hand, Gorgias believes that justice dictates that the rhetor ought not to use his
skill against his friends. Of course, if a friend were to fall ill and be in need of medicine, the
rhetor’s goals would come into conflict. Friendship may well impede the rhetor’s ability to
administer medicine in a manner that is conducive to the patient’s health.
Socrates very likely realizes that Gorgias’ conception of justice and friendship is in
tension, if not outright opposition, with his belief that rhetoric ought to aim for the good.
However, rather than set the good and the just against each other directly, Socrates instead shows
that the rhetorician could never do an injustice. After coaxing Gorgias to admit that the
rhetorician must necessarily know what justice is, Socrates is able to show (not altogether
convincingly) that as a knower of justice, the rhetorician must therefore be just, do just things,
and never wish to do injustice (460b–c). When Gorgias agrees, Socrates concludes that Gorgias
must have been mistaken in asserting that the rhetor would ever use his art in unjust manner.
What is noteworthy about this exchange is that neither Gorgias nor Socrates offers any
definition of justice. As Polus will later assert, Gorgias likely does not know what justice is, but
is shamed into asserting that he is concerned with justice. As a rhetorician who travels from
place to place, Gorgias has likely seen that different cities have different conceptions of justice.
Further, as a rhetorician who sells his services, Gorgias likely adapts his speeches (and thereby
his conception of justice) to the city he happens to be visiting. Socrates appeals to Gorgias’
sense of shame, inducing him to concede (perhaps falsely) that he is concerned with justice. As

79

a result, Socrates’ refutation of Gorgias contains no direct conflict between justice, or a
commitment to one’s friends, and the good.
Through an appeal to Gorgias’ shame, Socrates manages to save the phenomenon of
justice. However, the relationship of justice to friendship and the good has not yet been
resolved. Is justice allied with friendship (as Gorgias indicates) and therefore opposed to the
good? Or is justice allied with the good, and therefore something that undermines friendship?
The question of where justice stands in relation to the good and friendship comes to the fore in
the next section of the dialogue, which takes place between Socrates and Polus. Upon
witnessing Socrates refute Gorgias, Polus interjects with force, arguing that Gorgias is simply
ashamed to admit that the rhetorician does not also know the “just, noble, and good things”
(461b), and that it is his sensitivity to shame that has led to his refutation.37 Socrates responds,
telling Polus that it would be just for Polus to correct him and Gorgias if they have been “tripped
up in the speeches on some point” (461d).38 Polus agrees and begins to question Socrates on
what rhetoric is. Through a series of exchanges in which Socrates tells Polus what questions to
pose to him, Socrates reveals that he believes rhetoric to be a sort of flattery that is, in fact, a
“phantom of a part of politics” (463d).
When Gorgias intervenes, expressing confusion, Socrates elaborates, noting that the art
that is directed to the soul is called politics, and that it is comprised of two parts—the legislative
art and justice (464b–d). Justice, therefore, is directed toward the improvement of the soul.

Polus is likely correct to describe Gorgias’ shame as the cause of his refutation, as Gorgias does exhibit a sense of
shame at various points of the dialogue (cf. 458d7–458e2).
37
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Socrates’ response adumbrates what will later be his definition of justice. Justice is refuting others (cf. 505b–c).
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Socrates continues, stating that flattery (the phantom art of politics), is itself divided into two
parts; sophistry and rhetoric, which are meant to mimic the legislative art and justice. He states,
flattery “slipped in under each of the parts” of the art of politics (the legislative art and justice)
and pretends to be that which it has slipped under. Thus, sophistry pretends to be the legislative
art, while rhetoric pretends to be justice. The problem, Socrates notes somewhat perfunctorily, is
that neither of these parts of flattery give heed to “the best,” but instead “hunt … after folly with
what is ever most pleasant” (464d).
The distinction, therefore, between rhetoric and justice is that while justice aims at what
is best, rhetoric aims at what is most pleasant. While Socrates does not yet declare what “the
best” is, we can surmise that between the two contenders, friendship and the good, Socrates
means that justice aims at the good. This supposition is borne out when Socrates invokes the
analogy to the medical art that Gorgias had raised earlier, and notes that justice is akin to the art
of the doctor in that it aims at what is best: the health of the patient. By invoking this analogy,
Socrates finally dissociates justice from friendship and allies it instead with the good. It seems
at this point that rhetoric, which aims only at what is pleasant or that which gratifies, is allied
with friendship. However, while Socrates suggests that justice aims at what is best and,
therefore, at the good, we still do not know of what it is that justice consists. In fact, Socrates
remains almost cryptic about what justice is.39
Polus, not knowing quite what to make of Socrates’ depiction of rhetoric, seeks to
burnish the reputation of rhetoric by focusing on the supposedly powerful deeds that the person
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Cf. Apology, 32a.
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skilled in rhetoric is capable of accomplishing. He asks: Don’t rhetors, like tyrants, have the
capacity to “kill whomever they wish, and confiscate possessions and expel from the cities
whomever it seems good to them” (466b–c)? Rather than explain precisely what justice is,
Socrates explains that Polus has, in fact, asked two questions: “Do rhetors do whatever they
wish?” and “Do rhetors do what seems good to them?” (466c–d). Through a series of dialectical
moves, Socrates shows that the rhetor who engages in these deeds does them only to pursue what
he perceives to be good for him. Therefore, if the rhetor engages in one of these acts under the
mistaken belief that he is doing something good for himself, he does nothing of what he wishes,
although he certainly does what seems to him to be best (466e). Given that Polus had earlier
agreed that having power is good for the person who wields it, Socrates is able to refute Polus’
conception of power, concluding, “Do you then think it is good, if someone who does not have
intelligence does those things that seem to him to be best? And do you call this having great
power?” (466e).
In response, Polus reveals his commitment to what is pleasant as opposed to what is best.
He protests indignantly that Socrates himself would “welcome the possibility of doing what
seemed good” to him, whether it was just or unjust (468e). In recognition that Polus has not
been convinced by his refutation—that is, by what is best40—Socrates attempts to gratify him by

Socrates has implied, earlier in the dialogue that being refuted is best. Cf. Gor. 458a (“And of what men am I
one? Those who are refuted with pleasure if I say something not true, and who refute with pleasure if someone
should say something not true—and indeed not with less pleasure to be refuted than to refute. For I consider it a
greater good, to the extent that it is a greater good to be released oneself from the greatest evil than to release
another. For I think that nothing is so great an evil for a human being as false opinion about the things that our
argument now happens to be about”). That Socrates believes that being refuted is the greatest good (greater even
than refuting another) explains why Socrates earlier insisted that his primary purpose in pursuing the argument was
for his own sake, and not for the sake of his interlocutors. Socrates does not primarily pursue the argument to refute
Gorgias, but to test his own opinions. See above at n. 34 above and accompanying text.
40
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appealing to his desire for punishment. First, he tells Polus that one ought not admire those who
do injustice but instead ought to pity them, for they are wretched. When Polus asks how the
rhetor who commits great acts of injustice is wretched, Socrates compares the rhetor to a
common criminal who kills citizens in the market place. In response, Polus protests that this is
not the type of power he has in mind, because “it is necessary for someone who acts in this
manner to pay a penalty” (470a).41 This reply reveals that Polus’ earlier shameless disregard for
justice was feigned; Polus is not so shameless as to praise a petty criminal. While Polus admires
rhetors and tyrants who are able to engage in injustice on a grand scale, he has no admiration for
the common criminal.
Having exposed Polus’ shame or sense of decency by appealing to his desire for
punishment, Socrates seeks to refute Polus on two points. The first is Polus’ notion that it is
better to do injustice than it is to suffer injustice (469b), and the second is Polus’ belief that the
individual who escapes punishment is better off than the individual who pays the penalty for his
injustice (472e). In order to prove the first claim, that doing injustice is a greater evil than
suffering injustice, Socrates begins by establishing that all fine or noble things are called such on
the basis of either use or pleasure, while the shameful are defined by the opposite, namely, pain
and badness. Because Polus agrees that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering injustice,
the former must surpass the latter either in pain or in badness, or in both. Furthermore, because
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In comparing the rhetor to a common criminal who, according to Polus, deserves punishment, Socrates appeals to
Polus’ moralistic desire for punishment, which will eventually prove necessary to persuade him that the rhetor is
unjust. However, Polus is unwilling to equate the rhetor with the common criminal and, in support of the contention
that unjust rhetors are happy, he points to the many unjust deeds that Archelaus the ruler of Macedonia committed in
order to attain his station. Socrates never states his agreement with Polus that Archelaus is unjust, or even that he
has committed injustices. (Gorg. 468e–71d).
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doing injustice cannot possibly exceed the suffering of injustice in the realm of pain, it must
surpass it in badness (474e–475b). As a result, doing injustice must be worse than suffering
injustice (475d).42
Next, Socrates seeks to prove that it is a greater evil to avoid paying the penalty for
injustice than to be punished for an injustice. First, he obtains Polus’ agreement that “all just
things are fine” or noble insofar as they are just (476b). After this, he asserts that in any action
that is undertaken, the entity undergoing the action undergoes it in whatever way the action is
inflicted. Thus, if someone beats violently, the object that has been beaten will have been beaten
in a violent manner (476c). Having secured Polus’ affirmation, Socrates extends this to suffering
a penalty. If someone suffers a penalty from one who justly inflicts the penalty, the penalty must
also be suffered justly. And, if the penalty is suffered justly, it must also be noble or fine to
suffer such penalties (476e). Socrates concludes that it is beneficial to suffer punishments, as it
releases one from “badness of soul” (477a).
By appealing to Polus’ desire for punishment, Socrates partially reintegrates Polus into
the city. Polus’ attack on justice has been uncovered as insincere, and Socrates seems to reestablish the ties of justice between Polus and the city. However, he does so in a manner that
ensures that Polus does not simply uncritically accept the city’s conventions. Indeed, if it is
better to suffer punishment than to escape punishment, it is necessary that one seek to administer
justice—and therefore punishment—both on oneself and one’s friends. The relationship of

42

There is reason to believe that Socrates does not, himself, agree with this argument, as it relies on the claim that
the fine or noble is equivalent to the good, a distinction which is challenged in the Hippias Major. James Nichols
notes that “in the Hippias Major, Socrates investigates just what the fine (noble, beautiful) is; it proves very difficult
to state.” Plato Gorgias, 61, n. 54.
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justice to friendship is finally revealed. While Socrates had earlier revealed that justice is allied
with the good, we now see that it is allied with the good against friendship. One ought to act like
a doctor that administers medicine. To act justly means removing injustice from one’s own the
soul and from the souls of one’s fellow citizens. As a result, Socrates states the following
concerning rhetoric:
For speaking in defense of one’s own injustice, therefore, or that of
parents or comrades or children or fatherland when it does injustice,
rhetoric will be of no use to us, Polus; except if someone takes it to be of
use for the opposite purpose, supposing that he must most of all accuse
himself, and then whoever else of his relatives and friends happens at any
time to do injustice, and not hide the unjust deed but bring it into the
open so as to pay the just penalty and become healthy, and compel both
himself and others not to play the coward but to grit his teeth and submit
well and courageously as if to a doctor for cutting and burning. (480b–c).

Socrates appeals to Polus’ desire to punish, noting that if rhetoric is to have any use at all, it
would be to accuse oneself, one’s friends, and one’s own city.
Because Socrates suggests that one ought to accuse oneself, one’s friends, and one’s own
city, some scholars have suggested that Socrates is sending Polus back into the city to administer
justice and purge it of its unjust practices.43 However, a close look at Socrates’ statements
concerning justice reveals that this is only partially correct. Socrates does not seem to be
particularly concerned with what are conventionally or vulgarly considered to be the unjust
practices of politics.44 For example, when Socrates demurs from Polemarchus’ assertion that
Archelaus, the ruler of the Macedonians, is unjust, Polus responds incredulously, “But how on
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Nichols, “The Rhetoric of Justice in Plato’s Gorgias,” in Plato Gorgias, 139.
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Cf. Apology 32a–b.
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earth could he not be unjust?” (471a). Polus then conveys a litany of conventionally unjust
practices that Archelaus has committed, including the illicit attainment of the throne of
Macedonia and the killing of both his master and his master’s bloodline (471a–c). Socrates
responds, “I certainly do not agree with you on any one of these things that you are asserting”
(471e).45 Socratic justice, seems to be different from, or beyond, a conventional, vulgar,
understanding of justice that eschews the practices engaged in by Archelaus. Thus, it cannot be
that Socrates simply sends Polus back into the city to reform its unjust practices.
If Socratic justice differs from the vulgar, common conception of justice with which
Polus is concerned, what does it consist of? While Socrates does not provide a definition of
justice anywhere in his discussion with Polus, he intimates throughout that it is connected to
speech. For example, when questioning Gorgias what precisely concerns rhetoric or in what
areas it persuades, Socrates asks, “Since, therefore, not [rhetoric] alone but also other [arts]
achieve this work [i.e., persuasion] … we might after this justly ask the speaker further, ‘Of what
sort persuasion, and of persuasion about what, is rhetoric the art?’ Or doesn’t it seem to you just
to ask further?” (454a; emphasis added). Similarly, when Polus angrily interrupts Socrates’
conversation with Gorgias, Socrates tells him it is just for him to correct himself and Gorgias if
they have been “tripped up in the speeches on some point” (461d). Justice is connected to
speech; speaking truthfully is just, while falsity (and flattery) are unjust.46

Socrates similarly demurs from the statement that “the great king” (i.e., the King of Persia) is unjust, commenting,
“I do not know how he stands in regard to education and justice” (Gorg. 470e).
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Cf. 448b: “I’m asking now. If Gorgias happened to be a knower of his brother Herodicus’s art, what would we
justly name him” (emphasis added). Cf. also 465e–466a: “So then, when you are answering, if I too do not know
what use to make of it, you too extend your speech; but if I do, let me make use of it; for that is just.”
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This conception of justice also helps to make sense of Socrates’ argument that it is better
for one to pay the penalty for injustice than to escape punishment. According to Socrates’
understanding of justice, escaping punishment simply ensures that one maintains a false
conception of what is, whereas undergoing punishment ensures that one’s false convictions are
refuted. This interpretation of Socrates’ understanding of justice is borne out in the dialogue,
when Polus tells Socrates that even a child could refute him. Socrates responds, “I shall feel
much gratitude to the child then, and equal gratitude to you too, if you refute me and release me
from drivel. So don’t tire of doing good to a man who’s a friend, but refute” (470c; emphasis
added). Similarly, immediately before refuting Gorgias, Socrates states, “And of what men am I
one? Those who are refuted with pleasure if I say something not true, and who refute with
pleasure if someone should say something not true…. For I think that nothing is so great an evil
for a human being as false opinion about the things that our argument now happens to be about”
(458a–b). Last, sometime after Socrates has refuted Polus, Socrates states, “Don’t shrink from
answering, Polus; for you will suffer no harm. But submit yourself in a nobly born manner to the
argument as to a doctor, and answer” (475d). Socrates does not believe that justice primarily
consists either in performing actions that are vulgarly considered to be just deeds or in avoiding
unjust deeds. Rather, justice consists in refuting others’ opinions about what is, for it is by
refuting another—and thereby leading him to a state of perplexity—that a person, is released
from falsity.47

This is finally asserted explicitly toward the end of the dialogue during Socrates’ conversation with Callicles. Cf.
522d–e.
47
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Socrates’ conception of justice and his approach to Polus mirror the approach undertaken
in the Lysis. It will be recalled that in the Lysis Socrates refutes Lysis in a manner that causes
him to question all his pre-existing friendships. Socrates leads Lysis to understand that his
friendships have not been sufficient and that, to the extent that Lysis believed them to be
sufficient, they were simply “phantom friendships.” Therefore, through refuting him, Socrates
releases Lysis from a state of complacency and opens him up to an awareness of need and,
perhaps, to the good life of contemplation. In the Gorgias, Socrates undertakes a similar
approach with Polus. He refutes Polus and releases him from his erroneous conception of justice
and rhetoric. For Socrates, justice is allied not with friendship, but with the good. As a result,
justice—and rhetoric, if it is to be just—ought to question friendships and the conceptions of
justice that uphold them. According to Socrates, a true friend (as opposed to a “phantom friend”)
is one who questions and exposes the false or “phantom” conceptions of justice, friendship, or
whatever else that is. In contrast, a “phantom” friend is one who engages in flattery, preserving a
false conception of what is. In both dialogues, Socrates can be seen acting as a true friend (under
the Socratic conception of friendship), who releases his interlocutors from a mistaken conception
of what is. While refutation is a painful process—much like the taking of medicine or
punishment—it leaves one better off, as it leaves one perplexed and therefore desirous of true
wisdom.
Socrates’s negative approach to politics, therefore, is explained by his conception of
friendship and justice. His belief that justice consists in refuting a friend in order to free him
from an erroneous conception of what is, means that Socrates’ approach to politics and the
practice of justice takes a negative form. In the name of friendship and justice, Socrates
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dissolves his fellow citizens’ pre-existing conceptions of who a friend is, and what is just or
noble. In this way, Socrates’ claim to be the only person to practice politics is understandable,
despite his complete avoidance of conventional politics. This negative approach is not primarily
due to Socrates’ commitment to avoiding acts that the many consider to be unjust (i.e., vulgar
justice), nor is it due to a desire to preserve his own life. Rather, when Socrates relates in the
Apology that he has never “conceded anything contrary to the just” (33a), what he means is that
he has never engaged in flattery but has instead always acted justly by dissolving his fellow
citizens’ erroneous conceptions of what is.
Through his refutation of Polus, Socrates is able to show both Gorgias and Polus why
their practice of rhetoric is unjust. Flattery, as the phantom part of justice, preserves phantom
friendships. Together, flattery and phantom friendships lead to complacency. Just as the
phantom friendships described in the Lysis lead one to a false sense of self-sufficiency and
impede one’s access to the good, so flattery, the phantom part of justice, maintains a false
conception of what is and maintains those who have been lied to in a state of ignorance and
complacency (cf. Rep. 382b–c). In contrast, Socratic justice involves dissolving false
conceptions of what is. Of course, by doing so, one also dissolves that which undergirds
phantom friendships. In Socrates’ view it is by dissolving another’s false conceptions of justice,
and by dissolving their phantom friendships that one truly acts as a friend. Thus, it his
understanding of friendship and justice that prompts Socrates to act as a gadfly who wakens his
fellow citizens from their slumber by dissolving their pre-existing conceptions of what is (Apol.
30e). It is only by dissolving another’s false conceptions of what is, thereby leading him to a
state of perplexity, that one can open him up to a life of contemplation. Socrates’ approach to
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politics is negative because politics, as it is practiced in Athens—and likely as it is practiced in
all places at all times—relies on flattery (cf. Rep. 414b–c).

The Gorgias Part II: Socratic Eros and the Private Life
While Socrates’ conception of friendship and justice explains his negative approach to politics, it
does not yet explain why Socrates chooses to do this privately, but not in the public manner
befitting an Athenian citizen (cf. Apol. 31c). That is, why does Socrates not choose to engage
himself in the world of politics and publicly dissolve his fellow citizens’ conceptions of what is?
Some have maintained that it is simply because of the incompatibility of philosophy and
politics.48 However, Socrates’ discussion with Polus has made clear that rhetoric can potentially
be used to dissolve people’s false conceptions of justice and of what is (480b–c). To understand
why Socrates abstains from publicly engaging in his negative approach to politics, it is necessary
to turn to his discussion with Callicles, which comprises the second half of the Gorgias. As we
shall see, the basis of Socrates’ abstention is found in his conception of friendship.
Having heard Socrates explain to Polus that if rhetoric is to have any use in the city at all,
it ought to be used to punish oneself, one’s friends, and one’s fatherland, Callicles cannot contain
himself. He bursts in, asking Chaerephon whether Socrates is serious.49 Somewhat curiously,
Socrates responds to Callicles by first pointing to something he and Callicles share:

E.g., Villa, Socratic Citizenship, 37: “Public address … effectively forbids any fundamental questioning. Oratory
is flattery because persuasion, not genuine criticism, is its goal.”
48
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Callicles, if human beings did not have some feeling that was the same—
some having one and others another—but if some one of us suffered
some private feeling different from what the others feel, it would not be
too easy to point out one’s own affection to the other. I say this bearing
in mind that you and I now happen to have suffered something that is the
same: we are two lovers. (481c–d).

Socrates points out that he Callicles are similar in that they are both erotic individuals. Given the
distinction between “phantom friends” and erotic desire formulated in the Lysis, Socrates seems
to be indicating that Callicles, like he himself, is aware that he is in some way incomplete and in
need. Neither Socrates nor Callicles suffer from the complacency brought on by the illusions of
self-sufficiency associated with phantom friendships. Like Socrates, Callicles is a desirous
individual. Thus, we can already surmise that Socrates’ interaction with Callicles will not
consist of a simple refutation in order to perplex him and lead him to a state of desire.
After this initial statement pointing out their similarities, Socrates quickly goes on also to
explicate the differences between them by pointing to the objects of their love. While Socrates
loves Alcibiades and philosophy, Callicles is in love with the Athenian people and with Demos
the son of Pyrilampes.50 It seems that in their desirous nature, Socrates and Callicles are similar,
but not identical to one another. Of course, this was the final definition of friendship tentatively
put forward, yet not fully explored, at the end of Lysis. As I will make clear, by having Socrates

Nichols relates that Chaerephon’ s response, “there’s nothing like asking the man himself,” mirrors Callicles’
response to Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue suggesting “that the dialogue is to begin anew here.” Gorgias,
n. 61.
49
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The son of Pyrilampes was called Demos, which is of course the same word for the Athenian people (demos).
Demos the son of Pyrilampes “was famous for his beauty and also for lack of intelligence.” Nichols, Plato Gorgias,
70 n. 65.
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emphasize both their similarities and their differences, Plato alludes to the possibility of a
rapprochement, or friendship, between these two individuals.
However, Socrates does not seek a rapprochement between himself and Callicles.
Instead, he confronts him in a very personal way by suggesting that his own philosophic way of
life is superior to the active life practiced by Callicles, due to the stability of philosophy. While
the fickleness of the Athenian people causes Callicles constantly to say different and discordant
things, Socrates’ own love, philosophy, always says the same thing. Socrates challenges
Callicles to refute the philosophic principle that has come to light in his discussion with Polus,
“by showing that doing injustice and not paying the just penalty when one does injustice are not
the utmost of all evils” (482b). He concludes that if Callicles fails to refute this principle, he will
continue to say discordant things and “will be dissonant in his whole life” (482b). It is only by
either proving the superiority of his life or redirecting his desires from a love of the people to a
love of philosophy that Callicles’ soul will be made harmonious (Cf. Rep., 443c–e).
Taking up the challenge, Callicles responds by appealing to a sense of natural justice. He
asserts that the only reason Socrates has been able to refute both Polus and Gorgias, was that he
shifted the grounds of the debate from what is natural to what is conventional, thereby appealing
to his interlocutors’ sense of shame. It was their shame that caused Gorgias and Polus to shrink
from saying what they truly believe and compelling them to say contradictory things. 51

For a convincing analysis of the role of shame in Plato’s Gorgias, see Richard McKim, “Shame and Truth in
Plato’s Gorgias,” in Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings, ed. Charles L. Griswold, Jr. (New York: Routledge,
1988), 34–48. McKim argues that Socrates uses the concept of shame as a weapon of psychological warfare in
order to maneuver his interlocutors into acknowledging that, deep down, they do hold Socrates’ way of life to be
superior.
51
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To avoid the fate of Gorgias and Polus, Callicles seeks to blunt the power of convention
by attacking it at its roots. He asserts in what seems to be a proto-Nietzschean fashion that the
conventional or the lawful is simply a creation of the “weak human beings and the many”
(483b). The lawful, according to Callicles, is simply a tool by which the weak frighten away the
strong so that the many may have an equal share. In contrast to what is conventionally lawful,
Callicles holds that the law of nature reveals that it is just “for the better to have more than the
worse and the more powerful than the less powerful” (483d). A truly great individual, asserts
Callicles, is one who transcends the conventional morality of the weak and rises up “to be
revealed as our master” (484b). Thus, by engaging in the greatest of illegalities, an individual is
only acting in accordance with what is naturally just.52
Callicles continues, arguing that it is only once Socrates gives up the philosophic life in
favor of the political life that he will come to recognize the truth of natural justice. He warns of
the dangers of devoting oneself exclusively to philosophy, noting that a person who does this
will lack experience in political affairs and, as a result, will necessarily appear ridiculous when
he attempts to engage in them, just as a man who devotes himself exclusively to political
practices will appear ridiculous when he seeks to engage in philosophy. The individual who
avoids public life, he intimates, is unable to help himself or his friends. He concludes, in a
manner that is likely meant to foreshadow Socrates’ trial and death, that Socrates’ way of life is
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shameful. If anyone ever seized Socrates, claiming that he was doing an injustice, he would be
left “dizzy and gaping, without anything to say” (486a–b). Thus, Callicles urges him to “stop
refuting” and to “‘practice the good music’ of affairs” (486c).
In the middle of his harangue, Callicles quotes a line from Euripides’ play, Antiope.
Noting that those who exclusively pursue philosophy appear ridiculous when they enter into
political action, and similarly that political men appear ridiculous when they enter into
philosophic pastimes, Callicles states:
For Euripides’ saying comes to pass: each one is brilliant in this, and
presses on to this, “allotting the greatest part of the day to this, where he
happens to be at his best.” And he flees from wherever he is
undistinguished and reviles this, but praises the other thing out of
goodwill toward himself. (484e–485a).

The quotation cited by Callicles is the first of many references in the Gorgias that comes from
Euripides’ lost play Antiope.53 Why would Plato draw our attention to this play? The
significance of these references is revealed by the play’s dramatic plot, which centers on the
tension between the active life and the contemplative life. According to the existing fragments,
two brothers, Zethus and Amphion, sons of Antiope, the rightful Queen of Thebes, must rescue
their mother from their murderous uncle. However, before they are capable of doing so, they
must put aside their disagreements as to which of their two ways of life is superior. While
Zethus maintains that the practical life devoted to political affairs is superior, Amphion holds
that the life of philosophy and music is superior. Zethus’ powerful arguments win, and Amphion
accedes that the active life is better. Together they arrange their mother’s rescue, and Amphion,
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having been won over to the active life, is just about to put their uncle to death when the god
Hermes intervenes as a deus ex machina. Hermes re-establishes order by restraining the brothers
and establishing them as rightful joint-rulers of Thebes.54
The dramatic struggle between Zethus and Amphion depicted in Antiope mirrors the
struggle between Callicles and Socrates. Not only does Callicles explicitly invoke Zethus as
representative of his type of life, but the two value many of the same things, including hard
work, manly strength, and the ability to help oneself and one’s family.55 In contrast, Socrates,
who leads a life of political abstention and pursues the pleasurable practice of philosophy, is akin
to Amphion. According to one of the extant fragments, Amphion states that “anyone who
engages in many activities that he need not engage in is foolish, when he can live free from
business in a pleasant fashion.”56 Nightingale suggests that both Amphion and Socrates believed
that despite their political abstention, they were capable of providing the greatest benefit for the
city through their philosophy.57 Furthermore, Socrates later forthrightly identifies himself with
This brief synopsis of the work comes from E. R. Dodds’ commentary on the Gorgias, 275–76. For a full account
of the plot, Dodds directs the reader to N. Wecklein, “Die Antiope des Euripides,” in Philologus, 79 (1923) 51–69;
A. W. Pickard-Cambridge in J. U. Powell, ed., New Chapters in Greek Literature, 3d series (Oxford, 1933), 105–
113.
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Callicles’ commitment to manliness and the ability to help oneself and one’s family and friends is explicitly stated
at 485c and 486a respectively. His commitment to hard work is intimated by his denigration of childish play at
485b. John Gibert notes that “Zethus advocates hard work, manly strength, care of property, and the ability to help
oneself and one’s family and friends both privately and publicly” (“Euripides’ Antiope and the Quiet Life,” in The
Play of Texts and Fragments: Essays in Honor of Martin Cropp, ed. J. R. C. Cousland and James R. Hume [Leiden:
Brill, 2009]). The extent to which Zethus is an exact representative of Callicles is debated. Andrea Nightingale
points to some apparent differences between Zethus and Callicles by noting that Callicles “does not suggest, as
Zethus did, that the life he advocates is for the good of the city, for he would be hard pressed to prove that a selfseeking tyrant is good for a state.” “Plato’s ‘Gorgias’ and Euripides’ ‘Antiope’: A Study in Generic
Transformation,” Classical Antiquity 11 no. 1 (1992): 127. However, Devin Stauffer argues convincingly that
Callicles is not simply a self-seeking tyrant. See n. 51 above.
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Amphion when he informs Callicles that he would have liked to give “him back the speech of
Amphion for the speech of Zethus” (506b). Thus, it seems that Plato refers to Euripides’ play to
suggest that Zethus and Amphion are representative of Callicles and Socrates, respectively.
However, the resemblance between Euripides’ Antiope and Socrates’ encounter with
Callicles is limited to this similarity between the characters. The conclusion of Euripides’ play
differs significantly from the conclusion of the debate between Socrates and Callicles. The
conclusion of Antiope suggests that it is best for active and for contemplative individuals each to
perform that to which they are by nature predisposed. The establishment of Zethus and Amphion
as joint rulers at the end of the play points toward the necessity of both Zethus and Amphion. As
John Gibert notes, Zethus and Amphion “express complementary ideals, neither of which, in the
partial and undeveloped form in which it is presented and exemplified by the inexperienced
young men, is conspicuously beneficial to the polis.”58 The play, therefore, points toward the
coincidence of power and wisdom in the figures of Zethus and Amphion. Both are in some way
good and necessary for the city. As noted above, this notion also characterizes the definition of
friendship that was raised, but not fully explored, in the Lysis. As will be recalled, near the end
of the Lysis, Socrates suggests that friendship may exist between those who are akin to one
another.59 The implication (an implication that Socrates ignored) is that friendship may consist
in the relation of two individuals who are akin (or who belong to each other) and who are both
good in their own way, or according to his own nature.60 By alluding to Antiope, Plato may be
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drawing our attention to a potential reconciliation between Callicles and Socrates that may serve
as a foundation for political life.
As we shall see, however, no reconciliation between power and wisdom is forthcoming in
Socrates’ encounter with Callicles, as neither Callicles nor Socrates agrees with Euripides’
assessment. For his part, Callicles argues that it is precisely the predilection to favor one’s
strengths and ignore one’s weaknesses that leads to ridicule. To avoid the ridicule, Callicles
argues that it is best for a serious man to gain experience in political affairs. While it is fitting
and noble for a free man to partake of philosophy when he is young, beyond this he ought to
focus on becoming highly distinguished in political affairs. For Callicles, if someone fails to
practice philosophy when young, he “will never deem himself worthy of any fine and noble
affair” (485d). That Callicles believes one ought to practice philosophy when young shows that
he is not completely oblivious to its merit and its use. However, by recognizing its use in
preparing men for “fine and noble affair[s]” (485d), Callicles relegates philosophy to an inferior
status. For Callicles, philosophy ought to be ministerial to the practice of politics.
In response to Callicles’ disquisition, Socrates exclaims his good fortune in having fallen
in with Callicles. He goes so far as to proclaim Callicles to be a touchstone on which Socrates
will be able to test his soul. Callicles, he asserts, has the three characteristics of “knowledge,
goodwill, and outspokenness,” by which Socrates will be able to “make a sufficient test of a
soul’s living correctly” (487a). While Gorgias and Polus were wise and friendly toward
Socrates, they were “too sensitive to shame” (487b). In contrast, Socrates notes that Callicles is

The notion that people may be good “in their own nature” is the good that Socrates misquotes in his quotation of
the drinking song listing the various things that are said to be good. See above at n. 32 and accompanying text.
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sufficiently educated, has goodwill toward him, and is outspoken, or not entirely restricted by a
sense of shame. The extent to which Socrates is being ironic in praising Callicles has been a
source of much debate, because Plato makes Callicles’ character the lynch-pin on which hinges
the question of whether Socrates is correct in exclusively practicing the philosophic life. 61
Indeed, Socrates relates that because Callicles has all three of these qualities, his agreement with
Socrates on the things Socrates has opinions about (not knowledge) would signal that Socrates’
way of life is correct. In contrast, his disagreement would signal that Socrates’ way of life is
incorrect. Of course, at the end of the dialogue Socrates has not persuaded Callicles of the things
he has opinions about.62 Thus, if Callicles possesses these three qualities, it would suggest that
as presented by Plato, Socrates’ way of life is incorrect.
The first quality, Callicles’ knowledge, seems to be immediately called into question by
Socrates. Indeed, after calling Callicles knowledgeable, Socrates follows this up by telling him
that he has “been sufficiently educated, as many of the Athenians would say” (487b).
Furthermore, Socrates relates that he once overheard Callicles urging his friends not to become
“wise… beyond what is needful” (487d). Many scholars agree that Socrates’ appeal to what “the

McKim argues that Callicles does not have any of the three characteristics Socrates ascribes to him. “Shame and
Truth,” 40; Benardete argues that “Callicles has neither wisdom nor frankness, but he does seem to have goodwill.”
Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 68. Stauffer suggests that “while it may be reasonable to take Callicles’
speech as evidence of his outspokenness,” Callicles manifestly lacks wisdom, and likely goodwill as well. He
concludes that Socrates may mean to indicate by his “proof” that Callicles does not possess what is necessary to
pursue the truth to its attainment, and thus that the truth will not come fully to light in their conversation.” The Unity
of Plato’s Gorgias, 93–94; finally, E. R. Dodds holds that that while Socrates is being ironic in calling Callicles
wise, he genuinely believes that Callicles has goodwill toward him and is outspoken, but that this belief is mistaken.
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many” would say, as well as his admonition not to become too wise, suggests that he is being
ironic in calling Callicles knowledgeable. However, while it is true that Callicles may not be
wise, this does not preclude him from having a certain type of knowledge, or intelligence, in the
form of prudence. Indeed, while Callicles may lack wisdom, he does not lack prudence, or a
concern for the human things, as is evidenced by his concern for Socrates’ safety.63 In this way,
Callicles can be seen to have knowledge, the first characteristic necessary to test Socrates’ way
of life.
Socrates further relates that Callicles does have goodwill toward him and is outspoken.
As evidence of Callicles’ goodwill, Socrates points to the fact that he has heard Callicles give his
friends the same counsel that he had just conveyed to him, namely, to stop philosophizing
beyond what is necessary, and to take greater care for his own safety. Some scholars point to the
fact that later in the dialogue, Callicles will act in a way that causes Socrates to revoke whatever
friendship he believed they had (499b–c). However, goodwill and friendship are distinct.64
Thus, while Callicles likely is not Socrates’ friend, this does not preclude his goodwill toward
him. In addition, Socrates suggests that Callicles’ outspokenness, or immunity to shame, has
been established by his speech praising natural justice. Thus, Callicles does possess the
characteristics necessary to test Socrates’ way of life.
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99

In any case, Socrates begins by taking on Callicles’ assertion that according to what is
naturally just the stronger and the superior ought to rule and have more than the inferior. The
obvious difficulty with this position is that according to nature the many, when joined together,
are stronger than the one. As a result, the laws they institute, including the laws that “doing
injustice is more shameful than suffering injustice,” are not only just by convention, but are just
by nature as well (489a–b). In response, Callicles asserts that by superior he does not
exclusively mean stronger but refers to those who are more intelligent (φρόνιμος). Thus, asserts
Callicles, the more intelligent individual ought to rule and ought to have more than the ruled.
Socrates seizes on Callicles’ contention that the intelligent ought to have more and asks whether
a doctor, having intelligence concerning a person’s diet, ought to have more food than others or
whether, through his ruling, he ought to distribute the food to everyone, according to his
intelligence. Earlier in the dialogue Socrates had compared justice to the art of medicine—while
the art of medicine concerns the body, justice is directed toward the health of the soul. Socrates’
example is intended to expound on this corollary, while also pointing out that Callicles is too
preoccupied with external goods such as food, rather than with what is good for the soul.
Displaying his lack of philosophic acumen, Callicles retorts, “You are talking of food and
drink and doctors and drivel; but this is not what I mean” (490c–d). At this point, likely in
recognition of Callicles’ ignorance, Socrates becomes ironic with Callicles. He asks him
whether those who are most intelligent and superior in weaving or cobbling ought to have the
biggest cloak or the biggest shoes. In frustration, Callicles asserts that by those who are more
intelligent and stronger he means “neither cobblers nor cooks, but those who are intelligent in
regard to the affairs of the city and in what way they may be well governed” (491a–b). Callicles,
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does not leave it at this, however, adding that the intelligent and strong are “not only intelligent
but also courageous, being sufficient to accomplish what they intend” (491a–b). It is precisely
these individuals—those who are intelligent in regard to the affairs of the city and courageous—
who ought to rule. Callicles concludes, “The just is this, that these, the rulers, have more than
the others, the ruled” (491d).
Devin Stauffer notes that by asserting that it is just for the superior to rule and for the
rulers to have more than the ruled, Callicles provides a natural segue for the conversation to turn
to the question of justice.65 However, rather than do so, Socrates instead turns to the question of
moderation, asking whether the ruler also ought to rule his own desires (491d). Why does
Socrates turn to the topic of moderation? As will be made clear, part of the reason is Callicles’
excessive concern with external goods, or the goods of the body. By turning to the issue of
moderation, Socrates seeks to show Callicles not only that that there is a greater good than these
external goods, but also that the acquisition of these external goods necessarily requires some
involvement with evil. Socrates seeks to redirect Callicles’ desires from external goods to an
unalloyed good that is not dependent upon evil.
In response to Socrates’ suggestion that rulers ought to be moderate, Callicles asserts
vehemently that one who controls his desires and appetites is a slave. Instead, he argues that one
ought to allow one’s desires to be as great as possible and that the ability to satisfy these desires
leads to happiness. Socrates, in turn, praises him for his outspokenness before asking whether
Callicles believes that in order to satisfy these desires one ought to “prepare satisfaction for them

Stauffer, “Socrates and Callicles” 640–41. For this next portion of the chapter concerning Callicles’ desire for a
good that is independent of evil, I am indebted to Stauffer’s insights.
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from any place whatsoever” (492d–e). When Callicles agrees, Socrates in turn asks whether
those who are in need of nothing are, therefore, not happy. Callicles responds, “No, for in this
way stones and corpses would be happiest (492e).66 Surprisingly, Socrates does not deny the
charge, but instead points out the equal wretchedness of those who continuously need to satiate
their desires without end. He compares the life of the intemperate man to a man with perforated
and decayed jars. In a quest to fill his jars, the intemperate man continuously works to fill them
and is in pain when they are not filled. In contrast, the life of the orderly and moderate man is
like a man with healthy jars who, upon having filled his jars, gives them no more thought and is
at rest (493a–d). Callicles remains unpersuaded, noting again that the life of the moderate man is
like that of a stone, for “when one has been filled up,” he no longer rejoices nor feels pain
(494b). Unable to convince Callicles, Socrates seeks to shame him, comparing the life described
by Callicles first to a stone curlew, a bird who excretes as he eats, and next to a life of constant
scratching (494b–c). In the face of both examples, Callicles remains outspoken and unashamed,
asserting that “he who scratches, too, would live pleasantly” (494d). However, when Socrates
finally turns to the “culmination of such things as these, the life of catamites,” Callicles exclaims,
“Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to lead the arguments into such things?” (494e). While some
have maintained that this betrays Callicles’ sense of shame, it is equally plausible that Callicles is
attempting to shame Socrates. If so, Callicles can be seen to be turning Socrates’ own tactics
against him. Just as Socrates had appealed to conventional justice and shame to refute Gorgias

Aristotle, at the end of book VII of the Ethics, seems to agree with Callicles: “Hence the god always enjoys a
pleasure that is one and simple, for there is an activity not only of motion but also of motionlessness, and pleasure
resides more in rest than in motion. But “change in all things is sweet,” as the poet has it, on account of a certain
defective condition. For just as the defective person is a human being who readily undergoes change, so also the
nature in need of change is defective, for it is neither simple nor decent” (1154b26–32).
66

102

and Polus, Callicles now seeks to use shame to refute Socrates. Again, Plato seems to be
pointing to the similarity between Socrates and Callicles.
Socrates, of course, is impervious to Callicles’ attempt to shame him. Instead, he simply
notes that Callicles is the one who has led the argument to this point by refusing to distinguish
between good and bad pleasures. Socrates now turns to the question of whether the good and the
pleasant are the same or different. If the good and the pleasant are the same, the shameful
examples provided by Socrates could, perhaps, be classified as good, whereas if the good and the
pleasant are different, the examples would be classified as pleasurable, but not as good. In a bid
to remain consistent, Callicles asserts that he will hold to the position that the good and the
pleasant are the same. While Callicles’ answer suggests that Socrates’ examples have convinced
him that the pleasant and the good are not the same, he asserts that he will maintain his former
argument. Callicles is not willing to be shamed into abandoning his position. Rather, he will
follow the argument to its conclusion. Callicles’ desire leads the way; he is not held back by
shame.
What follows is a somewhat odd colloquy, in which Socrates tells Callicles that if he is
speaking contrary to his own opinion, he would be “corrupting the first speeches” and “would no
longer be sufficiently examining with me the things that are” (495a; emphasis added). When
Callicles replies, “And you too,” Socrates coyly responds, “Well then, I too am not doing what’s
correct, if indeed I do this, nor are you” (495b). Through a series of dialectical moves, Socrates
will go on to elicit from Callicles that the good and the pleasant are different. Of course, earlier
in his conversation with Polus, Socrates led Polus to the conclusion that the good and the
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pleasant are the same.67 It seems that Socrates and Callicles agree that neither of them is going
to be examining what is. Callicles will assert contrary to his true belief that the pleasurable and
the good are the same, while Socrates, perhaps in contrast to his true beliefs, will attempt to lead
Callicles to the belief that the pleasurable and the good are different.
As part of his refutation, Socrates distinguishes between the good and the bad on the one
hand, and the pleasant and the painful on the other hand. According to Socrates, the good and
the bad are completely distinct—that is, they are obtained and lost separately. As evidence, he
points to health and sickness; when one becomes healthy, he is released from sickness. It is
impossible to suffer what is good (health) and bad (sickness) at the same time. In contrast, the
pleasant and the painful are necessarily mixed. When one obtains pleasure from eating or
drinking, for example, this implies the need and desire of hunger or thirst, which is painful.
Socrates’ ostensible purpose is to critique Callicles’ thorough-going hedonism by
pointing out that pleasure cannot be identical to the good because pleasure is necessarily mixed
with pain, while the good is wholly free of need, or lack. However, Socrates’ critique suffers
from a number of flaws. As Dustin Stauffer points out, it is not true that health and sickness
cannot coexist, as one can suffer varying degrees of sickness and health throughout life.68
Furthermore, Socrates never proves that an unalloyed good, free of any bad, can exist. In fact, as
was shown above, in the Lysis Socrates calls into question whether such a good can exist at all in
the present life.69 However, Callicles does not raise these problems. Instead, when Socrates asks
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him whether he agrees that there is a good, independent of bad, Callicles asserts emphatically, “I
do agree, extraordinarily so” (496c). Callicles’ assertion is significant, as it reveals his desire for
a good that is free of evil.70
By way of the distinction between the pleasant and the good, Socrates is able to refute
Callicles. Through a series of moves, Socrates shows that if the pleasant and the good are indeed
the same, then the intelligent and the courageous (those revered by Callicles as good and
deserving to rule) are no different from the foolish and the cowardly, as both experience the
same amount of pleasure. Callicles is shown to have no basis on which to ground his admiration
for intelligence and courage. At the end of this exchange and in response to the refutation,
Callicles asserts that he has not been forthright with Socrates in asserting that all pleasures are
the same, but that he has, instead, been joking. In response, Socrates cries out:
Oh! Oh! Callicles, how all-cunning you are and how you treat me like a
child—at one time claiming that things are this way, and at another time
that the same things are otherwise, deceiving me! And yet I did not think
at the beginning that I was to be deceived by you voluntarily, since you
were my friend. But now I have been played false, and it looks like it’s
necessary for me—according to the old saying—to make do with what is
present and to accept from you this that is given. (499b–c).
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Stauffer argues that Callicles’ desire for a such an unalloyed good indicates that Callicles is not a simple hedonist
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Socrates points out that Callicles has deceived him and, therefore, can no longer be considered a
friend. Of course, as noted above, Callicles was never said to have friendship with Socrates, he
was only credited with having goodwill toward him.71
In any case, while Socrates claims to have exposed Callicles’ friendship as fraudulent, it
is significant that almost immediately prior to this, Socrates uncovers Callicles’ desire for an
unalloyed good. We have already seen that near the beginning of their discussion, Callicles
shows himself to be a desirous individual. However, his desire was directed solely to the
extrinsic goods that rhetoric and the conventional practice of politics are able to provide. At this
point in the dialogue, Callicles’ desire for the good is revealed to be so great that he believes in
the existence of a good independent of any evil. In the next portion of the conversation, Socrates
will lead Callicles to the conclusion that the attainment of such a good is, in fact, impossible.
Based on Callicles’ distinction between good and bad pleasures, as well as his belief in
the existence of an unalloyed good, Socrates steers Callicles to accept the proposition that
pleasures and pains are good only to the extent that they are directed toward the good. Next,
Socrates asserts that it requires an artful man to distinguish pleasant things that are good from
pleasant things that are bad. Tying the conversation back to the theme of rhetoric, he reminds
Callicles that he had earlier designated rhetoric as an experience rather than an art, on the basis
that rhetoric concerns itself only with flattery, or pleasure, irrespective of whether the pleasure
aims at the good. He concludes by asking Callicles whether the “rhetoric directed toward the
Athenian people and the other peoples of free men in the cities” is anything other than simple
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flattery aimed at gratifying the people (502e). In response, Callicles asserts that it depends on
the rhetor; some care for the citizens, while others are precisely as Socrates describes.
Perhaps surprisingly, Socrates does not deny the existence of the art of rhetoric Callicles
describes, instead noting that if such an art were to exist, its goal would be to make the “citizens’
souls to be as good as possible” (503a). However, Socrates quickly follows up on this comment
by noting that this rhetoric has never yet come to pass. He continues his description of this
“noble” rhetoric by noting that the rhetorician who “speaks with a view to the best” would seek
to arrange and order the citizens’ souls in a healthy way, namely, by instilling justice and
moderation into them, and by removing injustice and intemperance (504d–e). Socrates notes,
however, that moderation is not chosen simply for its own sake. Rather, just as doctors “allow a
healthy man to satisfy his desires” and deny the same to a sick man, so the rhetor will allow
healthy souls to pursue their desires, while keeping base souls away from their desires. By
keeping the base soul away from these desires, the rhetor will improve it. When he agrees,
Socrates concludes by asking Callicles to agree also to the proposition that keeping the base soul
“away from the things it desires” is punishment and that being punished is “better for the soul
than intemperance” (505b). Of course, by leading Callicles to this conclusion, Socrates has
bested him. Socrates has shown Callicles to be unable to meet the challenge posed at the
beginning of their conversation: to show that doing injustice and not paying the just penalty
when one does injustice are not the utmost of all evils.
Callicles, however, refuses to be refuted, claiming that he does not know what Socrates is
saying. In response to this feigned ignorance, Socrates states, “This man here does not abide
being benefitted and suffering for himself this thing that the argument is about, being punished”
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(505c). Despite the logic of Socrates’ argument, Callicles remains unpersuaded and refuses to
take his medicine. Socrates now indicates that his argument is only half over because Callicles’
intransigence is frustrating its development. At this point the dialogue takes a turn. Socrates
asserts it is “not righteous to abandon even myths in the middle” and proposes to take over the
argument by posing questions and answering them in turn (505c–d). In what follows Socrates
shift from a dialogic style of argumentation to a disquisitional, or rhetorical one, to finish the
argument. However, Socrates, explains that what he is about to say is not said with knowledge.
Furthermore, he indicates that he would have preferred to continue speaking with Callicles until
he had “given him back the speech of Amphion for the speech of Zethus” (506b). In this way,
Plato suggests that the disquisition that Socrates is about to deliver cannot be characterized as
Socrates’ true belief—or that he is unsure of its truth.
Socrates begins by fairly accurately recounting the conversation he has just finished with
Callicles. He distinguishes the pleasant from the good and states that the pleasant must be done
for the sake of the good. Furthermore, he notes that things are made good by the presence of
some virtue and that the virtue of the soul is moderation. At this point, however, Socrates
deviates from the conversation he has had with Callicles. Whereas up to this point, Socrates has
held that moderation is directed toward the good, he now holds that the moderate soul is good
(507a). Given Socrates’ insistence that philosophy always says the same thing, we may conclude
that Socrates does not truly believes the rhetorical display he is delivering and that what he is
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about to say is simply a noble myth (505d).72 As we shall see, this rhetorical display is designed
to appeal to Callicles’ desire for an unalloyed good.
Socrates continues by noting that the ordered, moderate soul is the basis for the ordered
whole of nature, as moderation leads to happiness between men and the gods. The moderate
man, Socrates states, would do “fitting things concerning both gods and human beings,” and he
would, in fact, be “the completely good man” (507a–b). Therefore, if one wishes to be happy
and good, he must “pursue and practice moderation, and each of us must flee intemperance as
fast his feet will carry him” (507d). At the center of this noble myth are the virtues of justice and
moderation. Wisdom and its concomitant desire are not even mentioned.73
Socrates then ties the noble myth back to the philosophic principle that he has maintained
throughout the dialogue; one ought to avoid the practice of injustice, and one must punish the
evil doer, even if the evil doer is oneself or “some other of one’s own” (507d). Invoking the
wise (σοφοί), Socrates states that “heaven, earth, gods and human beings are held together by
community, friendship, orderliness, moderation, and justness; and on account of these things,
comrade, [the wise] call this whole an order, not disorder and intemperance” (507e–508a). As a
result, the immoderate evildoer, who is incapable of friendship and community, ought to be
punished if this happy state of order is to be maintained: “If oneself or some other of one’s
own—whether private man or city—needs it, one must apply the just penalty and punish, if he is
to be happy” (507d). According to the myth put forward by Socrates, a natural harmony obtains
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between the whole and the human soul; the soul is a microcosm of the whole. Although
Socrates’ account is simply a myth, the philosophic principle he has maintained throughout the
dialogue remains the same: injustice ought to be avoided, and the evildoer must be punished.
Thus, Socrates constructs a myth that is as close to the truth as possible.74
Socrates’s myth, which holds out the possibility of a wholly-ordered and wholly-good
universe, is designed to appeal to Callicles’ desire for an unalloyed good. Socrates himself,
however, does not actually believe in the existence of such a universe. As we shall see, for
Socrates there is no natural compatibility between the individual soul and the whole; the soul is
not, in fact, a microcosm of the whole. As a result, Socrates, in contrast to Callicles, does not
believe in the existence of an unalloyed good.
As noted, Socrates’ myth is based on an understanding of nature and the whole
articulated by “the wise” (σοφοί). This reference to “the wise” is significant because, as
indicated above, these same wise (σοφοί), who “converse and write about nature and the whole,”
are invoked in the Lysis in support of the proposition that “like is always necessarily a friend to
its like” (Lys. 214b2–6). As argued above, Plato suggests in the Lysis that Socrates does not quite
fully understand these “wisest ones.” As will be recalled, I have argued that Plato’s purpose in
the Lysis is subtly to imply that Socrates’ inattention to nature and the whole causes his inquiry
into the definition of friendship to flounder. It is perhaps no surprise, then, that almost
immediately after providing this appealing account of an ordered whole of nature Socrates
implicitly denies its possibility by appealing to the concept of friendship.
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Socrates begins his denial of the myth by recounting Callicles’ charge against him. Let
us examine, he says, on the basis of the myth, “whether what is said is fine or not: that I am
unable … to help either myself or anyone of my friends or relatives, or to save them from the
greatest dangers, but am at the mercy of whoever wishes” (508c). As the myth has indicated,
and as Socrates has continuously maintained, doing injustice and failing to pay the just penalty is
the greatest evil or harm that can befall a person. Furthermore, he contends that the greatest help
one can provide for oneself and for one’s friends is to turn away the greatest harm; in turn, the
second greatest benefit “would be help against the second evil, third against the third, and so on”
(509b–c). The nobility of the benefit corresponds to the greatness of the evil turned away.
When Callicles assents, Socrates notes that it is, therefore, necessary to prepare a power so as
neither to do injustice nor to suffer injustice.
He begins by analyzing the power necessary to avoid suffering injustice. The power
consists in either taking up rule in the city (perhaps even as a tyrant) or being a friend of the
existing regime (510a). Not surprisingly, Callicles agrees emphatically. Next, Socrates asks
whether Callicles also agrees that “each man is the friend of another to the greatest possible
degree, who the ancient and wise said was the friend: like to like” (510b). As will become
evident, the introduction of friendship and, in particular, the introduction of this definition of
friendship, is crucial. As noted, in the Lysis, Socrates’ understanding of this concept is depicted
as, at best, incomplete. Not only does Socrates deny there the possibility of two individuals
having a self-sufficient friendship that entails an appreciation for each other simply on account of
one another’s goodness, but he also guides the conversation in such a manner that at its end
friendship is subsumed within the ambit of erotic desire (ἔρως).
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When Callicles agrees to the definition of friendship provided by the wise—like is friend
to like—Socrates continues, stating that neither a good nor a lowly man would be able to become
the tyrant’s friend “with his whole mind” (510b–c). The tyrant would either fear the good man
or despise the lowly. The only individual who could be a friend with the tyrant, suggests
Socrates, is the man “who, being of the same character and praising and blaming the same
things, is willing to be ruled and to be submissive to the ruler. This man will have great power in
that city” (510c–d). As a result, the only way an individual is able to obtain power in a city ruled
by a tyrant—and thus be able to prepare a power to avoid injustice—is by becoming as much
like the tyrant as possible. The obvious result of preparing such a power, concludes Socrates, is
that great injustices will also have been committed and, therefore, the greatest evil will have
befallen the individual who has obtained power in the regime. Such an individual will have
harmed “his soul through imitation of the master and through power” (511a).
In effect, Socrates’ understanding of friendship denies the possibility of the unalloyed
good he had earlier proffered in the form of the noble myth. At the end of the Lysis, Plato points
toward the unsettling political ramifications that the Socratic understanding of friendship entails.
In the present dialogue, Plato makes clear how the Socratic understanding of friendship unsettles
the cohesion of the regime. The myth of an ordered and complete whole depends on the
phenomenon of friendship: “The wise say … that heaven, earth, gods, and human beings are held
together by community, friendship, orderliness, moderation, and justness” (507e–508a; emphasis
added). If political community and the order of the cosmos depend on friendship, Socrates’
understanding of friendship implies that the myth does not adequately describe reality. Indeed,
Socrates’ understanding of friendship suggests that there is, in fact, no harmony between the
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individual soul and the political community. As a result, he counsels Callicles to avoid the life
of politics and instead to pursue the Socratic way of life; the private life of contemplation. While
the life of politics (including befriending the demos) may protect one from the lesser evil of
suffering injustice, it does so only “at the cost of the things dearest to us” (513a). The Socratic
life is unable to ensure that one does not suffer injustice; it does ensure that one avoids
committing injustice, which is the greatest harm that can befall a person.
Upon the conclusion of Socrates’ speech, Callicles seems to be only partially persuaded.
He states, “In some way, I don’t know what, what you say seems good to me, Socrates; but I
suffer the experience of the many—I am not altogether persuaded by you” (513c). In reply,
Socrates states “if we investigate these same things often, and better, perhaps you will be
persuaded” (513c–d). Perhaps a better rhetorician would be capable of persuading Callicles. In
any case, as we saw above, Socrates began the conversation with Callicles by noting that due to
his goodwill, outspokenness, and knowledge, Callicles could serve as the touchstone for
Socrates’ way of life. Socrates had declared that if he could convince Callicles to agree with him
on the thing about which he holds opinions, it would vindicate his way of life. Now, near the
end of the dialogue, Callicles remains unpersuaded, suggesting that Socrates’ way of life has not
been vindicated. By drawing our attention both to Callicles’ character and to the fact that
Callicles remains unpersuaded, Plato seems to be suggesting that Socrates’ approach to the
debate between politics and philosophy—or the debate between Zethus and Amphion—is, in
fact, not the correct approach. Given Plato’s critique of the Socratic understanding of friendship
leveled in the Lysis, as well as the role that Socrates’ understanding of friendship plays in the
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Gorgias, it is fair to conclude that Plato believes the Socratic understanding of friendship is not
only incomplete, but that it negatively impacts his relation to the polis.
The manner in which Socrates introduces the myth at the end of the Gorgias bolsters this
interpretation. The myth itself concerns the judgement of human beings in the afterlife, and it
relates how it came to be that men are judged on the basis of their soul alone, rather than on
account of their wealth, beauty, or political connections.75 The myth is meant to underscore the
message Socrates has conveyed throughout the dialogue: the care for one’s soul ought to come
before a concern for the external goods provided by politics, and, to the extent that the external
goods are obtained at the expense of an upright soul, they ought to be considered worthless.
Socrates introduces the myth by alluding to a passage in the Iliad concerning the division of rule
among the gods. He states, “For just as Homer says, Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto divided the rule
among themselves, after they took it over from their father” (523a). As James Nichols notes, this
is a reference to Book XV of the Iliad, in which Poseidon complains of being unjustly stripped
by Zeus of his right to jointly rule the land. According to the account in the Iliad, Zeus orders
Poseidon to leave the fighting at Troy. In response, Poseidon angrily states that he is of equal
honor to Zeus. Poseidon recounts that he, along with Zeus and Pluto (Hades) had divided up the
rule they had taken over from their father Cronos, such that while Pluto would have control of

According to the myth, during the early portion of Zeus’ rule, the fate of individual men was decided while they
were still living, and it was decided by other living men. The result was that “the judgments were decided badly.”
Pluto, the god of the underworld and those in charge of “the islands of the blessed” informed Zeus that the judges
were deciding the fates wrongly and that “unworthy human beings were frequenting them in both places.” To
rectify this, Zeus ordered that going forward, the men being judged should be dead and naked. For under the
previous practice, many “who have base souls are clothed in fine bodies, ancestry, and wealth.” Furthermore, the
judges were also previously clothed “with eyes and ears and the whole body, like a screen, covering their soul.” The
problem with the previous practice is that all these coverings—both those of the judges and those of the men being
judged—stand in the way and result in poor judgements. Thus, by judging the soul alone, without any of the
sensible accoutrements concealing its true state that, the judgements will be made correctly. (Cf. 523a–524a).
75
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the underworld, Zeus would have control of the heavens, and Poseidon would have control of the
seas. Meanwhile, they would all have equal access to the land and to Mount Olympus. As a
result, Poseidon suggests that Zeus is committing a grave injustice by ordering him to stop
interfering in the land battle between the Achaeans and the Trojans, as they have an equal title to
jointly rule the land. Despite this fact, Poseidon leaves the battle on account of Zeus’ superior
force.
Why does Plato allude to this story? Of course, it introduces the myth in a way that sets
up Zeus’ ability unilaterally to alter the method of judging human beings without interference
from Poseidon, so that they are judged on the basis of their soul alone. Throughout the dialogue,
Socrates has attempted to convince his interlocutors that the soul alone is important, suggesting
that the Zeus depicted in the myth is representative of Socrates. Like Zeus, Socrates changes the
standards of judgment such that the soul alone is of importance, while external or necessary
goods are counted as worth nothing. Socrates believes that only his way of life is good.
Plato’s allusion to Zeus’ banishment of Poseidon and the myth told by Socrates at the end
of the dialogue seem to offer a substitute ending to that of Antiope, the Euripidean play alluded
to at earlier points in the dialogue. It will be recalled that in Antiope, Zethus, the political man of
action (who is meant to represent Callicles), and Amphion, the philosophic man of
contemplation (who is meant to represent Socrates), argue about whose life is superior. At the
end of the play, Hermes enters and restores order by granting them the power to rule jointly. As
we have seen, this is decidedly not how the dialogue between Callicles and Socrates ends. While
Socrates does not persuade Callicles of the superiority of his way of life, he is unambiguously
the victor of the conversation. Socrates ensures that the standards by which his way of life is
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judged, are recognized as the only standards. The fact that Plato introduces the final myth told
by Socrates by alluding to Zeus’ unlawful act of depriving Poseidon of his share in their jointrule suggests that he believes that Socrates also commits an injustice in denying any merit to
Callicles’ concern for the external (or necessary) goods. Could it be that Plato believed that some
sort of joint-rule is necessary between politics and philosophy? Or that the coincidence of power
and wisdom is necessary?

Conclusion: Friendship and the Coincidence of Power and Wisdom
The Gorgias details the way in which the Socratic understanding of friendship developed
in the Lysis directly impacts Socrates’ approach to politics. At the end of the Lysis, Socrates’
ambivalence about friendship is made clear. On the one hand, he tells Lysis and Menexenus that
he counts himself as one of them, suggesting that they have become friends. On the other hand,
he immediately follows this up by stating that they have not yet discovered what a friend is. It
was earlier noted that the conclusion of the Lysis suggests that at the end of the dialogue Socrates
considers himself to be a friend of the boys only because he has “refuted them” and has inculcatd
in them an awareness of their deficiency and of their metaphysical incompleteness—he has
stoked in them a desire for the good.
In the Gorgias, Socrates’ understanding of friendship is seen to impact his approach to
politics. In the first half of the dialogue, Socrates’ understanding of friendship, as well as his
declaration of friendship to Polus and Gorgias, leads him to refute them. By refuting them he
seeks to remove their false conceptions of what is. First, he refutes Gorgias by exposing his
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deficient and contradictory understanding of the nature and purpose of rhetoric. Next, he refutes
Polus, showing him that it is better to suffer injustice than it is to do injustice, and that it is better
to pay the just penalty for injustices committed than it is to escape punishment. In the same way
that Socrates refuted Lysis, he refutes Polus and Gorgias. Furthermore, just as in the Lysis, in
which Socrates’ refutation of the boys caused them to rebel against the established authorities, so
in the Gorgias, Socrates sends Polus back into the city armed with a rhetoric designed to refute
the city rather than flatter it. For Socrates, it is just to refute both oneself and one’s friends;
friendship consists in refuting or removing the lie that exists in one’s soul. This ensures that any
approach to politics is necessarily negative and destructive of the bonds of the city. Socrates’
interaction with Gorgias and Polus shows how his conception of friendship has the effect of
destroying the city and how his conception of friendship causes his interaction with it to be
negative.
In the second half of the dialogue, Socrates counsels Callicles to avoid politics on the
basis of his understanding of friendship. How is it that Socrates’ understanding of friendship can
cause him both to send Polus back into the city armed with a rhetoric meant to refute it and to
counsel Callicles to avoid politics altogether? The answer is related to the difference in character
between Polus and Gorgias, on the one hand, and Callicles, on the other. Callicles is, in some
ways, very similar to Socrates. While Polus and Gorgias both suffer from a strong sense of
shame, Callicles and Socrates are both more outspoken. As a result, while Polus and Gorgias are
not capable of overcoming the conventional understanding of justice due to their shame,
Callicles and Socrates—perhaps to differing extents—are able to overcome these conventions.
Indeed, both are shown to be highly erotic individuals, and it is their erotic desire for what is
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good that enables them to “shake… off and break… through all” the conventional taboos that
stand in their way (484a). In fact, Callicles’ desire for the good is so great that he believes in the
existence of an unalloyed good independent of any evil. As a result, under the Socratic
conception of friendship, which holds that like is a friend to its like, Socrates asserts that
Callicles ought to avoid politics altogether, for it is only by becoming like the regime that
Callicles will come to have power in the city. Gorgias and Polus are both wedded to
conventional conceptions of justice. Therefore, Socrates is not depriving them of the good by
undertaking a life that requires them to challenge and refute the existing conventional
understanding of justice. In contrast, Callicles’ erotic desire and his devotion to natural justice
suggests that he ought to avoid politics altogether.
Neither Socrates’ negative approach to politics nor his attempt to avoid politics altogether
is due primarily to a desire to avoid the conventional, vulgar conception of injustice. Rather, the
Socratic approach to politics stems from his conception of friendship. While the destructive
effect of his understanding of friendship is hinted at near the end of the Lysis, it is made explicit
in the Gorgias. There is no self-sufficient basis for friendship that is grounded in a simple
conception of another’s goodness. Rather, to the extent that friendship exists, it consists in
refuting the lie in another’s soul and awakening in him a desire for completeness—a
completeness that lies outside the realm of friendship and politics altogether.
Plato’s treatment, however, suggests that the Socratic conception of friendship may be
mistaken. In the Lysis, Plato alludes to the fact that there may be a basis for friendship between
two people who both are good but who are good each in his own way. The friendship between
Lysis and Menexenus is portrayed as potentially being one of such friendships. The soft-spoken,
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thoughtful Lysis is contrasted with the more brash Menexenus. This allusion to a self-sufficient
friendship independent of need is continued in the Gorgias. Socrates and Callicles are depicted
as being in some way similar to one another. Both are erotic, relatively shameless individuals
who have a strong desire for the good. However, each is devoted to a different mode of life,
Callicles to the active the life of politics, and Socrates to the quiet life of contemplation. By
presenting Socrates and Callicles in this way—as similar, yet in some way different—Plato
seems to be suggesting that their lives may be complementary. Could it be that Socrates and
Callicles are good, each in his own way?
Given both Plato’s depiction of the Socratic understanding of friendship in the Lysis and
the way that friendship works to destroy the myth in the Gorgias, it seems that for Plato the
seeds for a reconciliation between power and wisdom lie in a correct understanding of
friendship. In both the Lysis and the Gorgias, Plato points to the danger that Socrates’
understanding of friendship carries for politics. The manner in which Socrates subsumes
friendship into the ambit of erotic desire for the good ensures that there is no friendship
independent of need, a friendship that appreciates another solely for the other’s own good
qualities. Furthermore, as a result, the pursuit of the good through philosophic contemplation
becomes a personal endeavor, and a concern for the good of another interferes with that
endeavor. Socratic philosophy, in its attempt to discover the right way of life through dialogue
with others, ends up being parasitic on politics, as it questions the conventions and practices that
hold a city together. At the same time, Plato’s purpose in these dialogues is not simply to point
to the danger of philosophy—a teaching certainly worth bearing in mind—but he simultaneously
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points toward a reconciliation between politics and philosophy through the medium of
friendship, a reconciliation that he leaves for Aristotle fully to develop.
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CHAPTER THREE. ARISTOTLE’S FRIENDSHIP OF THE GOOD

Politics and Philosophy: An Unresolved Tension
In Book I of the Politics, Aristotle traces the emergence of the polis, or how the polis comes to
be established. In the overview provided, Aristotle stresses the role that necessity plays in the
process. He notes that the most basic unit of the polis, the individual, unites with other
individuals in order to counter necessity. As evidence of this, he points both to the natural
coupling of male and female, who come together “from a natural striving to leave behind”
offspring, and to the conjoining of master and slave, both of whom use their distinct functions to
preserve themselves as well as the other. From these relationships arises the household, which
exists in order to satisfy “the needs of daily life” (Pol. 1152b13). Thus, the household exists to
counter day-to-day necessities. However, Aristotle continues by noting that a household is not
on its own self-sufficient but is still subject to necessity of “non-daily needs” and, as a result,
various households join together to constitute the village. In turn, several villages come together
to comprise “the complete community”—the polis. The polis, Aristotle states, is completely selfsufficient and exists “by nature.” From this brief sketch it seems that for Aristotle the polis
arises naturally in order to counter necessity. Man is by nature a political being, because man is
by nature not self-sufficient on his own.
If, however, necessity is the only basis for the development of the polis, it is not entirely
clear why several villages would come together to form a polis. Indeed, as Aristotle makes clear,
the household and the village together already provide for both man’s daily and non-daily needs.
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Thus, it is already at the level of the village that necessity has been overcome. To what end do
villages join together to form a polis? In his brief depiction of the development of the polis
Aristotle hints that the polis has an end beyond simply countering necessity; while the polis
comes “into being for the sake of living, it exists for the sake of living well” (1252b25–30). The
city, therefore, has an end beyond merely securing the existence of its members and countering
necessity. Aristotle initially suggests that the end of the city is justice. Pointing to man’s
capacity for speech, he notes that man, in contrast to other “herd” animals, has the ability to
distinguish between good and bad, justice and injustice, and furthermore has the capacity to
institute its judgements concerning the just into custom and law. Justice seems to be the natural
end of the city.1
Based on the city’s complete and full self-sufficiency, Aristotle argues that it is “prior by
nature to the household and to each of us” (1253a20). The whole is prior to the part. As a result,
man’s full existence depends on his relation to, and participation in, the polis in the same way
that a foot or a hand depends on the existence of whole body. Aristotle seems to suggest that it is
in the city that man finds completion or perfection as a human being. Specifically, it is by being
an active participant in the shaping and promulgation of the city’s laws concerning what is just
and unjust, and furthermore by obeying these laws, that man fulfills his purpose. In contrast to
Socrates, Aristotle presents the individual as having the same end as the city. In Book I of the
Nevertheless, as Susan Collins points out, “Aristotle’s ‘natural beginning’ is a bit of a red herring: The city
presents its justice as the natural completion of a human being, yet the city is not simply natural in one respect: It
must be constituted.” Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006),
19. The fact that justice is not strictly speaking a natural end of the city is hinted at already in Book I of the Politics.
After suggesting that man’s capacity for speech or reason is what sets him apart from other “herd animals,” Aristotle
states that this capacity “is what makes a household and a city” (1253a19). This, of course, suggests that the city is
not distinguished from the household on account of justice and political virtue. At this point, the distinct end of the
polis has not yet been revealed.
1
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Politics, Aristotle seems to imply that there is a natural harmony between the individual and the
city.
The remainder of the Politics, however, complicates this picture. In Book VII, Aristotle
specifically raises the question of what the best life is for the individual and whether it is the
same for the individual as for the city. We are again told that the city has an end beyond itself; it
aims at living well, not mere existence. Both the city and the individuals that comprise it ought
to aim at living well.
What it means to live well, however, is not entirely clear. While Aristotle makes clear
that to live well means to live a life of virtue,2 he notes that there is debate over which virtue. It is
at this point that Aristotle deals head-on with the question that had been debated by Callicles and
Socrates in the Gorgias:
There is dispute among those who agree that the most choiceworthy way
of life is that accompanied by virtue as to whether the political and active
way of life is choiceworthy, or rather that which is divorced from all
external things—that involving some sort of study, for example—which
some assert is the only philosophic way of life. (1324a26–29).

The political and the philosophic life are here juxtaposed, and, after spending some time
distinguishing the various modes of active life, Aristotle involves himself in the debate between
the proponents of these two types of life.3 Aristotle lays out the various opinions before

2

In a passage that mirrors the division of goods in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle divides good things into three:
property, the goods of the body, and the goods of the soul. Through a series of arguments, Aristotle concludes that
the goods of the soul (i.e., virtue) are superior to other goods. Cf. Pol. 1323a24–1323b21.
3

Before turning to the merits and demerits of each life, Aristotle first distinguishes between two types of active, or
political life. On the one hand, there is a life dedicated to ruling as a master over one’s neighbors in a despotic
fashion. On the other hand, there is rule in a “political fashion,” which seems to be rule in accordance with law.
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investigating them. He first puts forward a position that is nearly identical to the Socratic
position as presented in the Gorgias before contrasting it with the position held by Callicles. He
notes that some eschew the active life on the grounds that “the way of life of the free person [is]
different from that of the political ruler and the most choiceworthy of all,” and that the political
life is an impediment to one’s own well-being (1325a17–22). In contrast, others consider the
active life to be best, due to the fact that “it is impossible for one who acts in nothing to act well,
and that acting well and happiness are the same thing” (1325a22–24).4
In the last book of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle conspicuously concludes that the
philosophic life is superior to the political life. This same conclusion is expressed in Book VII of
the Politics as well. Thus, while Aristotle’s statement that “happiness is a sort of action” may
seem to settle the debate between the two lives in favor of the active life of politics, Aristotle
famously re-defines the life of philosophy to be a life of action. The active life, he states, is “not
necessarily in relation to others” (1325b17). Aristotle suggests that the active life can also be
practiced in a private manner, rather than simply in a public or political manner. The
philosophic life is active as well because thought itself is an activity. In fact, Aristotle goes so
far as to say that those thoughts “that are complete in themselves, and the sorts of studies and

Aristotle lays out three sets of opinions regarding the merits of these two types of active life. Some, Aristotle notes,
believe neither type of rule is good; they maintain that while the tyrannical rule over one’s neighbors is accompanied
by great injustice, rule “in the political fashion” is simply “an impediment to one’s own well-being” (1324a36–39).
This first opinion encapsulates Socrates’ position in the Gorgias. Others, Aristotle notes, hold that the “political
life” is the only life for a man (1324a40–41). This opinion seems to encapsulate Callicles’ assertion that the man
who fails to engage in politics will never amount to much. Last, Aristotle notes, are those who assert that “the mode
of regime involving mastery and tyranny is the only happy one” (1324b3–4). Aristotle concludes that the while the
opinion that rule always involves mastery and tyranny is the most common and even accords with nature to some
extent, this is not the city’s highest aim. Aristotle will later explain that the city’s ultimate aim is, instead, “the
actualization and complete practice of virtue” through the institution of laws and education (1332a9–10).
4

Cf. Gor. 485d–e.
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thoughts that are for their own sake” are “much more” active than those thoughts that are
pursued for some other activity (1325b18–21). This statement mirrors Aristotle’s argument
Book X of the Ethics that the philosophic life is the happiest due to its greater self-sufficiency
and the fact that it is sought as an end in itself. The Politics ends with the same conclusion as the
Ethics: the philosophic life is the most active life.
While Aristotle is explicit in his assertion that the philosophic life is superior to the
political life, he nevertheless emphasizes in the Politics that cities can also partake in the action
of thought. Positing the existence of an “isolated city” that intentionally chooses to live alone, he
writes that this type of city is also active, “for activity can come about relative to a city’s parts:
there are many sorts of shared activities undertaken by the parts of the city in relation to one
another” (1325a3–4). While this passage is somewhat cryptic, what Aristotle seems to have in
mind is education. As Susan Collins notes, Aristotle “suggests that the political community may
be organized so that its highest aim is action understood in [the] sense” of study and thinking.5
The life of political rule—understood as the improvement of souls—shares in the active life of
the philosopher by aiming at the life of study and thought. It is for this reason that the last book
of the Politics covers the education that ought to be instituted in the best regime. Aristotle
concludes that in this way, the aim of the best regime and the aim of the individual are the same;
both partake of the activity of thought.
A number of indicators suggest, however, that harmony between the individual and the
city is not so easily achieved. First, the education described by Aristotle is not simply

5

Collins, Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship, 116.
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philosophic. In fact, Aristotle’s views on philosophic education mirror those of Callicles. It will
be recalled that Callicles believed that while some education in philosophy was necessary and
suitable for the young, one ought not pursue education beyond what is necessary. Aristotle
relates similarly that one ought not to “persevere overly much in the [liberal sciences] with a
view to proficiency” (1337b17). Commenting on the education in Aristotle’s best regime, Susan
Collins writes that the education Aristotle lays out aims at “a life of leisure in which the arts and
music figure most prominently. This life is neither wholly political nor wholly philosophic—
neither wholly devoted to the city nor separated from it.”6 Of course, this seems to be in stark
contrast to Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, where the life of theoretical contemplation is
unambiguously held to be the best life, for sake of which all other actions are undertaken.
Robert Bartlett concludes that “the discussion of ‘leisure’ in [Book] VII is arguably the peak of
the Politics, not because it outlines the genuinely satisfactory end of life but because it points to
the true peak, the truly satisfying and altogether private activity of philosophic contemplation.”7
If Bartlett is correct, it would seem that the aim of the individual and the aim of the city are not
the same, as the aim of the city is not strictly philosophic in the way it is for the individual.8
Furthermore, to the extent that education in the best regime is philosophic, we have to
wonder what causes the city to be concerned with philosophy. That is, while the necessity that
characterizes the pre-political state is the impetus that animates the city’s concern for justice, it

6

Ibid.

7

Robert Bartlett, “The ‘Realism’ of Classical Political Science,” 394.

If this conclusion is correct, it may well call into question Aristotle’s description of man as a political animal.
Indeed, if the end of man is different from the end of the city, it would seem that man is not by nature directed
toward participation in the city.
8
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remains an open question what it is that animates and orients the city toward philosophy. Last,
Aristotle fails to make clear why the philosopher should be concerned with the well-being of the
city. It will be recalled that in his discussion concerning the relative worth of the political and
philosophic life, Aristotle had raised the Socratic objection to the political life that political rule
is simply an impediment to one’s own well-being (1324a38–39). However, he does not (in the
Politics) directly respond to this criticism. Given that Aristotle spends the last book of the
Politics giving political advice on how to institute an educational system that is concerned with
the improvement of the souls of other people, it would seem fair to question whether Aristotle’s
pursuit of the good is undermined or tainted in some way by political concerns.9 We may
conclude, therefore, that, in the context of the Politics, Aristotle’s attempt to resolve the tension
between the philosopher and the city appears to be at most a superficial solution. Analogizing
the leisure of the city to the theoretical speculation of the philosopher does not fully reconcile the
city and the philosopher.
The Politics does, nonetheless, hint at a resolution to the problem regarding the
philosopher’s estrangement from the city. In introducing the educational system of the best
regime, Aristotle raises the question of why one would do, or learn, something if it does not
directly benefit oneself. He writes, “It makes a difference, too, for the sake of what one does or
learns something. What is for one’s own sake or for the sake of friends or on account of virtue is
not unfree, while the person who does the same thing on account of others would often be held to
do something characteristic of the laborer or the slave” (1337b18–22). It seems that the

9

Strauss, The City and Man, 29.
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philosopher needs to obtain some benefit from instituting the educational system if he is not to be
doing something “characteristic of the laborer or the slave.” As the quotation indicates, it is the
concept of friendship that is able to answer the questions of why the city is concerned with
philosophy and why the philosopher is concerned with the education of his fellow citizens. As
will later be made clear, friendship is concerned both with one’s own good and the good of
another. Like the city itself, friendship is ordered toward two ends.

Friendship and The Structure of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
Fully to understand the way in which friendship mediates the tension between the political and
philosophic life, it is necessary to turn to the Nicomachean Ethics, in which Aristotle unpacks his
conception of friendship in detail. It is a discussion that has traditionally received little attention.
This lack of attention is curious, given that the two books on friendship, Books VIII and IX,
together constitute a full fifth of the Ethics. To see how Aristotle’s discussion of friendship
figures into the debate between proponents of the life of politics and proponents of the private
life of contemplation, it will be helpful to look to the structure of the Nicomachean Ethics as a
whole. The first book of the Ethics states Aristotle’s intention “in outline.” In this book,
Aristotle notes that his goal is to find “the human good” (NE, 1094b7).10 Based on an argument
that assumes the teleological character of the entirety of nature, Aristotle holds, somewhat
ambiguously, that the human good is “an activity of soul in accord with virtue, and if there are

10

Unless otherwise indicated all citations to the Nicomachean Ethics will be based on the translation provided by
Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2011).
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several virtues, then in accord with the best and most complete one” (1098a17–18). Of course,
as the Ethics continues it quickly becomes clear that there is more than one virtue; Aristotle
distinguishes the moral virtues, discussed in Books III through V, and the intellectual virtues
discussed in Book VI.
The ambiguity surrounding the human good—and whether it consists in the practice of
moral virtue or the practice of intellectual virtue— does not appear to be resolved until Book X,
the last book of the Ethics, in which Aristotle straightforwardly states that the philosophic life of
contemplation is the highest life, while the life of moral virtue is happy “only in a secondary
way” (1178a8–9). Given Aristotle’s somewhat abrupt conclusion and the apparent ambiguity
surrounding the way in which his discussion of the moral virtues fits together with his account of
the philosophic life described at the end of the Ethics, some scholars have despaired of finding
any unity at all in the Ethics.11
Many political interpretations of the Ethics have sought to resolve these difficulties by
reading the Ethics in light of the debate that is raised in the Politics; the relation between the
active life devoted to politics and the private contemplative life of philosophy.12 One standard
political interpretation of Aristotle’s Ethics holds that Aristotle recognizes the tension between
philosophy and politics but seeks to alleviate it in various ways, all the while maintaining the

J. L. Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Otfried Hoffe, trans. Fernbach
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superiority of philosophy.13 According to this interpretation, the Ethics can be seen as containing
two complementary parts. While the first half deals with the political life characterized by moral
virtue, the second half is concerned with the philosophic life. This interpretation has much to
offer in that it is able to make sense of the way the moral virtues relate to the life of philosophic
contemplation. Specifically, this reading holds that Aristotle presents the life of moral virtue in a
way that emphasizes its nobility, while also exposing its limitations. This ensures that the wellbred Greek gentleman (καλοσκάγαθος), if he is a sufficiently attentive reader, will recognize that
the true benefit of moral virtue is that it points beyond itself toward philosophic virtue, which is
self-sufficient and capable of being practiced alone.14
While this interpretation provides much purchase, it suffers from two drawbacks. First, it
struggles to make sense of Aristotle’s stated intention in Book I to define the human good. In
describing his intention at the outset, Aristotle argues that the end of human action—the human
good—falls under the architectonic art of politics, and that the good of a nation or city is “nobler
and more divine” than the good of any single individual (1094b10–11). How can the good of the
city be “nobler and more divine” than the good of a single individual if the Ethics ends with the
conclusion that the solitary life of contemplation is the human good? Second, it runs into a
difficulty similar to that noted above concerning the conclusion of the Politics—namely, if the
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human good is the solitary life of contemplation, why does Aristotle concern himself with
directing the Greek gentleman toward the life of contemplation? Last, and perhaps most
problematically, this political interpretation gives short shrift to Aristotle’s two books concerning
friendship. The standard political approach typically treats these two books as an exhortation
meant to prepare the reader for Aristotle’s somewhat startling claim that the philosophic life is
the happiest life.15
It is my contention that, in light of Aristotle’s discussion of friendship, the Ethics does
not end with the conclusion that the solitary life of contemplation constitutes the human good.
Rather, I will show that Aristotle views the political life of moral virtue and the philosophic life
of contemplation as complementary. Focusing on Aristotle’s account of friendship not only
allows us to see the Ethics as a single, unified, work, but it also is able to account for why
Aristotle asserts that the philosopher is concerned with the political realm.

The Ascent to Friendship via Magnanimity
Aristotle famously holds that true friendship, or friendship in the primary sense, is the
friendship of good human beings (1157a30–32). If so, it would seem that the highest friendship
would be a friendship between those who are characterized by magnanimity or those who are
‘great-souled’ (μεγαλοψυχία), as Aristotle considers these individuals to be completely virtuous
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(1123b36–1124a2). Therefore, when we turn to Aristotle’s discussion of magnanimity, we are
perhaps unsurprised to see that friendship makes an appearance. At the same time, however, its
appearance in the discussion of magnanimity is striking given Aristotle’s depiction of the greatsouled man. He is described as haughty and somewhat aloof (1124a20). One commentator has
gone as far as to say that Aristotle’s magnanimous man is “self-absorbed.”16 And yet, Aristotle
writes that the magnanimous man “is incapable of living with a view to another—except a
friend—since doing so is slavish” (1124b28–1125a1). Why does the topic of friendship appear
at this juncture of the Ethics? Even more curiously, why does it appear as part of the description
of an individual who seems to be most self-sufficient and is “incapable of living with a view to
another”? The question is related to Socrates’ inquiry in the Lysis: what need could a selfsufficient, good individual have of another?
The answer, I hope to make clear, will become apparent once we understand who
Aristotle’s magnanimous man is. However, the identity of the magnanimous man is itself a
vexing question, as Aristotle never provides a definition of the virtue of magnanimity; nor does
he give an unambiguous indication in the Ethics of who the magnanimous man is. To
understand the identity of Aristotle’s magnanimous man requires that we look outside the
confines of NE 4.3 and examine first the virtue of courage, as well as Aristotle’s depiction of the
magnanimous man in the Posterior Analytics. As will be made clear, Aristotle’s account of
courage reveals the need that a city may occasionally have for an individual who is capable of
transcending its standards. While the great-souled man would seem to fit the mold of an
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individual who is not beholden to the city’s standards, Aristotle’s depiction of the great-souled
man in the Posterior Analytics shows the dangers such a man poses to the city.17 I contend that
when Aristotle’s account of magnanimity in NE 4.3 is read in the light of these other passages, it
becomes clear not only who the magnanimous man is, but also why friendship is introduced at
this point of the Ethics, and what role friendship plays in Aristotle’s political philosophy in
general.
Courage is the first moral virtue that Aristotle covers in the Ethics and, contrary to what
some have insisted, his of treatment of courage is far from a conventional re-telling of the Greek
conception of courage.18 On the contrary, as we shall see, Aristotle’s account of courage in
Book III is meant subtly to bring into focus the limits of the conventional Greek understanding of
courage. Aristotle seeks to expose these limits in order to make clear to the reader the need for
the virtue of magnanimity, which is introduced in Book IV.
Aristotle initially indicates that courage “is a mean with respect to fear and confidence”
(1115a7–8). However, what this mean entails is never fully resolved in Aristotle’s discussion of
courage. This lack of resolution is due, in part, to the interrelation between two aspects of
courage: (1) the courageous man’s desire for honor; and (2) his lack of concern with ill-fortune.
The courageous man’s desire for honor is initially portrayed as laudable—indeed, one ought to

Given Aristotle’s famous dictum that the individual “who is in need of nothing through being self-sufficient is no
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17

For an excellent rejoinder to the view that Aristotle’s listing of the moral virtues in Books III and IV is simply an
account of the qualities admired by the Greeks during Aristotle’s time, see Collins, Aristotle and the Rediscovery of
Citizenship, 47–52.
18

133

be fearful of disrepute (1115a10–15). The courageous man’s lack of concern with ill-fortune is
similarly suggested to be laudable (1115a15–17). Aristotle suggests that perhaps one should not
be fearful of things such as poverty or sickness, as these are outside of one’s control. It seems,
then, that courage is primarily concerned with pursuing that which is noble and honorable and
remaining impassive in the face of the vicissitudes of fortune.
As Aristotle’s account of courage develops, however, he indicates that the relationship
between honor and ill-fortune is somewhat troublesome and that the common conception of
courage is problematic. Toward the end of the first chapter on courage, Aristotle defines courage
“in the authoritative sense,” by noting that “a courageous man could be said to be someone who
is fearless when it comes to a noble death and to any situation that brings death suddenly to
hand,” such as illness or death at sea (1115a33–35). This seems simply to bolster the
observations made earlier—the courageous man is concerned with honor and is unmoved in the
face of ill-fortune. Aristotle, however, follows this definition of courage “in the authoritative
sense” by noting two things. First, when faced with the prospect of death at the hands of illfortune, the courageous man “despairs of his preservation” (1115b3). Of course, this pulls back
on the observation that a courageous man ought to remain impassive when confronted with illfortune. Rather than remain unaffected by ill-fortune, the courageous man “despairs of his
preservation” and ought to be “disgusted with [the] sort of death” brought on by ill-fortune
(1115b2–3). Second, Aristotle notes that while “the courageous act like men (ἀνδρίζονται) in
circumstances where prowess in battle is possible or dying is noble,” in situations of illness or
sea, “neither such prowess nor nobility is possible” (1115b6–7). Aristotle subtly suggests that
the virtue of courage is not exhausted by the manly acts of valor that are considered noble—true
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courage seems to extend beyond that which the many consider noble. For Aristotle, neither
excessive concern with honor nor insufficient concern with one’s fate is indicative of true
courage.
This interpretation receives added credence from Aristotle’s depiction of the five types of
specious courage that merely resemble courage in the authoritative sense. The first of these
types of specious courage is the “courage found in the citizen” who “endures dangers” for the
sake of honor (1116a17–20). Aristotle uses Hector and Diomedes from Homer’s Iliad as
examples of this type of courage. According to the lines Aristotle selects to portray Hector and
Diomedes as exemplars of civic courage, both warriors indicate that they will maintain their
stations in battle so as to avoid reproach or scorn. These are, of course, somewhat odd examples
of specious courage, as both Hector and Diomedes are warriors undertaking great acts of valor
on the battlefield—precisely the situation described by Aristotle as that in which the courageous
man is capable of displaying his virtue. Why are these examples provided to illustrate the
courage that only seems like virtue in the authoritative sense, when they seem to fit all the
criteria for a courageous act?19
The answer becomes evident when one examines the wider context in which these lines
are spoken. The first line is part of a dialogue Hector has with himself as he is preparing to face
Achilles on the battlefield: “Polydamas will be the first to lay a reproach upon me” (1116a24).
The ending of the line—which Aristotle does not quote—is as follows: “…for that he bade me

Aristotle notes that of the five types of courage that merely resemble true courage, “this most closely resembles
the courage [in the authoritative sense], because it arises through virtue, that is through a sense of shame and longing
for what is noble (since it is for honor) and through avoiding reproach, since it is shameful” (1116a26–29).
19

135

lead the Trojans to the city during this fatal night, when goodly Achilles arose. Howbeit I
hearkened not—verily it had been better far!”20 Hector is portrayed as a hero with a tragic flaw.
His devotion to reputation and honor is so great that he cannot heed the advice of others and, as a
result, puts the welfare of his entire city at risk. Hector’s good (as he perceives it) conflicts with
that of his city. This tragic flaw prevents him from acting for the welfare of his city, as he places
his own sense of honor above that of the common good.
The second example Aristotle provides is that of Diomedes, who states, “For Hector will
one day declare among the Trojans, speaking in the assembly, ‘The son of Tydeus, by me…’”
(1116a25). Diomedes makes this statement as he is attempting to pursue Hector on the
battlefield. Each time he attempts to do so, however, Zeus thwarts his advance with a “white
lightning-bolt.”21 When Nestor recognizes that the gods are against them and advises Diomedes
to turn and flee, Diomedes initially refuses because of a concern about what Hector will say of
him. Like Hector, Diomedes is incapable of heeding advice because his reputation and honor are
at stake. Aristotle uses the example of Diomedes as an instance in which pride and concern for
honor can result in a failure to acknowledge one’s limitations. Diomedes’ pride and his
excessive concern for honor cause him initially to spurn Nestor’s advice in favor of the belief
that he can oppose the will of the gods, or challenge fortune. Diomedes’ failure to heed Nestor’s
advice evinces equanimity in the face of ill-fortune of a kind that is destructive of his own selfpreservation and serves as a detriment to his fellow Greeks.
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These two examples, coupled with what follows, indicate why civic courage is not the
same as courage in the authoritative sense. Aristotle immediately follows up these examples of
civic courage by comparing them to examples of men whom it is necessary to compel to fight.
He writes, “Someone might put in the same category also those who are compelled by their
rulers [to fight]” (116a30–31). The only difference between those operating under the auspices
of civic courage and those who must be compelled to fight is that while the former fight out of a
sense of shame, the latter fight on account of fear of the penalties involved. The city, it seems,
has two ways to induce men to fight for its interests: by holding out honor or by the threat of
penalties.
While Aristotle flatly states that having to be compelled to fight by the threat of penalties
is not noble (1116b4), he indicates that the former method is also problematic. Indeed, the very
concern for honor that the city seeks to inculcate in its citizens so as to induce them to fight for
its security and continued existence, can undermine that same goal as well. The corollary of
honor is shame and, as the examples of Hector and Diomedes make clear, an excessive concern
with honor and shame (the standards of the city) can cause men to act in ways that are contrary
to the good of the city. While Hector and Diomedes may obtain honor and glory by facing their
foes on the battlefield (and avoid the shame that attends leaving the battlefield), their conduct is
destructive of both themselves and the city. Through these examples, Aristotle makes clear that
the very sense of honor and shame that the city inculcates in its citizens can lead to its ruin as
well. To secure its existence, it seems that the city may at times require an individual who is
capable of transcending the city and its standards. Aristotle’s depiction of civic courage as

137

deficient points to the need for a more developed account of the proper relation to honor and
fortune, one that is not tied to the standards of the city.
Aristotle’s account of civic courage directs the reader’s attention to the need for an
individual who is capable of transcending the standards of the city. It is precisely this individual
whom Aristotle describes in his portrait of the great-souled man in Book IV of the Ethics.
However, while Aristotle’s account makes clear that the magnanimous man transcends the city
and is capable of bestowing great benefits on the city, the questions of who this magnanimous
man is and what type of benefits he provides have long been the subject of debate. Some have
argued that the great-souled man represents the height of moral achievement that is capable of
being attained by an individual devoted to the life of politics, such as a statesman or general.22
Others have suggested that Aristotle is referring to the philosopher who is devoted to the life of
contemplation.23
Strong arguments have been raised in favor of both positions. For example, those
insisting that Aristotle’s great-souled man is intended to depict a man of great moral or political
achievement point to Aristotle’s placement of this virtue among the so-called moral or political
virtues and to the fact that the magnanimous man is concerned with great actions. In addition,
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the magnanimous man is said to be eager to help others and willing to face great dangers.24 In
contrast, others have suggested that the great-souled man is the philosopher par excellence, with
some going so far as to maintain that he is intended to represent Socrates. Pointing to Aristotle’s
statement that magnanimity is a “kind of ornament” that only attends those who have complete
virtue (1123b36–1124a2) and to his statement that the life of theoretical contemplation is the
happiest life (and hence the most virtuous), these scholars conclude that the magnanimous man is
meant to represent the philosopher.25 In addition, some have noted that the magnanimous man’s
idleness and proclivity to irony also favor the view that magnanimity is at root a philosophic
virtue.26
Further debate has surfaced as to whether Aristotle views the magnanimous man as
unambiguously good or whether he presents him as suffering from a tragic flaw.27 For example,
Harry Jaffa suggests that the fault of the magnanimous man is his “overweening” concern with
“his own greatness.”28 In contrast, Holloway argues that this “overweening concern” is
“compatible with and may arise from his moral seriousness and not from a merely personal
preoccupation with his own status.”29 Others, such as Hardie, have suggested that the tragic fault
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of the magnanimous man lies not in his intolerance of insults but in his refusal to recognize “the
contribution of luck and nature to his achievement.”30 According to this view, the tragedy of the
magnanimous man is his inability to recognize his indebtedness to the role of fortune.
It is my contention that in his account of the virtue of magnanimity in NE 4.3 Aristotle
proposes to describe both the philosopher and the statesman. Building on Aristotle’s discussion
of magnanimity in the Posterior Analytics, in which Aristotle suggests the possibility that there
may be two types of magnanimity, I will argue that his depiction of the great-souled man in NE
4.3 is intended as a response to the difficulties posed by the virtue of magnanimity in the
Posterior Analytics.31 Specifically, I will argue that the Posterior Analytics suggests that
magnanimity can be ascribed to the apex of the moral life exemplified by the politically active
man as well as to the philosopher. As depicted by Aristotle in the Analytics, both the individual
at the apex of the moral life and the individual at the height of the contemplative life have a
correct estimation of the great benefits they are capable of providing to the city; yet both suffer
from a tragic flaw that causes them to act in a socially destructive manner. Last, I will argue that
in NE 4.3 Aristotle provides a solution to this tragic flaw in the form of friendship. It is through
friendship and the recognition of each other’s virtues that Aristotle is able to reorient the
magnanimous man’s lack of concern with the standards of the city for the common good.
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Aristotle’s discussion of the virtue of magnanimity in the Posterior Analytics occurs in a
passage that is ostensibly meant to provide a simple overview of how to attain the definition of a
genus that covers more than one species. The virtue of magnanimity is provided as an example
(Post. An. 97b7–28).32 Aristotle maintains that to obtain a definition of magnanimity it would be
necessary to compare two groups of individuals who are held to be magnanimous on account of
different traits, to see what they have in common. If we take our bearing from Alcibiades,
Achilles, and Ajax, we are led to the conclusion that magnanimity consists in an intolerance of
dishonor, as it was intolerance that caused Alcibiades to go to war, roused Achilles’ wrath, and
drove Ajax to commit suicide (97b20–21). In contrast, if Lysander and Socrates are held to be
magnanimous, it seems that magnanimity consists of being indifferent (ἀδιάφοροι) to good and
ill fortune.33 Aristotle concludes his brief discussion of magnanimity by stating that to obtain a
definition common to these two groups, it would be necessary to “inquire what common element
have equanimity (ἀπάθεια) amid the vicissitudes of life and impatience of dishonor” (97b23–26).
If they have nothing in common, Aristotle concludes that there would be two genera of
magnanimity.
If Aristotle’s discussion of magnanimity in NE 4.3 is intended as an attempt to discover a
common trait that applies to both groups of men mentioned in the Posterior Analytics, it would
initially seem to be failure. Indeed, as Howland notes, “If one reads the passage from the
Posterior Analytics at face value, such an attempt [to find a common trait] must fail: anyone who
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is intolerant of insults after the manner of Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax is not truly indifferent
to fortune.”34 However, before making a judgement as to whether NE 4.3 does, in fact, apply to
both groups of magnanimous men, it is necessary to inquire into the two groups themselves to
discover all the commonalities that the members of each respective group share. Aristotle
provides the following advice for attaining a common, universal, definition:
It is also easier by this method to define the single species than the
universal, and that is why our procedure should be from the several
species to the universal genera—this for the further reason too that
equivocation is less readily detected in genera than in infimae species.
Indeed, perspicuity is essential in definitions … and we shall attain
perspicuity if we can collect separately the definition of each species
through the group of singulars which we have established … and so
proceed to the common universal with a careful avoidance of
equivocation. (97b28–38).
Thus, Aristotle states that we must first inquire into all the aspects that the members of each
respective group share in common with one another, maintaining an especial vigilance for
equivocation, before examining what it is that the members of both groups have in common.
When we turn to the individuals who comprise the first type of magnanimity—those
intolerant of insults—their commonality seems straightforwardly political. As Tessitore notes,
Alcibiades, Achilles and Ajax were all great Greek warriors who “embody a conception of
greatness that expresses itself in action and battle. Each is characterized by a desire for glory
that exhibits itself in conquest and implacable resistance to dishonor.”35 Thus, it is clear that the
first type of magnanimity is, at root, political. All the individuals that comprise this group are
capable of providing great benefits in war and battle for their respective political communities.
34
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However, as Aristotle intimates, while their concern for honor can lead them to confer great
benefits on their community, it can also lead them to inflict great harm on their community due
to a tragic flaw (ἁμαρτία): stubbornness, and an inability to listen to advice.
A brief analysis of each of the three politically magnanimous men shows that knowledge
of their own greatness and of the honors that they are due, combined with an inability to heed
advice, causes them to inflict great damage on their community. Ajax is famous for attempting
to kill the Greek generals Menelaus and Agamemnon after they fail to grant him the honor he
feels he is due. According to Sophocles’ rendering of the story, as Ajax prepares to leave his tent
in order to avenge his dishonor, his concubine, Tecmessa, attempts to dissuade him. Ajax
replies, “Woman, silence is the grace of woman.”36 Later, when the plan goes awry due to the
intervention of the gods, Ajax plans to kill himself. Again, Tecmessa seeks to dissuade him,
asking, “Wilt thou not heed?”37 Again Ajax spurns her advice, telling her, “Too much hast thou
spoken already.” 38 Ajax shortly does, indeed, commit suicide.
Similarly, when Agamemnon deprives Achilles of the war prize he believes he has rightly
merited during battle, Achilles refuses to continue fighting with the Greeks against the Trojans,
thereby depriving them of their greatest warrior.39 When Odysseus and Phoenix seek to
persuade him, Achilles refuses to be reconciled with Agamemnon, recounting instead the
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dishonor that Agamemnon had done him.40 This failure to heed their advice results not only in
the death of a great many Greeks, but also of his dear friend, Patroclus.41 Last, Alcibiades’
failure to listen to Socrates’ moderating advice leads to his notorious political enterprises. 42 In
his pursuit of political glory, Alcibiades betrayed the Athenians by aiding the Spartan forces in
their war efforts against the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war.43 All three of these great
warriors were very much attuned to the honors they were due, and this self-knowledge,
combined with an incapacity to heed moderating advice, caused them to inflict great harm on
their community.
While it is relatively straightforward to determine what connects the individuals
comprising the first type of magnanimity, it is more difficult to discern what holds Lysander and
Socrates together. Socrates the philosopher and Lysander the Spartan general initially appear to
have little in common, aside from an ability to bear the ill-fortune of poverty with equanimity.44
As a result, some have maintained that Lysander’s love of honor and supposed intolerance of
dishonor suggest that he actually belongs with Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax, while Socrates
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comprises a class all on his own.45 Others have suggested that Lysander is merely included as “a
more accessible but less perfect introduction” to the philosophic magnanimity of Socrates.46
The inclusion of Socrates as representative of the second type of magnanimity suggests
that Aristotle does intend to draw our attention to the fact that this type of magnanimity can take
a philosophic form. However, while Aristotle may seek to draw our attention to the philosophic
form that this type of magnanimity can take, it is still necessary to account for the reason
Aristotle chooses to include Lysander the Spartan general (who was not known in any way for
his philosophic acumen) as opposed to some other philosopher. If we follow Aristotle’s advice
and proceed “from the several species to the universal genera” while maintaining an eye for
“equivocation,” we will see that Lysander and Socrates have more in common than simply an
ability to bear poverty with equanimity. Following Aristotle’s method allows us to avoid the
premature conclusion that Aristotle has either misplaced Lysander or has included him as simply
a “more accessible” introduction to philosophic magnanimity.
In addition to having an ability to bear the ill-fortune of poverty with equanimity,
Lysander and Socrates share in common that they are both excluded from rule on account of
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Alcibiades, Achilles, Ajax, and Lysander. These four are all marked by the love of honor and the intolerance of
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their status in society.47 However, in contrast to their easy acceptance of poverty, both Socrates
and Lysander did not easily accept the ill-fortune of their low-born status. Instead, they both
believed themselves to be superior to others and deserving of honor and rule. We have already
seen in our analysis of the Gorgias and the Apology that Socrates views his manner of life to be
superior to the political life due to his commitment to avoiding injustice, and that he thinks he is
worthy of honor for the benefits he is capable of bestowing on the city.48 Callicles tells Socrates
that his philosophizing causes him “to become unmanly (ἀνάνδρῳ)” as he flees “the central area
of the city and the agoras” (Gorg. 485d 5–7). He presciently declares that Socrates’
preoccupation with philosophy at the expense of practicing the more manly art of rhetoric and
politics ensures that if he is ever accused of doing an injustice, he would stand in the lawcourt
“dizzy and gaping, without anything to say” (486b1–2). Of course, in the Apology, Socrates
does attempt to use rhetoric to make the case that his way of life is superior to the active life. As
part of his defense speech, he seeks to justify his way of life by telling the jurors that he
constantly philosophizes because the oracle at Delphi had ordered him to do so, but he fails to
persuade the requisite number of jurors of his innocence.49 Given the depiction of Socrates in

For an account of Socrates’ poverty and low-birth see Eduard Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, trans.
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the Gorgias, as well as Socrates’ inability to persuade the jurors in his trial, we can conclude that
Socrates’ failure was largely the result of his inability to take seriously the necessity of courage
and rhetoric in political affairs.
Lysander’s low-born status similarly prevented him from obtaining the honor and
privilege that he deserved. To rectify this perceived injustice, Plutarch relates that Lysander
“formed a design to remove the government from [those who ruled Sparta], and to give it in
common to all … Spartans,” so that he might have a share in ruling.50 The plan, as recounted by
Plutarch, is strikingly similar to the story that Socrates relates at his trial concerning the oracle at
Delphi. According to Plutarch, Lysander sought to trick his fellow citizens into believing that it
was the will of the gods that political rule ought to be decided on the basis of merit rather than
nobility. To this end, he conjured up oracles from Apollo to “alarm and overpower the minds of
his fellow-citizens by religious and superstitious terrors, before bringing them to the
considerations of his arguments.”51 However, as Plutarch relates, Lysander’s plan fell through
due to the lack of courage of one of its participants.52 Thus, both Lysander and Socrates
audaciously sought to use the religious customs of the people to implement great change in the

In a passage detailing Lysander’s plan to change the constitution, Plutarch relates that Lysander “first attempted
and prepared to persuade the citizens privately…. Afterwards perceiving so unexpected and great an innovation
required bolder means of support, he proceeded, as it might be on the stage, to avail himself of machinery, and to try
the effects of divine agency upon his countrymen. He collected and arranged for his purpose answers and oracles
from Apollo [so as to] first alarm and overpower the minds of his fellow-citizens by religious and superstitious
terrors, before bringing them to the considerations of his arguments” (Plutarch, “Lysander” in Lives, 541). The
parallel to Socrates’ use of the Delphic oracle as recounted by Plato is striking. Socrates also first sought to
persuade the citizens of Athens privately to care only for virtue, and eventually used the oracle at Delphi to persuade
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order of the city, and both failed due to a lack of courage on the part of the participants involved
in the plan.
The commonality between Lysander and Socrates is all the more striking in light of the
fact that the term “ἀδιάφοροι” is equivocal and can mean different things in different
circumstances. When paired with “poverty,” “ἀδιάφοροι” describes one who is “indifferent” to
poverty.53 However, when paired with “adversity,” it means to be “steadfast” or unwearying.”54
In light of Aristotle’s advice that one ought to avoid equivocations when making the requisite
comparisons necessary to arrive at a common definition, it seems that we have to choose from
among the two meanings of the word “indifferent.” Aristotle means to draw our attention either
to the capacity of Lysander and Socrates to be indifferent to poverty or to their ability be
steadfast and persevere in the face of their low-born status.
It is likely that Aristotle intends to highlight the ability of Lysander and Socrates to
persevere in the face of their low-born status, as this seems to be a more fitting basis for
magnanimity than their ability to suffer poverty with equanimity.55 In addition, viewing Socrates
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Further indication that Aristotle intends the basis for the second type of magnanimity to be an ability to persevere
in the face of misfortune is found in his description of the method one ought to employ when seeking to arrive at a
“common universal” definition. After noting that it is important to avoid equivocation, Aristotle writes, “We may
add that if dialectical disputation must not employ metaphors, clearly metaphors and metaphorical expressions are
precluded in definition” (Post. An. 38–40). When describing Lysander and Socrates, Aristotle initially notes that
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indicates that Lysander and Socrates are “indifferent to fortune,” he cannot mean that they are “enduring” poverty,
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and Lysander from this perspective not only elucidates what they have in common, but it also
makes clear what unites the first type of magnanimity with the second, allowing us to obtain a
common, universal definition of magnanimity. Indeed, the members of both groups believe
themselves to be great and, therefore, to be worthy of great things.56 Achilles, Ajax, and
Alcibiades were all outstanding in battle, and because of an awareness of their own great worth,
they spurned their political community when it deprived them the honor that they were due.
Socrates and Lysander were similarly aware of the outstanding benefits they were capable of
bestowing on their political community.57 To ensure that they, or their way of life, would be
accorded the honor it was due, each attacked the foundations of their respective regimes. 58 If the
second group of magnanimity is intended to be, at root, philosophic, Aristotle seems to indicate
that while those who are philosophically magnanimous may have the capacity to undertake great
deeds for their community, their awareness of this fact, coupled with adverse fortune, can lead
them to attempt to conquer fortune in a way that is inimical to the well-being of the city.

as this is a metaphorical expression and metaphorical expressions are “precluded in definition.” We are left with the
conclusion that when Aristotle states that Lysander and Socrates are indifferent (ἀδιάφοροι) to fortune, he means
that they are capable of persevering in the face of adversity.
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The men who are provided as examples of the two types of magnanimity (political and
philosophic) in the Posterior Analytics have a correct estimation of their worth. However, while
they rightly recognize that their virtue is worthy of great honor, they mistake their own virtue for
the whole of virtue. Those who are politically magnanimous mistake their courage and the
benefits it provides for the city as the whole of virtue. Therefore, when they are not afforded the
honors they are due, they fail to take advice from those who have knowledge and end up acting
in a socially destructive manner. Similarly, those who are philosophically magnanimous fail to
recognize the necessity of political courage, and, therefore, they seek to usurp the existing order
of the city. As great-souled individuals, all five of the magnanimous men listed in the Posterior
Analytics stand above the standards or conventions of the city; yet each has a tragic flaw causing
him to be destructive of the health of the city.

Curing the Magnanimous Man
Based on the portraits that he provides of civic courage in the Ethics and of magnanimity
in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle seems to be in a bit of a quandary. On the one hand, his
portrait of civic courage points to the need for a type of courage that transcends the conventions
and standards of the city. Indeed, it is the excessive concern with the honor and shame that the
city fosters in its citizens that causes Hector and Diomedes (both of whom embody civic
courage) to spurn advice and act in a way that is inimical to the well-being of their respective
cities. On the other hand, the magnanimous men described in the Posterior Analytics do
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transcend the standards of the city. While they are not motivated by shame (as are Hector and
Diomedes)—instead, they have an accurate knowledge of their own worth—they also end up
acting in socially destructive ways when they fail to receive what is their due. Perhaps it is the
destructive tendency of these magnanimous men that causes Aristotle to conclude his discussion
of magnanimity in the Posterior Analytics by suggesting that if there is one definition of
magnanimity, the medical treatment for each will be the same. He states, “Besides, every
definition is always universal and commensurate: the physician does not prescribe what is
healthy for a single eye, but for all eyes or for a determinate species of eye” (96b26 – 28). As we
shall see, in the Ethics, Aristotle hints that the prescription for the socially destructive propensity
of magnanimous men is friendship.
An initial reading of Aristotle’s account of magnanimity in NE 4.3 reveals a number of
contradictions, particularly in regard to the magnanimous man’s orientation toward honor and
fortune. Aristotle does not begin his discussion by disabusing the magnanimous man of the
notion that he is worthy of great honor. Instead, he starts out by reaffirming his worth. The
magnanimous man “deems himself worthy of great things and is worthy of them” (1123b3–4).
However, as Aristotle continues, his focus shifts from the honors that attend greatness to the
underlying basis of that honor, namely, virtue. As Ryan Hanley notes, “As the account of the
magnanimous man’s attitude to honour develops it becomes clear that greatness of soul consists
not in equal parts claiming and deserving honour; true magnanimity has instead everything to do
with the latter and little to do with the former.”59 In fact, near the end of his discussion of honor,
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Aristotle forthrightly states that the magnanimous man’s virtue is so great that no honor could be
worthy of it (1124a8). It seems that Aristotle transitions from a concern for honor to a concern
for virtue.
Based on this shift, some have suggested that Aristotle’s purpose is to cast the virtue of
magnanimity initially in such a light as to appeal to ambitious honor-loving individuals. Once
this appeal is made, Aristotle subtly shifts the emphasis from honor to the underlying virtues that
accompany honor. According to this interpretation, Aristotle is simply preparing the reader for
the claim that is to come later in the Ethics: that the life of theoretical virtue is the best life.60
One of the difficulties posed by this interpretation, however, is that the shift from honor to virtue
is not sharply drawn. Indeed, while the magnanimous man is said to have “complete contempt”
for honors that come from people at random, or for small honors, the magnanimous man has a
moderate disposition toward the honor that comes from “serious human beings,” taking pleasure
from such people in a measured way (1124a5–12). Thus, it is not the case that Aristotle
unambiguously and absolutely shifts the magnanimous man’s concern from honor to virtue
alone. Aristotle remains purposefully ambiguous.

60
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Similar ambiguity surrounds Aristotle’s depiction of the magnanimous man’s orientation
to fortune. First, we are told that the magnanimous man takes a measured approach to good and
bad fortune as well as to wealth and political power, neither being overjoyed by good fortune nor
despairing of ill-fortune (1124a12–17). Next, he connects the gifts of fortune to honor, stating
that the magnanimous man “is not disposed even toward honor as though it were a very great
thing, and political power and wealth are choiceworthy on account of the honor they bring”
(1124a17–18). On the basis of this statement the magnanimous man seems to be concerned with
fortune because of the honors that attend good fortune. However, Aristotle soon shifts, noting
that “in truth only the good human being is honorable” (1124a25–26). This would seem to
suggest that one ought not to direct any attention to the gifts of fortune or the honors they bring,
as it is only the underlying character trait or virtue that is of real worth. Rather than ending with
this conclusion, however, Aristotle instead follows up by noting that “he who has both goodness
and good fortune is deemed even worthier of honor” (112426–27). That Aristotle calls attention
to the fact that some people believe those with good fortune are more worthy of honor than those
with ill-fortune, suggests that the beliefs of these people matter. Thus, in the same way that the
magnanimous man ought to accept honor from those who are “serious,” he also needs to dispose
himself to fortune in a proper manner, since fortune is productive of honor.
Why would Aristotle maintain such an ambiguous stance on the magnanimous man’s
relation to honor and fortune? If it is truly only the magnanimous man’s underlying virtue that is
good, rather than the honors that attend this virtue, why does Aristotle go out of his way to
maintain that the magnanimous man is concerned with honor from those who are serious and to
suggest that good fortune can affect other people’s perceptions of one’s magnanimity? The
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answer has to do with the phenomenon of friendship. As noted above, friendship makes a
curious appearance in Aristotle’s discussion of magnanimity. Indeed, Aristotle states that the
magnanimous man is “incapable of living with another—except for a friend—for to do so is
slavish” (1124b31–1125a1). As will shortly be made clear, Aristotle believes that the two types
of magnanimous men listed in the Posterior Analytics are well-suited for friendship.
As I noted above in Chapter One, in the Lysis, Socrates fails to arrive at a definition of
friendship. Nevertheless, in that dialogue, Plato intimates that friendship may come to exist
between two individuals who are similar, yet different in some way from one another. It is
precisely this type of friendship that Aristotle suggests as the cure for the socially destructive
tendencies of the two types of magnanimous men listed in the Posterior Analytics. The two
groups of magnanimous men listed in the Posterior Analytics are similar in that they are all
magnanimous and capable of bestowing great benefits on their community, though the benefits
they are capable of bestowing differ in kind. As we have seen, however, the individuals that
comprise the two groups of magnanimous men all suffer from a tragic flaw. Their awareness of
the honors they are due causes Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax to spurn prudent advice, leading
them to act in socially destructive ways. Similarly, while Socrates and Lysander have the
knowledge and wile to reform the social order, their plans result in failure due to lack of courage.
It seems, therefore, that each type of magnanimous man is well-suited to befriend the other, as
each makes up what is lacking in the other.
Bearing in mind the suitability of friendship between these two types of magnanimous
men helps to make sense of the apparent contradictions in Aristotle’s account of magnanimity in
NE 4.3. Aristotle’s account of honor and fortune both indulges and tempers the magnanimous
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man’s excessive concern with honor and his perseverance in the face of adversity. Aristotle
indulges the magnanimous man by insisting that he is great and is deserving of great things. In
this way, the magnanimous man avoids the strictures and standards of the city; he is not
beholden to the city’s standards concerning honor and shame in the way that Hector and
Diomedes are. At the same time, the magnanimous man is not a law unto himself. Aristotle
tempers the destructive tendency of the magnanimous man by ensuring that he be concerned with
the honor of a few serious people. In the case of those magnanimous men that are “intolerant of
insults,” Aristotle’s method ensures that they will maintain a concern for the opinion and, indeed,
the advice of serious people, while thinking nothing of the honors or dishonors that come “from
people at random” (1124a10). To the extent that he is concerned with the opinion of other
serious or magnanimous individuals, Aristotle’s magnanimous man is open to persuasion and
advice.
Similarly, Aristotle’s ambiguous treatment of the magnanimous man’s relation to fortune
is meant to both indulge and temper those magnanimous men who have the ability to persevere
in the face of ill fortune. Aristotle’s statement that “in truth, only the good human being is
honorable” indulges the magnanimous man’s belief that he is worthy of honor (and perhaps rule)
independent of any ill-fortune regarding birth, status, or wealth. At the same time, Aristotle
draws attention to the fact that some people esteem those with good fortune. To the extent that
the magnanimous man cares for the honor of “serious people,” Aristotle’s remark has the effect
of tempering the magnanimous man’s desire to upend the social order in his pursuit of that which
is his due. Aristotle’s account of magnanimity in NE 4.3 can be seen as an attempt to lead these
magnanimous men to recognize the social conventions that honor those who are well-born,
155

powerful, and courageous. The magnanimous man must, to some extent, accept the existing
social order. According to Aristotle, fortune is something that ought to be worked with rather
than conquered. Of course, being able to recognize the good attributes of another is the
definition of a friendship based on the good.
When read in light of the topic of friendship, Aristotle’s discussion of magnanimity can
be seen as part of his “cure” for the magnanimous men listed in the Posterior Analytics. By
being complete or self-sufficient in their own nature, each type of magnanimous man described
in the Analytics is good. Yet, to the extent that these magnanimous men mistake their own virtue
for the whole of virtue, they are tragic figures that cause grief for their communities. It is only
by recognizing the virtues and claims of other magnanimous men who are similar to themselves,
yet differ in some point of virtue, that the magnanimous man is able to avoid tragedy.61 By
indulging his concern for honor, Aristotle ensures that the magnanimous man stands above the
conventions of the city. At the same time, Aristotle tempers the magnanimous man’s concern for
honor such that he is concerned only with the honor of “serious people.” In this way, Aristotle
sets the ground for friendship, which alone can act as the cure for the socially destructive
tendencies of the magnanimous man; a cure that is more fully developed in Books VIII and IX.

Howland points out that “At Iliad 7.302, Ajax and Hector, having dueled, part “in friendship.” Hector gives Ajax
his sword and receives a belt in exchange. In Sophocles’ Ajax, Ajax kills himself by falling on Hector’s sword.
This gesture points toward the death he should have died—death at the hands of his only equal, who is paradoxically
both friend and enemy.” “Aristotle’s Great-Souled Man,” 51 n. 40. I would add that this points toward the fact that
true friendship can exist only between those who are similar to one another yet differ in point of virtue. Indeed,
friendship between those who are identical is unlikely to develop, as neither is able to provide anything the other is
lacking. See below n. 76 and accompanying text.
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Friendship: Book VIII – A Self-sufficient Friendship
Already in the first chapter of Book VIII, it becomes apparent that Aristotle’s discussion of
friendship seeks to engage in the same inquiry as that undertaken by Socrates in the Lysis: is
there a friendship that is not rooted in each friend’s deficiencies, but instead is based on an
appreciation of one another solely for their own sake? Yet, in contrast to Socrates, who was
unable to discover a definition of friendship and, therefore, placed it within the ambit of erotic
relationships characterized by desire and need, Aristotle does provide a definition of friendship.
Building on the framework of Plato’s Lysis, Aristotle develops an understanding of friendship
that is based not on a lack or need, but instead on a reciprocal appreciation of another’s
goodness.
In stark contrast to Socrates’ decision to preface his inquiry into friendship by setting two
friends against one another, Aristotle begins by emphasizing the utility of friendship. Friendship
“is most necessary with a view to life,” and “without friends, no one would choose to live”
(1155a5–6). Aristotle indicates that friendship is useful not only for the young and the old but
also for those who are in their prime to perform noble actions (1155a13–15). In support of this
contention he cites the Iliad: “For ‘two going together’ are better able both to think and to act”
(1155a15–16). This citation from the Iliad is spoken by Diomedes as he is about to go on an
excursion at night to seek information regarding the movement of the Trojan troops.62 Diomedes
chooses Odysseus to come with him, whom he describes as having a “heart and proud spirit …

Homer, Iliad, vol. I, 10:220–30. The entire line is as follows: “When two go together, one discerneth before the
other how profit may be had; whereas if one alone perceive aught, yet is his wit the shorter, and but slender his
device.”
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beyond all others eager in all manner of toils” and being “wise above all … in understanding.”63
On their excursion, Diomedes and Odysseus not only learn of the Trojan troop movements but
are also able to sneak into the Trojan camp and abscond with some fine horses.64 Together, the
wily Odysseus and the courageous Diomedes are able to provide great benefits for the city,
which redound to their own honor.
While Aristotle’s preface differs from Socrates’ initial foray into the subject by
emphasizing the utility of friendship, he quickly runs into the same dilemma as Socrates: what is
friendship? Aristotle initially puts forward two potential options. He notes that while some
argue that friends are “those who are alike,” others stress the complementarity of opposites
(1155a33–1155b7). Of course, both options were explored and found wanting in the Lysis. In
the Lysis, Socrates found that neither provides the means for elevating the basis of friendship
beyond mere utility or need. However, Aristotle provides a further definition of friendship—a
definition that was raised but not fully explored by Socrates in the Lysis: Aristotle notes that
aside from those who cite the previous two definitions of friendship, there “are still others,
including Empedocles, who claim that like aims at like” (1155b7–9). Of course, in the Lysis, this
quotation—“like aims at like”— was used as the launching pad for much of the inquiry into
friendship. However, while in the Lysis the expression is interpreted as suggesting that those
who are identical to each other are friends, in the Ethics the quotation appears to describe a
middle approach between the friendships of those who are identical to one another and the
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friendships of those who are opposites. This middle approach suggests that those who are
similar but not identical to one another would be friends.65 That Aristotle introduces a third
possible definition of friendship, one not fully explored by Socrates, suggests that he intends to
add to Socrates’ inquiry into friendship, or that he considers Socrates’ inquiry deficient in some
way.66
After raising these three possible definitions of friendship, Aristotle informs us that he
intends to turn aside from these “perplexing questions bound up with matters of nature” to focus
instead on those questions that are “bound up with what is distinctively human” (1155b9–10).67
65

This is made clear in both the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia, in which Aristotle provides a brief
commentary on the statement by Empedocles that “like aims at like.” Aristotle writes in the Eudemian Ethics: “The
natural philosophers also arrange the whole of nature taking as a principle the movement of like to like; that is why
Empedocles said that the bitch sat on the tile, because it had the greatest similarity” (EE, 1235a10–12, as quoted in
Brad Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles, trans. Brad Inwood (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 159.
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one opposite does not aim at the other opposite in itself, except incidentally. Rather, the longing involved is for the
middle term, since this is good” (NE 1159b19–21).
Further bolstering the possibility that Aristotle views Socrates’ inquiry in the Lysis to be deficient is the fact that
in the entirety of the Ethics, the only other time Empedocles is mentioned is in the context of Book VII. Here
Aristotle explicitly critiques the Socratic thesis that “no one acts contrary to what is best while supposing that he is
so acting” (1145b26–27). In this discussion, Aristotle notes that a person who knows the words of something, but is
ignorant of what they mean, “merely speaks, as a drunk man states the sayings of Empedocles” (1147b12–13). It
may be that Aristotle is suggesting that while Socrates knows the sayings of Empedocles, he fails to understand
them. Of course, as we’ve seen, in the Lysis Socrates himself raises the possibility that he does not fully understand
the saying “like aims at like.” Of the possibility that friendship exists between those who are alike, he states, “Then
do you also happen to have come across the writings of the wisest ones … namely that what is like is always
necessarily a friend to its like? And they, I suppose, are the ones who converse and write about nature and the
whole.” Socrates goes on to say that these “wisest ones” may “speak well … only we don’t understand them” (Lys.
214bff). It was noted above, that Plato suggests that Socrates’ understanding of friendship is deficient due to his
failure to understand the writings of “the wise” (οί σοφοί), who inquire into nature and the whole. As Aristotle’s
discussion of friendship will show, it is precisely this third definition espoused by Empedocles that is capable of
elevating friendship from a relationship based on mere necessity to one in which two friends love one another on
account of each other’s goodness.
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Aristotle may also be subtly critiquing Socrates’ inquiry into friendship by characterizing these possible
definitions of friendship as “perplexing questions bound up with matters of nature.” As noted above, Aristotle was
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As we shall see, however, the “distinctively human” approach that Aristotle adopts is very much
bound up with nature. In fact, throughout his discussion of friendship Aristotle will on several
occasions lapse into a discussion of nature almost as if to remind his audience of friendship’s
connection to nature. In this way, Aristotle can be seen to be building on the framework
established in the Lysis.
To see how Aristotle responds to the problems raised in the Lysis, it will be useful briefly
to recap the difficulties Socrates encounters in his attempt to define friendship. It will be
recalled that Socrates first raises the problem of reciprocity. While it seems natural that if
friendship is to exist between two people, they need to love one another, Socrates notes that it is
common to speak of lovers of wine, lovers of gymnastics, or lovers of wisdom, objects that are
all incapable of reciprocating love. However, accepting that friendship need not be reciprocal
would result in the absurd conclusion that those who do not reciprocate love, or even hate their
lover, are nevertheless friends of their lover. Taking a different tack, Socrates suggests that
perhaps the wise—those who inquire into nature and the whole—are correct in holding that “like
is always necessarily a friend to its like” (Lys. 214b5). The difficulty posed by this definition is
twofold. First, Socrates argues that it is impossible for the base to be friends. Second, even if it
is assumed that the wise are talking only about the good, Socrates notes that these would not be
useful to one another. To the extent that the good are sufficient in themselves, they will not be in
want of anything and, therefore, will not have any desire for their friend. Finding this definition
inadequate, Socrates takes another approach and suggests that perhaps those who are opposite

aware that Socrates “neglect[ed] the world of nature as a whole but [sought] the universal in … ethical matters”
(Meta., 987b1–3).
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and wholly unlike are friends with each other. This suggestion immediately runs into the
difficulty that hatred is the opposite of friendship. Finally, Socrates raises the possibility that the
neutral (those who are neither good nor bad) are friends with the good. As the dialogue
continues, it becomes clear that this definition would destroy the phenomenon of friendship,
because it would mean that, in comparison with the good (which Socrates terms the “first
friend”), all one’s friends would simply be phantom friends.
Aristotle begins by critiquing the notion that there would be a single form of friendship.
According to Aristotle, there are three forms of friendship, which correspond to the three things
that are loveable: the good, the pleasant, and the useful.68 Almost immediately, Aristotle points
to a difficulty: in their love of what is good, “is it the good, then, that people love or is it the
good for themselves?” (1155b22–23). This question recalls Aristotle’s discussion of Plato’s
theory of the forms in Book I, in which he investigates whether the good is one and universal, or
whether the good differs for different entities. In Book I, Aristotle does not fully resolve this
question, but he does note that the way in which various things are said to be good are in some
way similar to one another. In the present discussion of friendship, Aristotle again suggests that
both are possible (i.e., that the good is both universal and differs for various objects or people).
He writes, “It seems that each person loves what is good for himself and that, while in an
unqualified sense the good is what is lovable, what is lovable to each is what is good for each”
(1155b23–25).69 Aristotle suggests that different people are by nature directed toward different
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Note that in Book II the noble is something that is an object of choice.

In contrast to my interpretation, Lorraine Pangle argues that Aristotle is “not making any claim that the simply
good is good in some absolute way, wholly apart from its being good or pleasant for something, if only for itself.”
As evidence, she points to the fact that Aristotle includes the pleasant in this discussion, and notes that “it would be
69
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things; while the good may be unqualified and universal, the way in which people pursue the
good may be different or unique.
After raising the distinction between the universal good and that which is good for each
individual—a distinction that will inform nearly the entirety of the rest of his discussion on
friendship in Book VIII—Aristotle goes on to address the difficulties associated with friendship
that Socrates raises in the Lysis. First, Aristotle emphasizes the reciprocal nature of friendship.
He notes that friendship must involve reciprocated goodwill—that is, one must wish for good
things for one’s friend, for his own sake. Explicitly alluding to Socrates’ objection that one can
be a friend to inanimate objects, Aristotle states, “It is perhaps laughable to wish for good things
for the wine, but, if anything, one wishes that it be preserved so that one may have it” (1155b29–
30).70 Friendship, Aristotle suggests, must be between people. However, goodwill alone is not
enough;71 rather, each friend must also be aware of the other’s existence.72 People might well
feel goodwill for another they have not met but suppose is decent. It would be absurd, Aristotle

absurd to speak of something as being intrinsically pleasant if it were not pleasant for anyone.” Aristotle on
Friendship, 38. However, Aristotle discusses the intrinsically pleasant in Book VII of the Ethics. In Book VII,
Aristotle notes that the existence of the gods is intrinsically pleasant. Specifically, he writes, “Yet the same thing is
not always pleasant on account of our nature’s not being simple. Rather, something else is present in us as well
(hence we are subject to destruction) such that when the one part acts, this is contrary to nature with respect to the
other nature; and when both are equally balanced, the action performed seems to be neither painful not pleasant. For
if someone’s nature were simple, the same actions would always be most pleasant. Hence the god always enjoys a
pleasure that is one and simple, for there is an activity not only of motion but also of motionlessness, and pleasure
resides more in rest than in motion” (1154b21–28). I suggest that in the same way that the intrinsically pleasant is
available only to the gods, so the intrinsically good is also available only to the gods.
Laughter is, of course, not a convincing form of refutation (cf. Gor. 473e1–3). This suggests that Aristotle’s full
explanation regarding the role that reciprocity plays in friendship has yet to be revealed.
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See above at chapter 2 n. 64.

Becoming aware of another’s existence will prove to be major theme in Book IX, in which Aristotle reveals how
one becomes a friend to another. See below at pp. 214–217.
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argues, to suggest such people are friends without knowing of each other’s existence. Again,
Aristotle emphasizes the phenomenological and, thus, human aspect of friendship. Based on
these characteristics, Aristotle provides the following description of friendship: “Friends must,
therefore, have goodwill toward each other and not go unnoticed in their wishing for the good
things for the other, on account of some one of the [lovable] things mentioned” (1156a3–5).
Based on this definition, Aristotle turns in chapter three to distinguish the three forms of
friendship from one another. The first two types of friendship—friendships of utility and
pleasure—exist only on the basis of some advantage or pleasure that each individual comes to
have from the friendship. The parties to these two types of friendship “do not love each other in
themselves but only insofar as they come to have something good from the other” (1156a10–13).
As a result, once the purpose for which the friendship was entered into ends, these types of
friendship are prone to dissolve. In contrast, friendships between “those who are good and alike
in point of virtue” love each other on account of who they are (1156b7–8). Aristotle writes that
these friendships are “stable,” since the underlying basis for the friendship, virtue, is a stable
thing (1156b12–13). Thus, in contrast to Socrates, who held that all friendships are based on a
lack, Aristotle holds that there is a self-sufficient friendship based on an appreciation of the good
characteristics of each party to the friendship. The good, or those who are virtuous, love one
another solely for the other’s sake, insofar as he is good.73

Aristotle is quick to add that “friendships of this sort are likely to be rare, since people of this sort are few.
Further, there is also need of the passage of time and the habits formed by living together” (1156b25–26). He
concludes this chapter with what may be taken as a subtle critique of Socrates’ and Callicles’ declaration of
friendship in the Gorgias (cf. Gor. 485e3; 485c1; 499c2–5): “Those who swiftly make proofs of friendship to each
other wish to be friends but are not such unless they are also loveable and know this about each other. For a wish
for friendship arises swiftly, but friendship itself does not” (ΝΕ 1156b30–33).
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Of course, while Aristotle arrives at the precise opposite conclusion of Socrates, he does
not yet explain how he resolves the fundamental obstacle to his definition of friendship.
Specifically, why would two good individuals be friends to each other if they are both “good and
alike in point of virtue”? What benefit could they provide one another? Or, as Socrates asserts,
“How … will those who are good be at all friends to the good, since neither do they long for
each other when absent—for even apart they are sufficient for themselves—nor do they have any
use for each other when present?” (Lys., 215b). Why would these two virtuous individuals
desire each other’s company? Indeed, Aristotle simply asserts that good people are both
beneficial and pleasant to one another, without explaining the basis for this assertion.
It has already been noted in the discussion on magnanimity above that Aristotle believes
those who are magnanimous in the mold of Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax to be well-suited for
friendship with those who are magnanimous in the manner of Lysander and Socrates. The
members of the two groups are different from each another, yet they are all self-sufficient and
good with respect to their own character or virtue. Moreover, if the second type of magnanimity
is at root philosophic, then the wisdom it evinces would be well-suited to complement the
courage that is emblematic of the first type of magnanimity. If these two types of magnanimous
men were capable of amicably ruling together, wisdom and power would coalesce in a way that
benefits the entire political community. However, as Aristotle subtly indicates in the Posterior
Analytics, these magnanimous men are not likely to recognize each other’s virtues. As noted
above, these magnanimous men suffer from the tragic flaw of mistaking their own virtue for the
whole of virtue. Furthermore, we have seen that these two types of magnanimous men stand
above the standards of the city and, as a result, a utilitarian appeal to the city’s well-being is
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unlikely to have the persuasive effect necessary to lead them to recognize each other’s virtue or
claim to rule. Thus, while the two types of magnanimous men may be well-suited to become
friends with one another, it seems that they have little inclination to do so.
In chapters four through six of Book VIII, Aristotle presents a somewhat cryptic
argument to explain why it is nonetheless in their own interest for these magnanimous
individuals to recognize each other’s virtue and claim to rule. In chapter four, Aristotle sets up
the basis that will undergird his explanation as to what benefit friendship holds out for
magnanimous, self-sufficient men. He begins by reasserting that friendships that are complete
are both pleasant and useful as well. However, as he continues, Aristotle begins consistently to
elevate friendships of pleasure, such that the good and the pleasant turn out to be nearly
indistinguishable from one another. Aristotle begins by noting that “among those who seek
pleasure or utility, friendships endure especially whenever each attains the same thing from the
other—for example, pleasure—and not only this but whenever it comes from the same type, as
in, for example, those who are witty” (1157a4–6). By way of this example, Aristotle points to
the overlap between the good (virtue) and the pleasant, as wit was identified as one of the social
virtues articulated in Book IV. He immediately contrasts this example with the relationship of
lover and beloved, who do not receive pleasure from the same thing: the lover is “pleased by
seeing the beloved, the beloved [is pleased] by being attended to by his lover” (1157a6–8).
While Aristotle initially seems to disparage this type of relationship by stating that it sometimes
fades “when the bloom of youth fades” (1157a8), he continues by noting that these types of
friendships can become stable if, through the time spent living together, they begin to develop
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affection for one another’s character (1157a10–12). Thus, the time spent together can cause two
lovers to delight in one another’s character.
Turning to complete friendships, Aristotle underscores the way that erotic friendships can
evolve into friendships of virtue by pointing to the way in which the time spent together
stabilizes friendship. He writes, “Only the friendship of the good is secure against slander, for it
is not easy to trust anyone when it comes to slander about someone who has been tested by
oneself over a long time” (1157a21–22). He then concludes that only friendships based on the
good are complete friendships, and that the other two friendships are friendships “only by way of
a resemblance” (1157a32). However, Aristotle follows this up by noting that “what is pleasant is
a good for the lovers of pleasure” (1157a33). Here Aristotle seems almost unequivocally to
suggest that pleasure and the good are, for some, the same.
Why does Aristotle elevate friendships of pleasure, such that they become nearly
identical with friendships of the good? The answer becomes apparent in chapter five, where
Aristotle subtly reveals his solution to the difficulty that Socrates encounters in the Lysis: what
would cause those who are good and self-sufficient to desire another? Aristotle begins chapter
five by noting that “just as in the virtues, so too in friendship: some people are spoken of as good
in reference to the characteristic they possess, others as good in reference to the activity they
engage in” (1157b5–7).74 Aristotle informs us that virtue or goodness expresses itself in

This language mirrors Aristotle’s discussion of what it is that happiness consists of in Book I. In Book I Aristotle
writes, “The argument, then, is in harmony with those who say that [happiness] is virtue or a certain virtue, for the
activity in accord with virtue belongs to virtue. But perhaps it makes no small difference whether one supposes the
best thing to reside in possession or use, that is, in a characteristic or an activity” (NE 1098b30–33). This, of course,
sets up the fundamental distinction between the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues that undergirds much of the
rest of the treatise.
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different ways. Some are good in reference to their virtuous characters (i.e., their possession of
moral virtues), while others are good in reference to their activity (i.e., their practice of
philosophy). As we shall see, this differentiation in goodness provides the basis for friendship in
a way that avoids the difficulty encountered by Socrates in the Lysis.
After these initial steps towards a solution to Socrates’ dilemma, Aristotle makes a small
detour, reiterating what he had stated previously, namely, that living together is important to
friendship. Those who live together, he states, “delight in and provide good things to one
another” (1157b8). Again, pleasure comes to the fore as an important aspect of friendship. He
continues, noting that if friends remain separated for an extended period of time, the friendship
itself can be destroyed. Thus, Aristotle suggests that even among those who are good, friendship
cannot exist and be maintained on the basis of the good alone. Friendship, Aristotle suggests,
needs the leavening effect of pleasure. Turning to the elderly’s indisposition to form friendships,
this point is made even more starkly. The elderly and the sour, he states, are unlikely to form
friendships, “for there is little that is pleasant in them” (1157b14–15). He concludes, “Nature
appears to avoid most of all what is painful and to aim at what is pleasant” (1157b17). With this
short statement, Aristotle both reminds the reader of friendship’s connection to nature (or that
friendship is natural), and that the basis for friendship cannot be the good alone, but that pleasure
is a necessary component of friendship—perhaps even more so than the good.75

At this point, Aristotle is responding also to Socrates’ ambiguity in the Gorgias regarding the relationship
between the good and the pleasant. (Cf. pp 94–98.) While Aristotle does not come to a definitive conclusion here,
his discussion anticipates his fuller discussion of the difficulty in Book X.
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After having again emphasized the importance of pleasure, Aristotle directly touches
upon the Socratic dilemma. He restates the dilemma as follows:
The friendship of those who are good, then, is friendship most of all, just
as has been said many times. For what is good or pleasant in an
unqualified sense seems to be lovable and choiceworthy, whereas what is
good or pleasant to each individual seems to be such only to that person.
But a good person is lovable and choiceworthy to a good person on both
accounts. (1157b25–29; emphasis added).

Aristotle here restates Socrates’ question of how it can be that someone who is good or pleasant
in an unqualified sense can also be good or pleasant only for a certain individual. Would it not
instead be the case that the good in the unqualified sense be good for all good individuals?
Aristotle’s solution to the dilemma is best understood against the backdrop of the
introductory statement of Chapter five: “Some people are spoken of as good in reference to the
characteristic they possess, others as good in reference to the activity they engage in” (1157b5–
7). Aristotle seems to suggest here that in a friendship of the good, each individual is
unqualifiedly good—and, we may add in light of the subsequent discussion, such individuals are
also pleasant—and is therefore loveable and choiceworthy. While it is true that in a friendship
based on the good, both parties to the friendship are unqualifiedly good and pleasant, each party
is also different from the other in some way—some being good in character, others in
philosophic activity. Each party can therefore be good and pleasant specifically for the other
party to the friendship. In this way, Aristotle is able to resolve the Socratic dilemma of why
those who are good and self-sufficient would ever treasure or love another.

168

The sort of individuals that Aristotle has in mind as being both good unqualifiedly and
good for the other party to the relationship seems to be those who best exemplify the moral
virtues and those who practice the intellectual virtues. This interpretation is bolstered by the
following paragraph, where Aristotle delineates the role played by each party in a friendship
based on the good. He writes, “Friendly affection is also like a passion, whereas friendship is
like a characteristic: friendly affection exists no less toward inanimate things, whereas people
reciprocate love as a matter of choice, and choice stems from one’s characteristic” (1157b28–
32). In this statement, Aristotle indicates that each party will have a different role. The fact that
friendly affection is akin to a passion that one may have towards an inanimate object is meant to
recall the philosopher’s passionate love of wisdom.76 In this way, Aristotle suggests that one
party to the friendship acts as the passionate philosopher.77 In contrast, the party who
reciprocates love does so as a matter of choice, which stems from a characteristic.78 Aristotle’s
terminology here is meant to bring to mind the moral virtues, which are characteristics marked
by choice. Aristotle indicates that a friendship based on the good involves an exchange of
pleasure or delight between the practitioner of the intellectual virtues and the practitioner of the
moral virtues.

76

Cf. NE 1155b25–30; Lys. 212d6–10.

Aristotle notes, however, that “people also wish for good things for those who are loved, for the sake of the loved
ones themselves, not in reference to a passion but in accord with a characteristic” (1157b32–34). This suggests that
even the “active” partner loves not solely in an egotistical way ordered solely towards pleasure, but also for the sake
of the other, in so far as the other is good.
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78

At this point Aristotle finally answers the Socratic inquiry regarding the reciprocity of friendship. See above at
pp. 36–37.
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It seems therefore, that in a friendship based on the good, one party to the friendship will
have a passionate love for his friend similar to that which a philosopher has for wisdom, while
the other party will reciprocate love based on his characteristic. In this succinct statement on
friendship, Aristotle points toward a resolution to the Socratic dilemma concerning friendship.
Each party to the friendship brings a specific good or pleasure to the relationship that is both
good in and of itself and is also good or pleasant in some specific way for the other party. He
concludes, “Each [party], then, both loves what is good for himself and repays in equal measure
what they wish for the other and what is pleasant. For it is said, ‘friendship is equality.’”79
In the following chapter (Chapter 6), Aristotle discusses the political implications of this
type of friendship. Regarding the friendships of “people in positions of authority,” he states the
following:
It has been said that the serious person is at once pleasant and useful; yet
such a person does not become a friend to someone who exceeds him [in
power], unless [the person in power] is also exceeded [by the serious
person] in virtue. But if this does not occur, [the serious person] is not
rendered equal [to the person of greater power], since he is exceeded in
the relevant proportion. (1158a33–37).

Aristotle indicates that the powerful, owing to their superiority in power, are unlikely to be
friends with those who are “serious.” In fact, it is only when the serious person exceeds the
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This conclusion points to a further difficulty: the relative inequality of the virtues. The virtue of wisdom (i.e.,
philosophic virtue) is superior to that of prudence and the moral virtues (i.e., political virtue) (cf. 1143b18–1145a11;
for further discussion regarding the superiority of wisdom over prudence, see Richard Bodéüs, “The Gods as
Objects of Imitation,” in Aristotle and the Theology of Living Immortals, trans. Jan Garrett (New York: State
University of New York Press, 2000), 168–79. If “friendship is equality,” as Aristotle states, how could the wise
philosopher and the prudent statesman befriend one another? The answer is hinted at in the following chapter.
Aristotle will state that superiority in a point of power can render its practitioner equal to a serious person who
exceeds him in virtue (1158a35).
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person in power in point of virtue that a friendship may develop, as the differential in virtue is
able to compensate for the power differential between the two parties. Again, Aristotle points
toward a solution to the fundamental political problem: how power and wisdom might coincide
to realize the best regime possible. Those who are politically powerful ought to befriend those
who are “serious.” The magnanimity of an Alcibiades requires the complementary magnanimity
of a Socrates. Of course, Aristotle knows that Alcibiades spurned Socrates’ advice and that the
powerful are unlikely to befriend the wise. As a result, Aristotle concludes this brief reveal of
the political implications of his discussion of friendship with the observation that “[those in
positions of authority] are not much accustomed to becoming these sorts [of friends to the
virtuous]” (1158b38–39).
In his discussion of friendship, Aristotle has made clear that magnanimous men who are
politically powerful, well-born, and courageous are well-suited for friendship with
philosophically magnanimous men who, despite their low-born status, have great benefits to
offer the city. Aristotle suggests that the fundamental political problem identified by Socrates
and Plato—how to ensure the coincidence of power and wisdom—can potentially be resolved by
the phenomenon of friendship. Through an appreciation of one another’s virtue, two individuals
who are self-sufficient and good in their own nature can together ensure the existence of the best
possible regime. However, not a few difficulties remain. First, while Aristotle has hinted that
pleasure is that which causes the one individual of such a friendship to appreciate the good
qualities of the other, he has not yet indicated how or why this mutual exchange of pleasure will
take place. In fact, the most he has indicated is that those in positions of authority are not much
accustomed to becoming friends of the virtuous. It is not until Book IX, in which Aristotle
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finally tackles the fundamental political problem regarding the coincidence of wisdom and
power, that he explicates how this mutual exchange of pleasure will occur.
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CHAPTER FOUR. THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP

In the previous chapter I noted that Aristotle hints that the fundamental problem of politics—
attaining the coincidence of power and wisdom—may be capable of resolution through the
medium of friendship. Specifically, by way of friendship, the philosopher can impact the
policies of those in power. However, I noted that while Aristotle hints that friendship is a
solution to the difficulty of attaining the coincidence of power and wisdom, he states quite
frankly that those in power are not disposed to become friends with serious or worthy people.
The goal of Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics is to show how such individuals may become
friends with serious people. I will argue that it is through a discussion of the giving and
receiving of benefits, that Aristotle explains how this friendship may come about.1
Aristotle’s intention in taking up the discussion of how those in power may become
friends with the philosopher is indicated in the first sentence of Book IX, which states that its
subject matter is heterogeneous friendships, in which the goal of each party is different.2

1

In discussing the giving and receiving of benefits, Aristotle is, of course, picking up on a theme that he had earlier
touched upon in his depiction of the magnanimous man. In Book IV, Aristotle had noted the following about the
magnanimous man’s disposition towards the giving and receiving of benefits: “He is also the sort to benefit others
but is ashamed to receive a benefaction; for the former is a mark of one who is superior, the latter of one who is
inferior. He is disposed to return a benefaction with a greater one, since in this way the person who took the
initiative [with the original benefaction] will owe him in addition and will have also fared well thereby” (1124b9–
13). The magnanimous man’s attitude toward the giving and receiving of benefits is rooted in a concern with his
own superiority. This attitude initially appears to be at odds with Aristotle’s understanding of friendship, which
entails an appreciation of the other for his own sake. Book IX of the Ethics should be read as Aristotle’s attempt to
reconcile the magnanimous man’s concern with his own superiority with the description of friendship in Book VIII.
2

This distinction is made clear both by the concluding sentence of book VIII and by the introductory phrase of Book
IX. Book VIII concludes: “Let what concerns these matters, then, be spoken of to this extent” (1163b28). “These
matters” refers to “homogeneous friendships,” or friendships in which both parties to the friendship seek the same
goal—for example, usefulness or pleasure. The opening line of Book IX reiterates the intention to leave
homogeneous relationships behind: “In all heterogeneous friendships, what is proportional equalizes and preserves
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Aristotle begins by providing an example of a political or market friendship between different
craftsmen.3 This type of friendship is easily equalized through the medium of commerce, as
each party exchanges his wares according to their value, and Aristotle has discussed this type of
friendship at length in Book V in connection with justice.4 In contrast, the following example
that Aristotle provides is a decidedly non-political friendship, which is more difficult to equalize
and, as a result, is susceptible to dissolution: the erotic friendship consisting of a lover and
beloved who enter into the relationship for different purposes. Aristotle notes that such
relationships will dissolve “when the lover loves the beloved for the pleasure involved, [while]
the beloved his lover for his usefulness to him, and when both parties do not have what each
wants” (1164a6–10). Because neither party to the relationship receives what it desires, the
relationship ends.
By introducing the example of a political or market friendship that is easily equalized
alongside a decidedly non-political relationship that is difficult to equalize, Aristotle silently

the friendship” (1163b33–34). Thus, broadly construed, the subject matter of Book IX is that of heterogeneous
friendships, or friendships in which each party seeks a different goal.
3

Michael Pakaluk notes that this friendship is, strictly speaking, a homogeneous friendship, as both parties seek
what is useful. He asserts that Aristotle likely introduces this example by way of contrast with the types of
friendship that are to follow. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII and IX (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998),
149.
4

In Book V Aristotle notes that the exchange of wares occurs due to the prompting of necessity. Necessity, he
argues, prompts people to come together in order to undertake exchange. As a result, an object’s worth is measured
by necessity, and money acts as the medium of exchange that is capable of equalizing disparate things that have
different value (1133a25–b18). Nevertheless, Aristotle states—almost in passing—that some things have their basis
in something other than necessity and are incapable of being equalized in this way: “Now in truth, it is impossible
for things that differ greatly from one another to become commensurable, but it is possible, to a sufficient degree, in
relation to need” (1133b19–2). This may suggest that necessity does not hold all things together; some relationships
have their basis in something other than necessity and, as such, are beyond being made commensurable via the
virtue of justice. In this way, Book V’s discussion of justice points toward Aristotle’s discussion of friendship in
Books VIII and IX.

174

raises the question of whether relationships may exist that are both political and difficult to
equalize. Are some political relationships beyond the realm of proportional justice? The answer,
it turns out, is yes. The relationship between those who are in power and those who are wise—
that is, the relationship between those with political ambitions and those who are philosophically
inclined—is a relationship that is political in nature and is beyond proportional justice.
That Aristotle has this relationship in mind is borne out by his subsequent discussion
concerning the giving and receiving of benefits. He uses an erotic relationship, in which neither
party receives what it wishes, as a springboard to launch into the question of who is to decide the
worth of what is given in a friendship. Ought the person who “takes the initiative in giving”
assess the gift’s worth, or should it be “the one who is first in receiving” the gift? (1164a23–24).
Aristotle answers that “he who takes the initiative in giving appears to entrust this assessment to
the receiver, which is in fact what they assert Protagoras used to do” (1164a24–25). Aristotle’s
example of Protagoras is revealing and introduces the subject matter that will silently come to
dominate the rest of Book IX. Protagoras, of course, was the philosopher who claimed to have
the unique ability to teach men “the political art” and how to “make men good citizens” (Prot.
319a4). By using Protagoras as an example, Aristotle draws attention to the classic theme of the
relationship between politics and philosophy, a relationship that is both political and difficult to
equalize.
Protagoras, asserts Aristotle, would “bid the learner to estimate how much he held [his
teachings] to be worth knowing, and that is the amount he used to take” (1164a25–27). In
describing Protagoras’s conduct, Aristotle distinguishes him from the Sophists, “who take money
in advance and then do nothing of what they claimed, because their promises were excessive”
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(1164a27–31). While the Sophists are rightly accused by those with whom they contract for
failing to deliver what they promised, those who take the initiative in giving advice for the
benefit of their partner “do not give cause for accusation” and may instead be practicing the
highest type of friendship (1164b34–35).5 Thus, Aristotle implies that the philosopher who
advises with the intention of benefitting the one who receives the advice—perhaps by teaching
him “the political art” or by making him a “good citizen”—may, in fact, be practicing the highest
form of friendship (1164a35-36).
While the introduction to Book IX strongly suggests that Aristotle intends this section of
the Ethics to cover the friendship between the magnanimous philosopher and the magnanimous
statesman, a number of obstacles prevent the easy attainment of this type of friendship. First, as
noted above, Aristotle indicates that those in power are not likely to become friends with those
who are serious. In fact, those who are in power may have had to engage in decidedly nefarious
tactics to attain their position and, as a result, cannot be described as virtuous or good. Thus, it
can fairly be asked: what would dispose the philosopher to dispense advice to such a person? As
will be made clear, Aristotle will first seek to appeal to the philosopher by way of a protreptic
address to prepare him for the potentially difficult character of the politician. Second, if the
friendship between these two magnanimous individuals is a friendship based on the good,
Aristotle will have to make clear how the philosopher will turn the politician toward virtue, such
that they may appreciate and take pleasure in each other’s good qualities. Third, even if
Aristotle’s protreptic address is capable of preparing the philosopher for the politician’s prickly

While Aristotle’s evaluation of Protagoras’s art is beyond the scope of this project, his distinction between
Protagoras and those whom he terms the “Sophists” is striking.
5
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personality, it remains to be seen what benefit these magnanimous individuals receive from their
friendship with one another. If the magnanimous man is “incapable of living with a view to
another” (1124b31 – 1125a1), as Aristotle states in Book IV, why would the magnanimous
statesman and the magnanimous philosopher enter into friendship with one another? As I hope
to make clear, Aristotle addresses each of these issues in turn, explaining how and why the
friendship of the philosopher and the politician can be attained, thereby securing the coincidence
of wisdom and power in the establishment or direction of the regime.

Taming the Philosopher
Aristotle’s first task in bringing about a friendship between the philosopher and those who are or
aspire to be politically powerful is to inculcate a friendly disposition in the philosopher toward
those who are or who have the ambition to be statesmen. Through a discussion concerning the
giving and receiving of benefits, Aristotle seeks to tame the philosopher’s hubristic demeanor
and show him the advantages of friendship. After having introduced the theme of the
philosopher’s relation to the political realm by way of the example of Protagoras, Aristotle
suggests that the philosopher who provides political advice with the intention of conferring a
benefit may deserve some sort of repayment from the one who receives the advice. Of course, as
noted in the previous chapter, in friendships based on the good, the repayment is what one would
“wish for the other and what is pleasant,” and this repayment ought to aim to equal the benefit
that was bestowed (1157b35–1158a1). The issue of repayment is a difficult one, as it is not
evident what could possibly count as adequate repayment for the benefit of learning “the political
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art” and becoming a “good citizen.” It would perhaps not be surprising that the philosopher, in
recognition of the value of his benefit, might feel slighted either if the benefit he bestows
remains unrecognized, or if the repayment does not appear to be adequate.
The issue of repayment is complex, and Aristotle remains—perhaps purposefully—vague
in discussing the issue. Initially, he notes that the gift of philosophy is invaluable, and as such
the repayment cannot be satisfied by either money or honor, but instead “whatever it is possible
to repay would be sufficient” (1164b3–5). However, Aristotle continues, noting that “if the giver
receives as much as the recipient is benefited (or however much in return the recipient would
have given in choosing the pleasure involved), the giver will have received what was merited
from the recipient” (1164b10–13). The meaning of this somewhat abstruse explanation of
repayment will later be revealed,6 but at present it suffices to note that Aristotle suggests that
repayment depends, in part, on the efficacy of the philosophical advice rendered.
Before Aristotle expounds on what may count as adequate repayment, he seeks to prepare
the philosopher for the possibility that those in power may not be receptive or appreciative of his
advice. In order to forestall the sullen and bitterly ironic reaction of a philosopher who, in
response to having his advice rejected, retreats to his own private realm to criticize the political
community, Aristotle seeks to ground the philosopher in his community, or tame his hubristic
demeanor.7 As we shall see, he uses a number of tools to accomplish this task. First, he

6

See below at note 49 and accompanying text.

7

In this way, Aristotle, like Aristophanes, is critical of philosophers who have their heads in the clouds, unaware
that they have obligations to their political community. For an analysis of Aristophanes’ criticism of Socrates in this
regard, see Mary Nichols, Socrates and the Political Community: An Ancient Debate (New York: State University
of New York Press, 1987), 1–28.
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indicates that the value the philosopher places on his advice may be mistaken; that is, the
philosopher may not have an accurate understanding of his worth, or the worth of his advice.8
Second, he reminds the philosopher that those in power and the political community more
generally have certain claims that ought to be taken seriously. Last, he appeals to the
philosopher’s superiority, entreating him to be patient with those who, due to their limited
capabilities, are unable to recognize either the benefits of the advice or the good character of the
one who bestows the advice.
Aristotle begins his protreptic approach at the end of chapter one by unequivocally
stating that in the absence of an express agreement of the gift’s worth, the one who receives the
gift—or advice—ought to assess its worth in determining repayment. The rationale, according to
Aristotle, is that “many things are not valued equally by those who possess them and by those
who wish to receive them, since what is one’s own and what one gives appears to everyone to be
worth a great deal” (1164b17–19; emphasis added). The reference to “one’s own” is the second
of two references in the totality of the Ethics in which “one’s own” is contrasted with philosophy
or the truth. The first reference occurs in Book I, where Aristotle begins his famous critique of
Plato’s theory of the forms. Prefacing his critique, Aristotle notes that it will be a difficult
undertaking “because the men who introduced the forms are [friends]” (1096a13–14). He
continues, however, stating that for philosophers in particular, it may be necessary to “do away
with even one’s own things,” in order to preserve the truth (1096a14–16). Thus, while gaining a
truthful account of things may be difficult, Aristotle leaves us with the impression that such an

According to Aristotle’s depiction of magnanimity in Book IV of the Ethics, to the extent that a philosopher
overvalues his self-worth he would fail to be magnanimous. Rather than aiming at and achieving the mean with
regard to self-worth, such a philosopher would be guilty of the vice of vanity (cf. 1123b8–9).
8
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account of things is possible. The second reference to “one’s own,” which occurs here in Book
IX, seems to pull back the on the idea that one will ever be able to achieve a full truthful account
of things. Indeed, the fact that the philosopher ought to entrust the assessment of the worth of his
advice to the recipient indicates that even the philosopher is incapable of attaining complete
objectivity and may have a preference for what is “one’s own,” or for his own teaching.9 Ever
so subtly, Aristotle suggests that the philosopher may not be impartial as to the worth of his
teaching, and that the love of “one’s own” may cloud his assessment of the worth of his teaching.
In chapter two, Aristotle continues his protreptic approach by reminding the philosopher
of what he owes the political realm. He does so by raising the question of what obligation one
has to one’s father. Ought one “render everything to one’s father and obey him in everything?”
(1164b22). The claims of the ancestral are raised in light of the preceding discussion regarding
the advice rendered by the philosopher—that is, the philosopher and his penchant for innovation
are weighed against the claims of established customs. Similar political questions are raised in
conjunction with the claim of the ancestral: must one “serve a friend more than a serious man?”
and “must one repay a favor to a benefactor rather than give away something to a comrade?”

9

The difference in approach may be due to the audience Aristotle is addressing. In the first portion of the Ethics
Aristotle is directing his writing primarily to the politically inclined gentlemen (καλοικάγαθοι), who may initially be
suspicious of philosophy. Thus, in order to convince the καλοσκάγαθος to give up what is “his own,” Aristotle
needs to hold out the possibility of an “objective account” of things. In contrast, in the second half of the Ethics,
Aristotle undertakes a “another beginning” (1145a15) and seems to be directing his writing to the philosopher. The
philosopher, of course, does not need to be reminded of the possibility of obtaining an “objective view” of things,
but instead needs to be reminded that he may not have such an objective view of things. For a discussion
concerning Aristotle’s intended audience, see Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics, as well as Richard Bodéüs, The
Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics. While Bodéüs contends that Aristotle’s primary audience is the lawgiver,
whom he hopes to serve by “providing him knowledge of the best political or constitutional rules” (p. 39), Tessitore
remarks that Aristotle has a dual audience, comprising of both “non-philosophers and potential philosophers” (p.
20). My own account builds on insights from both Bodéüs and Tessitore but differs in that I view Aristotle’s
primary audience to consist of both statesmen/legislators and philosophers.

180

(1164b26–28). Each of these questions raises the issue of how one ought to be disposed towards
the claims of “one’s own” and towards the claims of philosophic truth.
In dealing with these questions, Aristotle initially provides an answer that would not
shock his more philosophically inclined readers:
That someone ought not to give back everything to the same person is not
unclear; nor is it unclear that, for the most part, he must repay good deeds
more than gratify his comrades, just as a person must pay back a loan to
someone he owes, more than he must give away something to a comrade.
(1164b30–34).
This answer provides the philosophically inclined reader with precisely what he would expect:
not everything is owed to the ancestral; the good ought to take priority over one’s comrades; and
the repayment of a loan (i.e., repayment for the philosophical advice one has received) ought to
come before one undertakes to give any gift to one’s comrades. No matter how axiomatic this
answer may seem to the philosopher, Aristotle immediately calls it into question. Perhaps,
suggests Aristotle, “not even this is always so” (1164b34). What follows is a somewhat cryptic
example regarding ransoms. Ought a person who has been ransomed from pirates pay in return
the ransom to his ransomer? Aristotle indicates that while the general rule holds that an
obligation is incurred, the obligation is relieved under certain circumstances. For example, if a
person owes his ransomer money while at the same time his father is being held ransom, he
ought to ransom his father first (11643b –1165a3). Through this example, Aristotle elevates the
claim of the ancestral and suggests that the philosopher’s axiomatic preference for the good over
the ancestral may not always be warranted.
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In addition, Aristotle seeks to remind the philosopher of his superior position relative to
those to whom he gives advice. He writes, “Sometimes the repaying of a previous service is not
even equal [or fair]—when someone benefits a person he knows to be serious, but the repayment
is to one whom the serious person supposes to be corrupt” (1165a4–7; square brackets original;
emphasis added). In this scenario, the service is rendered by a knower (i.e., a philosopher), who
has a correct assessment of the recipient’s character, while the recipient (i.e., a statesman)—
although, serious—only has an opinion of the philosopher’s character. Through an appeal to the
philosopher’s superior knowledge, Aristotle seeks to exhort him to be patient with those to
whom he gives advice, as they may be incapable of recognizing either the soundness of the
advice, or the philosopher’s character, and may be under the false impression that the
philosopher is corrupt.
Only after having called into question the philosopher’s axiomatic preference for the
good over the ancestral and after having exhorted the philosopher to be patient with those who
lack knowledge, does Aristotle make clear the implications of his teaching. He writes that
different relations ought to be accorded different honors. Again, Aristotle places the philosophic
and the ancestral in explicit contrast to one another: “Honor too we owe to parents, just as to the
gods—though not every honor. For we do not owe the same honor to a father as to a mother;
nor, in turn, do we owe them the honor proper to a wise man or general” (1165a24–26). This
suggests that the honor due to a wise man (as well as a general, for that matter) is different than
that which is due to a father. Aristotle raises here the notion that honor may be due to a wise
man—i.e., someone who gives advice—but it is only after he has elevated the claims of the
ancestral, that the possibility of such honor is mentioned. The chapter concludes by noting that
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while a relative assessment of what honor belongs to each relation is easy amongst those “of the
same family” or class,10 such an assessment is difficult when it involves people of different
characters (1165a33–34). Nevertheless, Aristotle concludes that “one must not, on this account,
give up the attempt but rather make the relevant distinctions, to the extent possible” (1165a34–
36). Thus, Aristotle concludes this chapter by remaining coy about what honor is, in fact, owed
to the philosopher.11
In chapter three, Aristotle continues the theme of the obligations that exist among
relations. Having cautiously presented his belief, in the previous chapter, that members of the
political community have an obligation to the ancestral, Aristotle now introduces the far more
radical contention that the philosopher himself may have certain obligations toward the political
community. Perhaps in recognition of the fact that the philosopher will likely have an instinctual
aversion to the idea that he has obligations to the political community, Aristotle introduces the
topic tentatively. He begins by simply reiterating the relatively uncontroversial assertion that
friendships based on what is useful or pleasant tend to dissolve when they no longer serve the
purpose for which they were entered. However, the focus soon shifts to the more difficult—and
for the philosopher, perhaps, more controversial—question of whether a friendship based on the
good can be dissolved if the character of one of the parties undergoes a change: “If someone
accepts another person as good, and that other becomes corrupt or seems so, must he still love
Liddell and Scott note that the word τὰ ὁμογενής can mean “of the same race or family.” However, they further
note that Aristotle’s usage of the word suggests a broader meaning: “of the same genus” or “of the same kind or
general character.” Greek English Lexicon, 1223.
10

11

Aristotle has thus far hinted several times that the philosopher is owed some sort of honor without specifying what
that honor is. See 1164b 4–6; 1164b10–14; and 1165a24–26. Aristotle’s coyness on this front stands in marked
contrast to Plato’s presentation in the Apology of Socrates’ (perhaps facetious) demand that the philosopher be
awarded meals in the Prytaneum at public expense. See above at chapter 3 n. 48.
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him? Or is it not possible, if indeed not everything is loveable but only the good?” (1165b12–
15).
Aristotle has, of course, already prepared his reader for the answer to this question in the
previous two chapters by suggesting that the ancestral is loveable. If the good and the ancestral
are distinct—as they usually (perhaps always) are—this would imply that the ancestral is
loveable despite the fact that it is distinct from the good. In this way, Aristotle has tacitly
signaled his answer: while the good may be pre-eminently loveable, the philosopher owes
something to the ancestral as well. This comes to light most clearly in the hypothetical
friendship presented by Aristotle in which one individual stays the same, while the other “greatly
surpasses him in virtue” (1165b23). Ought the more virtuous individual treat the one who has
remained the same as a friend? Or, alternatively, if an individual comes to a greater awareness
of the good and thereby recognizes the flaws and failings of the city in which he was raised, how
ought he respond to the city that raised him? Aristotle argues that while friendship may no
longer exist in such situations, the philosopher still owes something to his former friend. Rather
than altogether dismissing his former friend, “one ought … to remember the life lived together
with him,” and on this basis “render something to those who were once friends” (1165b33–36).
Thus, even in the event that the distance becomes so great as to dissolve the friendship, Aristotle
nevertheless finds that something is still owed.
Having introduced the possibility of an individual who so surpasses his friend in virtue
that the two can no longer remain friends, Aristotle turns, in chapter four, to the question of
whether it is possible for such an individual to be a friend to himself. While the question is no
doubt provocative, it seems to be a logical development from the previous chapter. If one’s
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superiority to those around him is so great that he can no longer remain friends with them, then
perhaps such a person can fulfill his desire for friendship by being friend to himself.12 This topic
is introduced by noting that four attributes appear to be most characteristic of friendship: (1)
wishing and doing things that are good (or at least appear good) for the sake of the other; (2)
wishing that the friend exist and live, for the friend’s own sake; (3) going through life together
and choosing the same things as the friend; and (4) sharing in life’s sufferings and joys (1166a1–
10).
Aristotle goes on to state somewhat tersely that these four characteristics can all pertain
to oneself. However, his description of the manner in which the second of the four
characteristics of friendship applies to oneself—wishing that a friend exist and live—contains a
compact discussion of what it means to exist:
He also wishes that he himself live and be preserved, and especially that
[part of himself] with which he is prudent. For existence is a good to the
serious person, and each wishes for the good things for himself. Yet no
one chooses to possess every good by becoming another—as it is, the
god possesses the good—but rather by being whatever sort he is; and it
would seem that it is the thinking part that each person is or is most of
all. (1166a18–23; square brackets original)

A serious person, argues Aristotle, finds his existence to be both desirable and good and, as a
result, he will seek to preserve his existence. By invoking the notion of preservation, which
hinges on the virtue of prudence (φρόνησις), Aristotle is able to focus on man’s existence as a

12

In Book IV of the Republic Socrates contends that the perfectly just man can be a friend to himself: the just man
“arranges himself, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts [of his soul], exactly like three notes in a
harmonic scale…. And if there are some other parts in between, he binds them together and becomes entirely one
from many.” Rep. 443c–e.
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mortal entity—that is as a human being. No one, he tells us, would choose to possess every
good by becoming another. By focusing on prudence, Aristotle argues that we seek that which is
good for us as human beings, and that only the god is completely self-sufficient and in
possession of the universal good. Thus, Aristotle reminds us that even the individual who is preeminent in virtue is merely human and, as such, needs to preserve his existence. In the very
argument in which the friend is famously declared to be “another self,” Aristotle seeks to tame
the philosopher by reminding him of his humanity, and that his virtue, while it may be selfsufficient, is not the whole of virtue. In this way, Aristotle reveals to the philosopher that he may
in some sense be in need of a friend and, given Aristotle’s discussion in Book VIII concerning
the importance of complementarity in friendship, we can surmise that the philosopher’s friend
will be an individual whose characteristics complement those of the philosopher. Together, the
philosopher and his friend could, perhaps, possess the entirety of virtue.

Forming a Friend
Together, chapters three and four point toward a difficulty. On the one hand, chapter three raises
the possibility that the philosopher may be so vastly superior to others that he is incapable of
friendship with them. On the other hand, chapter four reiterates the philosopher’s limited nature
as a human being and strongly suggests that he is nonetheless in some sense in need of a friend.
What ought the magnanimous philosopher to do in such a situation? It seems that the only path
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forward would be to seek out a potential friend, whom one can form, or educate, with a view to
virtue, such that he may become good and pleasant.13
Chapters five and six are devoted to identifying who the philosopher ought to become
friends with. Aristotle begins chapter five by distinguishing goodwill from friendship proper.
While goodwill is similar to friendship, it differs in that it “arises suddenly” and is “without
intensity or longing” (1166b34–1167a3). Nevertheless, Aristotle emphasizes that goodwill is a
necessary precursor to friendship, and that goodwill, if “prolonged over time and carries over
into the habit of living together … becomes friendship” of the highest kind (1167a13–14). As
noted above, in the Gorgias, Socrates and Callicles are described as having goodwill for one
another, and yet later in the dialogue, it becomes evident that the initial goodwill they feel toward
one another is an insufficient ground for friendship.14 Thus, Aristotle makes explicit what Plato
had implied in the Gorgias: goodwill may become the grounds on which a friendship can be
started, but friendship itself requires time and trust.
Aristotle concludes chapter five by indicating to whom the philosopher might look in his
search for a potential friend. He writes, “On the whole, goodwill arises on account of virtue and
a certain decency, whenever someone appears to another as noble or courageous or some such
thing, just as we said in the case of competitors as well” (1167a18–21; emphasis added). Thus,
Aristotle suggests that the philosopher ought to seek out those who appear to be noble or

The transition from chapter four to chapter five indicates that this may be Aristotle’s intention. At the end of
chapter four, after having warned that the base person only seeks to spend time with others so as to escape their own
misery, Aristotle tells the reader he must “flee corruption with the utmost effort and attempt to be decent, since in
this way he would both be disposed toward himself in a friendly way and become a friend to another” (1166b27–
29). In turn, chapter five focuses on good will, which Aristotle defines as “the beginning of friendship” (1167a3).
13

14

See above at p. 105.
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courageous when looking for a potential friend. The introduction to chapter six further
underscores the importance of complementarity in friendship. Aristotle notes that “likemindedness … appears to be a mark of friendship” (1167a22). However, he quickly clarifies
that this like-mindedness does not pertain to just anything. Indeed, “those who are of like mind
concerning the things in the heavens” are not friends (1167a26). Of course, those who concern
themselves with “the things in the heavens” are the philosophers. Aristotle indicates that it is not
on account of their philosophical agreement that two individuals become friends.15 Instead, he
notes that like-mindedness pertains to matters of common advantage and action. He provides an
example, citing how the citizens of Mytilene were like-minded when they resolved to have
Pittacus rule. In contrast, “when each person wishes that he himself rule … there is civil faction”
(1167a 30–35). This example is meant to distinguish the like-mindedness that contributes to the
common good (each having in mind that the good should rule) from the like-mindedness of
multiple self-interested individuals that results in discord. Aristotle is unambiguous in pointing
out that the former is a mark of friendship, while the latter is not.16
By stressing the complementarity of the partners in a friendship, Aristotle subtly indicates
to the reader why Socrates’ search for a definition of friendship in the Lysis results in failure. It

15

That philosophical agreement is not an essential ingredient for friendship is hinted at already in Book I, in which
Aristotle criticizes Plato’s theory of the forms. Aristotle writes that an examination of the universal goods “is
arduous, because the men who introduced the forms are dear. But perhaps it might be held to be better, and in fact
to be obligatory, at least for the sake of preserving the truth, to do away with one’s own things, especially for those
who are philosophers. For although both are dear, it is a pious thing to honor the truth first” (1096a13–16).
Aristotle indicates that philosophical agreement does not constitute the grounds of his friendship with Plato.
Aristotle’s example also points to a difficulty that will have to be overcome if those who are philosophically
magnanimous and are to become friends with the politically magnanimous: how will these two individuals, both of
whom believe themselves deserving of the greatest honors, decide who ought to rule? This difficulty is addressed,
and a solution provided, in chapter 8 of Book IX. See below at n. 39 and accompanying text.
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will be recalled that Socrates had initially interpreted the phrase “like to like,” as requiring
identicality. In contrast, Aristotle suggests that friendship is not marked by identicality, but
instead by a like-mindedness that concerns “what is advantageous,” aims at “what has been
resolved in common,” and pertains to “matters of action” (1167a26–30). By looking for
identicality, Socrates’ inquiry was bound to fail.17 Indeed, interaction between those who seek
the exact same benefits or honors is more likely to result in factious disputes than harmony.18
Aristotle indicates that the final definition of friendship that Socrates puts forward (but fails
adequately to pursue) in the Lysis is, in fact, the one that is most characteristic of friendship
between the good. The highest form of friendship, for Aristotle, is that which exists between
those who are similar to one another, yet differ in a point of virtue.
Aristotle’s distinction between goodwill and friendship is important. The notion that
goodwill is only potential friendship, or friendship that lies idle, suggests that the individual
described in chapter five as one who appears noble or courageous to the philosopher, has the
potential to become friends with the philosopher. Much of the Ethics can be read as an attempt
by Aristotle to actualize the potentiality of his readers as such noble individuals. No less than
four times in the Ethics does Aristotle remind his readers that his intention is to make his reader
“good” (1094b11; 1095a4–6; 1103b26–30; 1179b1–4). Furthermore, in the introduction to Book
II of the Ethics, Aristotle states that “none of the moral virtues are present in us by nature, since
In Book I of the Metaphysics, Aristotle provides a further subtle critique of Socrates’ interpretation of the phrase
“like to like.” He writes that “if we were to follow out the view of Empedocles and interpret it according to its
meaning and not to its lisping expression, we should find that friendship is the cause of good things, and strife of
bad” (Meta. 985a3–6). Aristotle may be implying that Socrates’ interpretation of Empedocles’ view is insufficient.
17
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This raises the question of whether two philosophers could ever be friends. While Aristotle indicates that he and
Plato are friends, he seems to be clear that their friendship is not based on their philosophical agreement. See above
at n. 15.
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nothing that exists by nature is habituated to be other than it is…. [The moral virtues] are instead
present in us who are of such a nature as to receive them, and who are completed through habit”
(1103a19–26).19 Thus, Aristotle’s task in the portions of the Ethics discussing the moral virtues
can, in large measure, be interpreted as that of “forming a friend.”
To comprehend well the manner in which Aristotle’s Ethics is an attempt to “form a
friend” by actualizing his potential for virtue, it is necessary to turn to Aristotle’s inquiry into the
nature of “being” in the Metaphysics, where Aristotle discusses the forces of potentiality
(δύναμις) and actuality (ἐνέργεια) in detail. In the first book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle
recounts the history of philosophy, or the history of the investigation into the “first causes and
the principles of things” (Meta. 981b29). He notes that most of the pre-Socratic philosophers
believed that “the principles which were of the nature of matter were the only principles of all
things” (983b7–8). Aristotle describes this belief as inadequate, as it does not account for the
existence of artificial or conventional things. He states, “It is not likely either that fire or earth or
any such [material] element should be the reason why things manifest goodness and beauty both
in their being and in their coming to be” (984b11–13). Aristotle argues that there needs to be
something beyond the simple material elements that accounts for change and causes things to
exhibit goodness and beauty.
This question concerning the origin of the artificial and conventional, as well as of the
origin of goodness and beauty, is similar to the question that Aristotle implicitly raises in the
Politics concerning the origins of the polis. It may be recalled that while Aristotle argues that the

Aristotle’s view seems to be similar to that of Protagoras as depicted by Plato in the Protagoras (cf. Protagoras
323a4–328c3).
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household comes into existence to deal with day-to-day necessities, and the village comes into
being to provide for the non-daily needs, he never indicates what it is that causes the polis to
come into existence. Indeed, it seems that with respect to material necessity alone, the village is
self-sufficient. Nevertheless, Aristotle maintains that the polis is natural and serves the purpose
of “living well,” without providing much in the way of explanation as to why this is so.20 In the
Metaphysics, in his recounting of pre-Socratic philosophy, Aristotle provides the early preSocratic answers to the question of why things manifest goodness or beauty, or what causes
things to progress and develop beyond the bare necessity dictated by nature. He notes that
according to Empedocles, friendship is the cause of order, beauty, and goodness, and strife is the
cause of what is bad, disordered, and ugly (cf. 984b8–985a9). Thus, for Empedocles, friendship
and strife are the sources of movement or change and account for what is conventional or
artificial. However, Aristotle states that while Empedocles correctly identifies the sources of
movement or change as friendship and strife, he does so in a vague and unscientific manner
(985a22–985b3).
It is not until Book IX of the Metaphysics, when Aristotle describes the forces of
potentiality (δύναμις) and actuality (ἐνέργεια), that he describes in a scientific manner the way in
which friendship and strife act as the sources of movement or change. At the beginning of Book
IX, Aristotle explains that potentiality and actuality are the originative sources of motion.
However, he is quick to note that these terms do not refer simply to motion but are also used in
another sense (1045b28–1046a4). Thus, while potency and actuality are, indeed, the cause of

20

See above at pp. 121–123.
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motion, they are also the cause of something else. As I hope to make clear, these forces are, in
fact, that which cause things to exhibit either goodness, beauty, and order, or disharmony and
ugliness.
To understand how the forces of potentiality and actuality cause things to exhibit either
goodness and beauty or disharmony and ugliness, it will be useful first to look to Aristotle’s
criticism of the Megaric school’s understanding of potency and actuality. In the third chapter of
Book IX of the Metaphysics, Aristotle states that “there are some who say, as the Megaric school
does, that a thing ‘can’ act only when it is acting, and when it is not acting it ‘cannot’ act”
(1046b28–30). Aristotle provides the example of a builder to elucidate this position. According
to the Megaric school, “he who is not building cannot build, but only he who is building, when
he is building” (1046b30–31). Potency and act are, for the Megaric school, unified and
indistinct. The obvious difficulty with this view, states Aristotle, is that “a man will not be a
builder unless he is building … and so with the other arts” and, indeed, all other capacities
(1046b33–35). This leads to the absurd conclusion that an individual gains and loses the ability
to conduct an art as many times as he commences and ceases acting, with no account of how he
comes to possess the art (1046b 35–1047a4). According to the Megaric position, any time a
capacity is not exercised, the capacity is lacking altogether. The consequence of the Megaric
position, according to Aristotle, is that it does away with both “movement and becoming”
(1047a14–15). As Edward Halper writes, the Megarians “appear to have pressed the results of
logic despite the disagreement of these results with physics.”21 Aristotle, in contrast, maintains

Edward C. Halper, The One and the Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: The Central Books (Ohio, IN: Ohio State
University Press, 1989), 206. Interestingly, the Megaric position is also described—but not mentioned by name—in
the second and third chapters of Book VII of the Ethics. Here the position is described in the context of a discussion
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that because movement and becoming are processes that clearly do occur in the world, potency
and actuality are distinct forces that account for these processes.
Aristotle introduces in chapter four the notion of pairs of potentialities, which are
dependent on one another. In a passage that is dense with formal logic, Aristotle makes the case
that “if B’s existence necessarily follows from A’s, and if A is possible, B must be possible.”22
While it is initially unclear what role this discussion concerning pairs of potentialities plays in
Aristotle’s metaphysics, chapter five makes his intentions manifest. Aristotle begins by noting
that all potentialities or capacities come from (1) nature; (2) habit; or (3) instruction (1047b31–
34).23 Potentialities from nature are non-rational and, as a result, always act in a particular way
when they are brought into contact with that which has the potential to be affected. Aristotle
makes clear that pairs of potentialities within nature have a certain regularity or necessity. For
example, when fire comes to bear on a pot of water, it will eventually boil and becomes steam.

concerning self-restraint. Aristotle asks how it could be the case that “a person, though he forms a correct
conviction, lacks self-restraint” (1145b22–23). He goes on to note that on account of this puzzle, Socrates denied
that a person “who has scientific knowledge [could] lack self-restraint” (1145b23). The Socratic position holds
instead that “nobody acts contrary to what is best while supposing that he is so acting; he acts instead through
ignorance” (1145b26–27). This position is identical to the Megaric position; both suppose that when a person has a
capacity (in this case, knowledge), he must exercise it; both deny the existence of potentiality. Aristotle rejects this
position in chapter three of Book VII: “Since we say ‘to know’ in two senses—both the person who has the science
but is not using and he who uses it are said to know—it will make a difference whether someone who does what he
ought not do has the relevant knowledge but is not actively contemplating it, or whether he is actively contemplating
it” (1147b31–34). Thus, Aristotle’s position differs from Socrates in that he maintains that one can have knowledge
but fail actively to exercise it.
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Halper, The One and the Many, 206; Cf. Meta. 1047b14–30.

This discussion mirrors Aristotle’s account in Book II of the Ethics of the manner in which the intellectual and
moral virtues come into being. Aristotle writes, “Both the coming-into-being and increase of intellectual virtue
result mostly from teaching—hence it requires experience and time—whereas moral virtue is the result of habit ….
Neither by nature, therefore, nor contrary to nature are the virtues present; they are instead present in us who are of
such a nature as to receive them, and who are completed through habit. Further, in the case of those things present
in us by nature, we are first provided with the capacities (δυνάμεις) associated with them, then later on display the
activities (ἐνεργείας)” (1103a14–8). Aristotle is clear that while the intellectual and moral virtues come into being
through habit and teaching, we have the capacity (δύναμις) for them by nature.
23

193

The water’s potential to become steam is actualized when it comes into contact with the
potentiality of fire to cause the water to turn to steam. When these two potentialities come into
contact, they are both necessarily actualized.24
In contrast to the non-rational potencies, which act in a pre-determined and necessary
way, rational potencies—those from habit and instruction—can act in different ways or produce
contrary effects. Aristotle uses carving as an example: “We say that potentially … a statute of
Hermes is in the block of wood … because it might be separated out” (1048a32–34). However,
the block of wood can also potentially be something else, perhaps a table. The final form that the
block of wood exhibits depends on the “desire or will” of the carver (cf. 1048a5–15). The
rational potency of the carver comes to bear on the non-rational potency of the piece of wood to
determine what artificial or conventional thing it might be. Indeed, we may say that the carver
has the ability to bring order or beauty to nature. However, Aristotle makes clear that it is
impossible for these potentialities to produce contrary effects at the same time. The carver can
form the block of wood into a statue of Hermes, or he can form it into a table, but he cannot
make both at the same time. Aristotle indicates that “desire or will” is determinative of what the
rational potency will do when it is brought into contact with that which has the potential to be
affected. Thus, potencies—including rational potencies—come in pairs, and it is through the
interaction of these potencies that the artificial or conventional comes into existence.
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Aristotle uses temperature and health as an example of this process at a variety of different places. See, e.g.,
Meta. 1046b18–20, “The wholesome makes health alone, the heat-making potency heat, and the cold-making
potency cold” as quoted in Halper, The One and the Many, 204; Phys. 201a19–24, “The same thing, if it is of a
certain kind, can be both potential and fully real, not indeed at the same time or not in the same respect, but e.g.
potentially hot and actually cold. Hence at once such things will act and be acted on by one another in many ways:
each of them will be capable at the same time of causing alteration and of being altered.”
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Of course, human beings have both types of potencies—the non-rational potencies from
nature, which are innate and “imply passivity,” as well as rational potencies that come to be from
either habit or learning (1047b31–34). The fact that human beings have both kinds of potencies
is amply demonstrated in the Ethics. In Book II, Aristotle notes that the moral virtues come into
existence via a process whereby practice comes to bear on the innate passive potencies. He
states: “Neither by nature, therefore, nor contrary to nature are the virtues present; they are
instead present in us who are of such a nature as to receive them, and who are completed through
habit” (1103a22–26). Thus, the innate potencies are realized, or come to be, through practice or
habit, and they in turn give rise to another potency, or capacity: the capacity to act virtuously.
However, as the Ethics demonstrates, if repeated practice is to result in the acquisition of a stable
virtue, it needs to be informed by reason. Thus, to act virtuously, one needs to be informed (or
formed) by one who has knowledge—that is, by the philosopher. The philosopher’s rational
potency has the ability to form another individual in the same way that a carver’s rational
potency can form a statue of Hermes out of a piece of wood. When the philosopher’s rational
potency comes into contact with his friend’s rational potency for habitual action, the result may
well be the actualization of virtue. It is the contact between the philosopher’s rational potency
and his friend’s potency for habitual action that is the cause of that which is good, beautiful, and
orderly.
Aristotle’s understanding of potency and actuality as explicated in the Metaphysics helps
to clarify much of his discussion of friendship in the Ethics. Part of Aristotle’s purpose in the
Ethics is to “form a friend,” by actualizing the potentiality of another individual. In chapter
seven of Book IX, Aristotle investigates the counter-intuitive observation that those “who
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perform a benefit seem to love those who receive this benefit more than those who are the
recipients of the benefit love those who perform it” (1167b16–19). While it may seem contrary
to reason for the benefactor to love the recipient more than the recipient to love his benefactor,
Aristotle explains why this is so by analogizing the situation to the relationship between an
artisan and his work (perhaps a carver and his statue). An artisan, states Aristotle, “is fond of his
own work more than he would be loved by that work, should it come to have a soul…. The case
of those who perform a benefit is like this too, for what has received the benefit is their own
work” (1167b34–1168a4). This curious comparison suggests that by dispensing advice, the
philosopher is, in some sense, acting like an artisan: the philosopher leaves his imprint on the one
he has benefitted.25 In fact, in words that mirror the division between the active and passive
parts of friendship in book VIII, Aristotle reiterates that “friendly affection … resembles an
active ‘making,’” while “being loved resembles a passive ‘undergoing’” (1168a19–20). Thus, it
is through the dispensing of advice that the philosopher is able to form the character of another
individual, such that the latter is able to act as an enlightened statesman.26
The format of Aristotle’s presentation of the virtues in the first portion of the Ethics
makes clear that his purpose is, in fact, to dispose a potential friend to be receptive of the advice
of the philosopher. As noted in the previous chapter, Aristotle begins with the virtue of courage,
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Aristotle ends book IX with the same observation in the context of a warning regarding the friendship of base
people: “Now the friendship of base people is corrupt: they share in base things and, being unsteady, they come to
be corrupt by becoming like one another. But the friendship of decent people is decent and is increased by their
associating with one another. They also seem to become better by engaging in activity together and by correcting
one another, for they take an imprint from one another of the qualities they find pleasing. Hence the saying, “noble
things from noble people” (1172a9–14).
Leo Strauss observes that “Aristotle’s political science is an attempt to actualize [the gentleman’s] potentiality.
The gentleman affected by philosophy is in the highest case the enlightened statesman, like Pericles who was
affected by Anaxagoras.” The City and Man, 28.
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subtly making clear its limitations and pointing toward the need for magnanimity.27
Magnanimity, in turn, points toward friendship as the cure for the magnanimous man’s socially
destructive tendencies.28 Throughout his presentation of the social virtues, Aristotle points
toward the need for an intellectual virtue or formative force that is capable of guiding these
virtues. He states repeatedly that “one ought to choose the middle term—not the excess and not
the deficiency—and that the middle term is what correct reason states it to be” (1138a18–21), but
never once indicates what “correct reason” (ὀρθὸς λόγος) is. When he turns to the intellectual
virtues in Book VI, he makes clear that what he had previously stated regarding the ethical
virtues is, “though truthful, not at all clear” (1138b25). As a result, in Book VI, he argues that it
will be necessary also to examine the intellectual virtues, as it is the intellectual virtues that
define the boundary or outer limits of ὀρθὸς λόγος. It is in his explanation of the intellectual
virtues that Aristotle finally forthrightly reveals that the statesman ought to be receptive to the
formative advice of the philosopher. However, as I will make clear, Aristotle maintains an
approach that is sensitive to the statesman’s sense of self-worth, framing the philosopher’s role
in a manner that is as non-threatening as possible.

Lorraine Smith Pangle questions why Aristotle begins with courage: “Does [Aristotle] begin with courage because
it is traditionally the core meaning of virtue or arete? … Or is it, to the contrary, because courage is the noblest and
most splendid of all …? In beginning with courage, Aristotle begins where the traditional gentleman does without
imposing more clarity on his priorities than he finds there, but with a gentle persistence in querying those priorities.”
“The Anatomy of Courage in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,” Review of Politics 80 no. (2018): 571. The fact that
Aristotle begins with courage may be explained by his depiction of the development of friendship. In his account of
friendship, Aristotle states that goodwill—the beginning and prerequisite condition of friendship—arises “on
account of virtue and a certain decency, whenever someone appears to another as noble or courageous or some such
thing.” Cf. 1167a18-20.
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While a full investigation of justice is beyond this project, the virtue of justice is also incomplete and points
toward friendship. See above at n. 4.
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The intellectual virtues, Aristotle tells us, are five-fold: art (τέχνη), science (επιστήμη),
prudence (φρόνησις), wisdom (σοφία), and intellect (νούς) (1139b 15–18). Of these five, νούς
receives the least attention. Notably, however, it is νούς that pre-eminently defines ὀρθὸς λόγος.
Indeed, νούς is the most divine of the intellectual virtues and is specifically concerned with the
outer limits or boundaries of correct reason.29 In chapter six of Book VI, in which Aristotle
briefly describes the intellectual virtue of νούς, he distinguishes it from επιστήμη, σοφία, and
φρόνησις. While επιστήμη “is a conviction concerning universals and the things that exist of
necessity” (1140b31–32), νούς concerns the “principle of what is known scientifically”
(1140b34). Νούς is, therefore, a grasp or comprehension of the principles of science itself, or a
grasp of that which lies beyond science. Aristotle explains that while that which is “known
scientifically is demonstrable,” the principles upon which επιστήμη rests are not demonstrable
but are beyond λόγος altogether; they defy rational explanation.
Precisely because these principles with which νούς is concerned lie beyond λόγος, they
are beyond the capacity of man. Man is principally defined—and distinguished from the gods—
by his capacity for speech. As Aristotle makes clear in the Metaphysics, the activity of pure
intellect or νούς is characteristic of the god (Meta. 1072a1–29). Nevertheless, while this sort of
existence is not a possibility for man, Aristotle indicates that through the exercise of certain
intellectual capacities, man is capable of certain “νούς-like” activities.30 Heidegger explains the
νούς characteristic of man in the following way: “This νούς in the human soul is not a νοείν, a
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In its most real or highest form, νούς is pure actuality, or divine thought thinking itself (Cf. Meta. 1072a1–29).

Martin Heidegger notes, “Aristotle calls this νούς: ὁ καλούμενος τής ψυχής νούς, the “so-called” νούς, which
means the non-genuine νούς.” Plato’s Sophist, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1997), 41.
30
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straightforward seeing, but a διανοείν because the human soul is determined by λογός.”31 Man’s
capacity for νούς is therefore never pure but is bound up with λογός. As a result, to the extent
that man is able to take part in noetic activities, it will take a form that is characteristically
human.
In Book VI Aristotle makes clear that the form that man’s dianoetic activity takes is that
of wisdom (σοφία) and prudence (φρόνησις). Through the exercise of these intellectual virtues
man has the capacity to engage in activity that approximates that of the divine νούς. What is it
about σοφία and φρόνησις that sets them apart as man’s “νούς-like” capacities? Σοφία, Aristotle
explains, is “a science and an intellectual grasp [νούς] of the things most honorable by nature”
(1141b3–5). While science (ἐπιστήμη) concerns the demonstrable teaching that proceeds from
certain eternal principles, σοφία goes beyond mere ἐπιστήμη in that it seeks “not only to know
what proceeds from the principles but also to attain the truth about the principles” (1141a18–19).
Wisdom, therefore, concerns the outermost principles that are capable of being discerned by the
wise (σοφός) human being. Aristotle specifically distinguishes σοφία from φρόνήσις, which
concerns itself with human affairs. While prudence deals with that which is immediately given in
our everyday existence, or that which concerns our human needs, σοφία has the ability
intellectually to grasp (νοείν) the principles that are beyond merely human concerns and is able
to demonstrate, or teach, that which proceeds from those principles. Thus, it is σοφία’s concern
with the outermost limits of ὀρθὸς λόγος that sets it apart as man’s highest virtue.
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Although Aristotle sets up σοφία as distinct and separate from φρόνησις on account of
the former’s concern with the principles that underlie science, φρόνησις too imitates—although
to a lesser degree—the activity of the divine νούς. Φρόνησις, as noted, concerns itself with
human affairs and, in contrast to science, concerns those things that can be otherwise. Aristotle
defines it as “a true characteristic that is bound up with action, accompanied by reason, and
concerned with things good and bad for a human being” (1140b5–7). Because of this somewhat
expansive definition, φρόνησις comes in a variety of forms, including (1) the political art
(πολιτική); (2) household management (οἰκονομία); and (3) φρόνησις in the specific sense,
concerning the interests of the individual (cf. 1141b24–31). While these roles are all distinct,
they are nevertheless similar to one another in that they all involve action in response to
engagement with particular circumstances. Aristotle states the following:
Prudence concerns the ultimate particular thing, as was said, for the
action performed is of this kind. Indeed, prudence corresponds to
intellect (νούς), for intellect (νούς) is concerned with the defining
boundaries, of which there is no rational account; and prudence is
concerned with the ultimate particular thing, of which there is not a
science but rather a perception. (1142a24–27).

Φρόνησις, like σοφία, corresponds to νούς, because it is concerned with the “defining
boundaries, of which there is no rational account.” However, in contrast to σοφία, which is
concerned with the most abstract principles, prudence is bound up with the most particular thing.
Thus, both σοφία and φρονήσις involve an intellectual grasp of things that are at the opposite
ends of the very limits of human comprehension.
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Aristotle continues by noting that the perception of the “ultimate particular thing”
involved in φρόνησις is a perception “not of things peculiar to one of the senses, but a perception
of the sort by which we perceive that the ultimate particular thing, in mathematics, is a triangle”
(1142a28–29). Commenting on this passage, Heidegger suggests that Aristotle is referring to
the perception of “states of affairs as a whole” as they are “commonly given in everyday
existence.”32 When we are faced with a particular, given situation, we may be able, without the
need for further deliberation, intuitively to grasp the course of action that must be taken. In the
same way that we can sense by simple perception that in mathematics the triangle is the most
elementary shape that cannot be broken down any further,33 so the prudent man (φρόνιμος) is
able intuitively to perceive how he ought to act in a particular situation.34
As Heidegger points out, Aristotle holds that this same intuitive grasping occurs in the
arts and sciences. For Aristotle, those engaged in the arts and sciences do not deliberate about
the ends that ought to be pursued but only about the method that ought to be employed to pursue
the end: “A doctor does not deliberate about whether he is going to heal; on the contrary, that
belongs to the meaning of his existence itself, because as a doctor he has already resolved in
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Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 110.

Heidegger writes, “In Greek geometry the triangle is the ultimate, most elementary plane figure, which emerges
out of the polygon by means of a διαγράφειν, “writing through.” Διαγράφειν analyzes the polygons until they are
taken apart in simple triangles, in such a way that the triangles are the ἔσχατα where the διαιρείν stops. In αἴσθησις,
as it occurs in geometry, I see the triangle at one stroke as the most original element, which cannot itself be resolved
again into more elementary figures.” Plato’s Sophist, 110–11.
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Notably, Aristotle distinguishes perception itself from prudence. He writes, “Prudence is concerned with the
ultimate particular thing, of which there is not a science but rather a perception, and a perception not of things
peculiar to one of the senses, but a perception of the sort by which we perceive that the ultimate particular thing, in
mathematics, is a triangle. For here too there will be a stop. But this is perception rather more than prudence,
though perception of a form different from that [of one of the senses]” (1142a27–32). Thus, it seems that for
Aristotle, perception is a sort of pure onlooking, divorced from action, while φρόνησις involves both the onlooking
and the action that follows it.
34
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favor of healing.”35 Thus, the doctor looks around at the given situation as it presents itself, and
when he perceives “the first αἴτιον [cause] whence [he] can intervene,” he then acts to bring
about the end which is already posited.36 In the same way, a politician or statesman does not
deliberate about the end he ought to pursue (i.e., the good of the community), but instead looks
at the political situation and simply perceives the best possible way that this end might be
pursued. Thus, Aristotle frames φρόνησις—intuitive grasping of the situation at hand—as
something that precedes action.
Aristotle indicates that it is through the intellectual activity of σοφία and φρόνησις that
man is capable of acting in a manner akin to the divine νούς. While of these two capacities,
σοφία has priority, Aristotle does not straightforwardly assert this priority. Instead, he clarifies
the relationship between these two intellectual virtues through an extended discussion of
deliberation. This discussion reveals that good deliberation is a capacity of those who are held to
be prudent and is dependent on σοφία. Good deliberation, Aristotle writes, is a sort of
“correctness of deliberation,” in which the end of the action being deliberated upon is correct
(1142b16). Aristotle explains that while “the base person” may set before himself some ignoble
goal and, with the use of calculation, attain that goal, he will not thereby have engaged in good
deliberation. While he may have gotten ahold of what he sought, he cannot be said to have
exhibited “good deliberation,” because good deliberation “is apt to hit on what is good” (cf.
1142b17–27). For deliberation to be considered “good,” the end at which it aims must be good.
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Therefore, good deliberation—the characteristic of the prudent man—takes its bearing from
σοφία, which establishes the end toward which the prudent man will be directed.37
On its face, this relationship between σοφία and φρόνησις appears to be problematic.
Indeed, the magnanimous statesman is the jealous type not prone to listening. However, as
pointed out, Aristotle has taken care throughout the first five books of the Ethics to point out the
limits of the social virtues, as well as their need to be guided by some higher virtue. In this way,
Aristotle has disposed his audience to be solicitous of any advice that may help guide these
social virtues. At this critical juncture in Book VI, where he finally forthrightly makes clear that
φρόνησις takes its direction from σοφία, Aristotle frames his depiction of the relationship in
terms that will be palatable to the magnanimous statesman. The virtue of φρόνησις is described
as being for the sake of some further political action. In addition, the hero chosen as the
archetype of this virtue is the great Athenian statesman Pericles (1140b9). The courageous
individuals at whom Aristotle aims this description of φρόνησις will appreciate the life of action
that Aristotle presents here. In contrast, his description of those who are wise is presented in a
non-threatening manner: Aristotle holds up the philosophers Anaxagoras and Thales who, while
they “know things that are extraordinary, wonderous, difficult, and daimonic,” are thought to be
useless “because they do not investigate the human goods” (1141b3–8). Notably, Aristotle does

Another distinction between φρόνησις and σοφία is that φρονήσις is ordered toward action—that is, it is ordered
towards an end beyond itself. In contrast, σοφία contains the end within its own activity; contemplation is good for
its own sake. As Aristotle will argue explicitly in Book X, the very practice, or activity, of contemplation makes
one happy, or εὐδαίμων. In contrast, φρόνησις, or the intellectual grasping of any given situation that is ordered
towards action, is oriented toward bringing this happiness into existence. In this way, φρόνησις is ordered towards
an end beyond itself, while σοφία is not. Σοφία is, therefore, architectonic, in that it posits the end for which
φρόνησις acts.
37
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not here dispute this assertion,38 but instead follows up by contrasting their wisdom with the
utility of prudence: “But prudence is concerned with the human things” (1141b9). By calling
attention to what appears to be the uselessness of wisdom and immediately comparing it with the
eminent practicality of prudence, Aristotle presents the two virtues in such a way that that the
statesman will not feel threatened by the philosopher but will instead solicit his advice.
Aristotle makes clear that the philosopher is able to form the character of the statesman
through the dispensation of advice. Although the greatest of his politically inclined readers are
hubristic and by nature contemptuous of advice, Aristotle shows that it is nevertheless possible
for the philosopher to gain an audience with these politically inclined readers by appealing to
their desire for action and by presenting the philosopher in a non-threatening manner.
Nevertheless, several issues remain: first, by framing φρόνησις as being oriented and directed
toward action, Aristotle has placed one of man’s highest, νούς-like capacities in the service of
political action. Furthermore, σοφία has been relegated to acting as a formative or guiding force
for the statesman and the city. Nevertheless, through his presentation of the intellectual virtues,
Aristotle again seems to show that great things may be accomplished for the sake of the city if
the two types of magnanimous men were to become friends.
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In the Politics Aristotle indicates his disagreement with the conclusion that philosophy is useless by recounting
the story told about Thales, who was able to use his knowledge of astronomy to predict a good harvest of olives.
Using this knowledge, Thales cornered the olive market by buying up all the olive presses while the olives were out
of season. In turn, on the advent of the olive season, he was able to hire out the olive presses for whatever rates he
wished. Thales, Aristotle concludes, showed “how easy it is for philosophers to become wealthy if they so wish, but
it is not this they are serious about” (Pol. 1259a18–19). This example further supports the interpretation outlined
above; in Book VI of the Ethics Aristotle exaggerates the conventional image that people have of philosophers in
order to present them in a non-threatening, almost buffoonish, manner.
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Actualization, Pleasure, and Self-Love
That the philosopher is able to form the character of another individual through the dispensation
of advice raises a number of related issues: First, the fact that σοφία has priority over φρόνησις,
suggests that the relationship between the philosopher and the statesmen will not be one of
equality. Aristotle seems to suggest at a number of points that friendship is characterized by
equality. Is it possible for true friendship to exist between two unequal individuals? Second,
what does the philosopher gain from actualizing the potency of the gentleman? Why would the
magnanimous philosopher, who has been described by Aristotle as being somewhat asocial and
“incapable of living with a view to another” (1124b31), put his talents in the service of his friend
and of the city? Would this not involve a certain degradation on the part of the magnanimous
philosopher? Aristotle devotes chapters eight and nine to answering these issues.
He opens chapter eight by exploring the perplexing question “as to whether one ought to
love oneself most or someone else” (1168a29). On the one hand, people commonly stigmatize
those who are “fondest of themselves” as “self-lovers” (αὐτοφιλία) on the understanding that the
base person does “everything for his own sake” (1168a32). On the other hand, Aristotle notes
that all the qualities of friendship are “present especially in the person in relation to himself,”
such that “he is most a friend to himself, and so [he] ought to love [him]self most” (1168b4–7).
Thus, Aristotle proposes to investigate these common opinions to see the extent to which they
are true.
In the ensuing discussion, Aristotle clarifies both why self-love can be a good thing and
how it can be made compatible with friendship. He begins by stating that those who are
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constantly grasping for a “greater share of money, honors and bodily pleasures” are seeking to
gratify the nonrational part of their soul. Aristotle concludes that these individuals “bring selflove into reproach” (1168b15–21). In contrast, while those who pursue what is just, moderate,
and noble may not commonly be characterized as self-lovers, Aristotle states that this type of
person is, in fact, more of a self-lover. Indeed, Aristotle notes that those who pursue what is just,
moderate, and noble are self-lovers, as they are seeking to gratify the most authoritative part of
themselves (1168b36). Aristotle’s argument mirrors Plato’s comparison of the tyrannical man
and the just man in the Republic. While the tyrannical man is grasping and has insatiable
desires, the just man is self-restrained, and ensures that his desiring part is “neither in want nor
surfeited—in order that it will rest and not disturb the best part by its joy or its pain, but rather
leave that best part alone pure and by itself” (Rep. 571e2–572a2).
A number of indications suggest that Aristotle’s praise of self-restraint is not absolute, or
that it does not comprise his ultimate thoughts concerning self-love. He observes that by being a
self-lover, the good man will both “profit himself and benefit others by doing noble things”
(1169a12–13). However, it seems that these “noble things” may be different for different
people. Aristotle writes, “Every intellect chooses what is best for itself, and the decent person
obeys the rule of his intellect” (1169a17–18). The serious person, he states, “does many things
for the sake of both his friends and his fatherland, and even dies for them if need be: he will give
up money, honors and, in general, the goods that are fought over, thereby securing for himself
what is noble” (1169a19–22). This gentleman, as Aristotle describes him, can be said to “grasp”
at what is noble. Of course, by this point in the Ethics, Aristotle can trust that his reader believes
the noble to be, not whatever the community honors, but what “serious individuals” deem noble
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or honorable Thus, Aristotle suggests that the self-lover seeks out opportunities to undertake
great deeds of noble self-sacrifice, not to attain honor from any “random person,” but inasmuch
as these deeds are considered noble by “serious individuals.”
However, while noble self-sacrifice that has the effect of saving the fatherland may be
best for some, it is not best for all serious persons. Aristotle notes that it is equally possible that
the serious person would “forgo, in favor of his friend, the performance of certain [noble]
actions, and that it is nobler for him thus to become the cause of his friend’s actions than to
perform those actions himself” (1169a33–34; square brackets original). Given his discussion of
potentiality and actuality, it seems that Aristotle distinguishes two roles: while it may be best for
those who are politically magnanimous to pursue the noble action of self-sacrifice, it is better for
those who are philosophically magnanimous to be the cause of their friend’s actions, or to
actualize their friend’s innate potentiality. Aristotle suggests that it is greater for the
philosophically magnanimous man to give up honors and political offices to a friend, thereby
becoming “the cause of his friend’s actions,” than to “perform those actions himself” (1169a29–
34). In this way, Aristotle solves the unstated issue regarding the roles of the politically
magnanimous man and the philosophically magnanimous man that had been left lurking in the
background, namely, which of the two ought to rule.39 The philosopher’s role is to enable the
statesman to rule.
Although Aristotle resolves the unstated issue as to whether the philosopher or the
statesman should rule, the question remains, what does the philosopher obtain in return for
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See above at n. 16 and accompanying text.
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actualizing the ruling potential of his friend? If it is equality that characterizes friendship most of
all, should the philosopher not obtain something in return for providing this great benefit to his
friend? It would seem uncharacteristic of friendship, if it were the case that the friendship
between the philosopher and the statesman resulted in the statesman’s ability to gratify his most
authoritative part by doing noble deeds, while the philosopher was left without any means to
gratify his most authoritative part. Aristotle’s statement that it may be “nobler” for the
philosopher to “become the cause of his friend’s actions than to perform those actions himself”
seems to be an underwhelming reason for the magnanimous philosopher to commit himself to
actualizing the potentiality of his friend for the benefit of the city. What benefit does the
philosopher obtain from actualizing the potential of his friend? Furthermore, what if there are no
opportunities for the politically magnanimous man to gratify himself? If the city is at peace—a
condition that Aristotle will later endorse as being preferable to war (cf. 1177b7–12) —how will
the politically magnanimous man have opportunity to gratify himself?
Aristotle provides answers to these questions in chapter nine of Book IX of the Ethics.
Here, Aristotle explains that the philosopher’s friend, having been formed by the philosopher, is
in turn able to actualize the potential of the philosopher. The way in which Aristotle explains
this process of actualization is somewhat cryptic. To grasp Aristotle’s answer properly, it is
necessary to turn again to the metaphysical principles that undergird his explanation.
Specifically, we must turn first to Aristotle’s account of actuality, or complete reality, in the
Metaphysics, as well as to his treatment of pleasure in Book VII of the Ethics.
As noted above, the Metaphysics makes clear that actuality is the opposite of
potentiality, and that a person or thing’s actuality is realized when two potentialities come into
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contact. As we noted, just as the potentiality of the carver can come to bear on the innate
potentiality of a block of wood, actualizing its potential to become a statue, so the philosopher’s
potentiality can come to bear on, and actualize, the innate potentiality of the statesman, such that
the statesman may become an enlightened statesman. In chapter six of Book IX of the
Metaphysics, Aristotle notes that there are different types of actions or actualities. On the one
hand, some actions have a limit or a definite end. As an example, Aristotle states that an exercise
that makes the body thin is not a complete action, as the movement itself (i.e., exercise) is not the
purpose of the action. The purpose, or end, for which the action is engaged (thinning out the
body) is outside the activity itself (Meta. 1048b18–23). Such actions are limited, or incomplete,
as the end does not inhere in the action itself. On the other hand, actions in which the end is
present in the action itself are complete actions. Aristotle provides the following examples: “At
the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood, are thinking
and have thought” (1048b23–24). Activities such as seeing, understanding, and thinking,
Aristotle indicates are whole and complete immediately upon being exercised. Aristotle thus
concludes by classifying the former actions (actions that have a definite end) as movements, and
the latter actions (actions which contain the end in the activity itself) as actualities or “complete
reality” (1048b28–34).
Aristotle’s extended account of pleasure in Book VII of the Ethics makes clear that
pleasure is one of those types of actualities that are complete, or which contain their end in their
action. Indeed, pleasure is similar to sight, understanding, and thought. Aristotle prefaces his
investigation of the nature of pleasure with a brief description of the reasons that people posit for
deprecating pleasure as being less than, and distinct from, the good. The central reason that
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people deprecate pleasure is that they view “every pleasure [as] a perceptible process of coming
into its nature, [and] no coming-into-being belongs to the same class as the ends we pursue”
(1152b13–14). According to this teleological argument, all actions or activities are pursued for
the sake of some end or purpose. As a result, because pleasure is an activity, or a “coming-intobeing,” it cannot be the good or the purpose for which we act. According to the common opinion
that Aristotle describes, pleasure exists for the sake of some other end.
Aristotle quickly notes his disagreement with this opinion. He states, “It does not turn
out that, on account of these things, pleasure is not good, or even not the best thing” (1152b25).
Aristotle begins by distinguishing different types of pleasures: incidental pleasures and
unqualified pleasures. Incidental pleasures, Aristotle informs us, are restorative in nature. These
pleasures are not “unqualifiedly pleasant,” as they are pleasant only to the extent there is
something lacking on the part of the individual enjoying the pleasure (1152b33–35). For
example, eating and drinking are pleasant only because they are restorative in nature. However,
once our nature has been restored (our hunger sated or our thirst slaked), continued eating and
drinking are no longer pleasant. Thus, restorative pleasures are not unqualifiedly pleasant but are
pleasant only by virtue of a deficient condition.
In contrast, “unqualified pleasures” are those that are pleasant in and of themselves. In
support of this contention, Aristotle explains that contrary to common opinion, pleasure is not a
process of coming-into-being but is an “activity and an end” (1153a10). Some pleasures,
Aristotle contends, do not have something else as an end, but the end inheres in the activity itself.
Aristotle indicates that pleasure is like one of the “complete activities” listed in Book IX of the
Metaphysics; seeing, understanding, and thinking. As a result, he defines pleasure as an
210

unimpeded “activity of the characteristic that accords with nature” (1153a14), and he provides
“the activity bound up with contemplation” as an example (1152b37). When one’s nature is not
deficient, the activity of contemplation is accompanied by neither pain nor desire but is
pleasurable in and of itself. Thus, because the activity of pleasure that is “bound up with
contemplation” is not impeded in any way when one’s nature is not deficient, contemplation is
unqualifiedly pleasant.
In the following chapter, Aristotle goes on to argue that pleasure is good and may in fact
be “the best thing.” He explains that if the unimpeded activity of each characteristic (i.e.,
pleasure) is most choiceworthy, it follows that “a certain pleasure would be the best thing”
(1153b12). Of course, the term “best thing” implies that it is better than all others, or that it is
the highest good. What is striking about this claim is that Aristotle explicitly seems to be pulling
back on a claim he had made in Book I. There he had critiqued Plato’s theory of the forms on
the basis that the good appears to be manifold; things such as pleasure, honor, and prudence, all
of which are said to be good in themselves, are “distinct and differ in the very respect in which
they are goods” (1096b24–25). In fact, Aristotle went on to note that even if there is some one
thing that is separate all by itself, which we might term “the good” or the idea of the good, such a
thing “would not be subject to action or capable of being possessed by a human being”
(1096b33–34). Why would Aristotle now discuss this “best thing” after having claimed in Book
I that it is beyond the capacity of a human being to attain?
A possible answer is given immediately after Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic theory
of the forms in Book I. He notes that even though no human being can possess such a thing as
“the good,” it may be helpful to have the idea of the good “as a sort of model,” or pattern, so that
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“we will to a greater degree know also the things that are good for us; and if we know them, we
will hit on them” (1097a2–4).40 Thus, while Aristotle seems to be ambivalent about the actual
existence of this sort of good, he appears to think that it may nevertheless be useful for human
beings to strive for, so that they may attain what is good for them.41
The fact that in Book VII Aristotle states that pleasure may be “the best thing” may
indicate that he views pleasure as the model, or pattern, on which human beings can base their
life. In making the argument that the pleasures of contemplation may be “the best thing,”
Aristotle states that “if in fact there are unimpeded activities of each characteristic … a certain
pleasure would be the best thing” (1153b7–13; emphasis added). The significance of the
conditional nature of this argument is made clear near the end of Aristotle’s account of pleasure,
where he underscores the human limitations in achieving such pleasure. Because human nature,
in contrast to that of the god, is not simple, “the same thing is not always pleasant” for human
beings.42 The pleasure that the god enjoys is, in the words of Book I, “not subject to action or
capable of being possessed by a human being” (1096b33–34). While the god can “always
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Aristotle further notes that the argument “seems to be inconsistent with the sciences” because the various sciences
are not concerned with the “knowledge of the good itself.” Nevertheless, he concludes, “It is not reasonable for all
craftsmen to be ignorant of so great an aid and not even to seek it out” (1097a3–7). Aristotle seems to suggest that
this pattern of the good may be useful for select few—perhaps one or two—types of craftsmen.
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In Book XII of the Metaphysics Aristotle describes the pure activity of the divine νούς: “[The First Μover has] a
life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be)
since its actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason are waking, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and
hopes and memories are so on account of these.)” (1072b14–17). For Aristotle, the god, in contrast to human
beings, is able to undertake action that is both continuous and pleasurable. Furthermore, the complete activities for
which human beings have the capacity—waking, perception, and thinking—are related to the complete activity of
the First Mover due to the pleasure involved in these activities. It seems that by engaging in activities such as
waking, perception, and thinking (activities that have no end apart from itself), we are—to an extent—able to share
in the unqualified pleasure enjoyed by the First Mover or divine νούς.
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enjoy… a pleasure that is one and simple” (1154b26), such a pleasure is beyond the capacity of a
human being to attain due to a certain “defective condition” (1154b29).43
Why, if Aristotle has already in Book VII arrived at the conclusion that the best life for a
human being is the life of contemplation, does the Ethics continue for another three books? The
answer has to do with our limited capacity for continuous pleasure. While human beings are
capable of experiencing the sublime pleasures associated with contemplation that the god
experiences, we are incapable of experiencing this pleasure continuously, due to our embodied
and limited existence. As a result, Aristotle’s concluding paragraph of Book VII reminds the
reader of his humanity: “‘Change in all things is sweet,’ as the poet has it, on account of a certain
defective condition.”44
That Aristotle discusses the limitations of human nature immediately before launching
into his two books on friendship may seem to suggest that it is precisely our limitations that
cause us to engage in friendship. Much of Book IX of the Ethics seems, at least at first glance, to
bear out such a reading. As noted above, Aristotle indicates the manner in which the philosopher
may seek out a courageous or noble individual in order to form a friend precisely because his
status as a mortal human being requires him to have a friend. And in chapter nine of Book IX,

Robert Bartlett and Susan Collins note that the term defective (πονέρια) is “usually translated as “wickedness”;
[Aristotle] may here be playing on the fact that the term has both a moral and a nonmoral use.” Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, 162 n. 62.
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The quotation is taken from Euripides’ Orestes. In the play, Orestes is suffering from madness brought on by the
furies, who are exacting punishment on him for murdering his mother. The line, “change in all things is sweet” is
spoken by his sister Electra, who is tending to him and encouraging him to rise from his bed. Orestes responds,
“That will I; for that has a semblance of health; and that seeming, though it be far from the reality, is preferable to
this” (Euripides, Orestes, 235). Aristotle may be suggesting that in response to the painful awareness of the fact that
the life of the god is beyond our reach, it is best to embrace the world of appearances, which, though far from
reality, can ease our sufferings.
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Aristotle explicitly links his insights concerning our limited nature in Book VII to the
philosopher’s need for a friend who can actualize his potentiality. If this interpretation were to
hold, Aristotle’s attempt to find a basis for friendship that is rooted in self-sufficiency would be a
failure. As I will make clear, however, towards the end of the Ethics, Aristotle actually does find
a basis for friendship between two magnanimous individuals that is not rooted in deficiency but
is instead based on a self-sufficiency, while enabling each party to the friendship to recognize
and appreciate the good of the other.
Aristotle begins his analysis by raising the issue of whether the happy person needs
friends. He mentions the Socratic opinion concerning self-sufficiency and friendship that was
stated in the Lysis: “Those who are blessed and self-sufficient have no need of friends, since the
good things are theirs already; and … since the happy are self-sufficient, they have no need of
anyone in addition” (1169b4–7). The quotation that Aristotle invokes to summarize this position
may give us an inkling of his valuation of the Socratic stance. Indeed, he cites the following line
from Euripides’ Orestes: “When a daimon gives well, what need of friends?” (1169b8). In the
play, the line is stated caustically by Orestes, as he is at the time being pursued mercilessly by
the daimonic furies after he has killed his own mother. This suggests that Aristotle is not entirely
convinced of the Socratic stance, or that the Socratic stance may not convey the totality of the
phenomenon of friendship.
Why, then, will the magnanimous, self-sufficient individual need friends? Furthermore,
if he does need friends, does this not imply a deficiency on the part of the magnanimous man?
Aristotle’s response to the Socratic dilemma unfolds in three stages by way of a kind of
crescendo, with each argument building upon and complementing the previous argument.
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Aristotle’s first argument in favor of the philosopher’s need for friendship is based on a number
of conditions: if the actions of a serious person are good and pleasant, and if we can contemplate
the actions of those near us better than our own, it follows that “the actions of serious men who
are friends” will be “pleasant to those who are good” (1169b30–1170a1). Lorraine Smith Pangle
points out that this argument is incomplete, as “a friend’s activity [is] always ultimately his and
not ours.”45 According to Pangle, any pleasure we receive from witnessing the good or noble
acts of another “will always be a somewhat passive and vicarious pleasure.”46 However, as
pointed out above, Aristotle views friendship as consisting of an “active making.” Thus, to the
extent that the philosopher is the cause of his friend’s good and noble actions, the pleasure
received will not be simply passive and vicarious. Instead, the philosopher will have undertaken
an active role in creating those good and noble acts.
The second argument draws our attention away from viewing the activity of a friend to
the difficulty attending continuous activity. Aristotle tells us that life is hard for the solitary
person, “since it is not easy to be active continuously by oneself” (1170a5–6). This recalls
Aristotle’s argument in Book VII concerning the limits of human life. In contrast to the god,
who is capable of constant contemplation, human beings are limited and are therefore incapable
of constant contemplation. This conclusion is stated explicitly in Book X of the Ethics, where
Aristotle states that while the wise person is “the most self-sufficient,” the life of constant
contemplation “would exceed what is human” (1177a30; 1177b27). Read in this context,

Lorraine Smith Pangle, “Friendship and Self-Love in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,” in Action and
Contemplation: Studies in the Moral and Political Thought of Aristotle, ed. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 198.
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Aristotle’s second argument for the need for friends seems to be that because the life of constant
activity is impossible, the magnanimous man will, to this extent, need friends.
Finally, Aristotle’s third argument is based on an understanding of the workings of
nature. He notes that for a serious person, a friend is choiceworthy and good by nature, and that
the things that are good by nature are “good and pleasant” in themselves (1170a13–16). In this
way, Aristotle signals to the reader that his third argument will show friendship to be good not on
account of some lack that it is able to fill, but inasmuch as it is good in itself, or on its own terms.
Aristotle begins by pointing out that for human beings, living is defined as “a capacity for
perception or thought” (1170a16–18). This definition is striking in that it seems to go out of its
way to include perception. At the beginning of the Ethics, Aristotle had insisted that what is
distinctive about human beings is our capacity for thought, as it is our capacity for thought that
distinguishes us from the animals. At this point, however, shortly after having pointed out that
man is not a god, Aristotle includes man’s particularly corporeal capacity of perception in his
definition of man, thereby drawing our attention to man’s distinct status as neither beast nor god.
He continues, noting that “a capacity is traced back to its activity, and what is authoritative
resides in the activity” (1170a18). As applied to perception and thought, this means that the
authoritative status of a person or thing lies not in its potentiality, but in its activity. We have
already seen that the philosopher actualizes the potentiality of the statesman by the dispensation
of advice, causing him to act in accord with the moral virtues. At this point, as we will see,
Aristotle intends to make the argument that while the philosopher actualizes the statesman, the
statesman in turn also actualizes the potentiality of the philosopher.
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To make the case that the statesman also actualizes the philosopher’s potential, Aristotle
states the following:
If living itself is good and pleasant … and if he who sees perceives that
he sees … then there is something that perceives that we are active. The
result is that if we are perceiving something, we also perceive that we are
perceiving…. And to perceive that we are perceiving … is to perceive
that we exist. (1170a27–34).

This abstruse passage is meant to elucidate a fundamental aspect of Aristotle’s understanding of
friendship. His argument is that it is through the senses, and in particular the sense of sight, that
we come to perceive (αἰσθάνομαι) or understand that we have sight. Since sight is a type of
activity, it is through the medium of sight that we are capable of perceiving or apprehending that
we are active. As a result, when we look at something, or apprehend something, we also come to
realize that we are apprehending. Finally, to realize that we are apprehending something, is to
understand that we exist. This passage could appropriately be called the existential moment in
Aristotle’s Ethics. For Aristotle, it is through our sense perception, and specifically through our
perception of a friend, that we become aware of our own existence.47 Because the philosopher is
the cause of his friend’s noble actions, he is able to perceive the good present in himself by
witnessing his friend’s noble actions.
In this third and final argument as to why the philosopher needs a friend, Aristotle
explains how the exchange between two friends takes place. It will be recalled that in the very

Aristotle’s understanding of existence can profitably be contrasted with René Descartes’ famous “Cogito, ergo
sum.” While Descartes’ interaction with the sensual world stems from an attitude of skepticism, in which our
existence is revealed to us through the use of our mind alone, Aristotle affirms that it is through sense perception
that we come to be aware of our existence. Cf. René Descartes, Meditations, Objections, and Replies, ed. and trans.
by Roger Ariew and Donald Cress (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 2006), 14–15.
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first chapter of Book IX, Aristotle had indicated that the philosopher is owed some kind of return
for the philosophical advice he gives his friend. Nevertheless, Aristotle indicated that it is up to
the recipient of the advice to determine its worth. Aristotle cryptically stated: “For if the giver
receives as much as the recipient is benefited … the giver will have received what was merited
from the recipient in question” (1164b11–13). In this third argument as to why the philosopher
needs friends, Aristotle finally unpacks this statement regarding what the philosopher is owed:
the philosopher receives pleasure in return for his philosophical advice.48 By rendering
efficacious philosophical advice, the philosopher actualizes the potential of his friend and is able
to witness his friend’s noble acts. Furthermore, because he is the proximate cause of his friends’
noble actions, the philosopher is, in a sense, witnessing his own actions and is thereby taking
pleasure in his own existence. The relationship between the statesman and the philosopher is
made equal by the exchange of pleasure that occurs.49
However, Aristotle does not stop at pointing out the benefits that the philosopher will
obtain from actualizing the potential of the statesman. As noted earlier, Aristotle describes the
statesman’s prudence—specifically his ability to survey a given situation and intervene—as
directed and oriented toward political action. We saw that this is problematic both because it
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In Book VIII, Aristotle had indicated that it is through the exchange of what is good and pleasant that partners in
friendship are made equal: “Each one, then, both loves what is good for himself and repays in equal measure what
they wish for the other and what is pleasant. For it is said, ‘friendship is equality.’” (1157b35–37).
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The equality that characterizes the relationship between the philosopher and the statesman is an equality of returns
and not an equality of status. Aristotle intimates that the return one obtains can have the effect of equalizing a
relationship that is inherently unequal in status in his discussion of the friendships that exist in the household. He
explains that while no amount of affection by a child could make up for the “greatest benefits” that a parent bestows
on the child, parents nevertheless “love children as they love themselves,” and that this friendship affords “both
what is pleasant and what is useful” (1161b27–34). Thus, it seems that the delight derived from watching an inferior
whom one has benefitted in some way is what sustains the relationship. Aristotle also makes clear that pleasure is
something whole and complete. See below at n. 57 and accompanying text.

218

subordinates a “νούς-like” function as if it were a mere instrument to achieving some political
good, and because the opportunities to exercise this function are likely to be limited. Aristotle
had already hinted at the lack of opportunity to exercise this “νούς-like” function in the service
of political ends in his description of magnanimity in Book IV.
In Book IV, Aristotle noted that the magnanimous man’s awareness of his own worth and
greatness causes him to view most things as beneath him. As a result, he is slow to act; in fact,
Aristotle goes so far as to characterize him as “idle” (1124b24). Not any small occasion will
cause the magnanimous man to act, as these are inappropriate to his greatness. Instead, it is only
when an opportunity arises that is equal to his greatness that the magnanimous man will take a
great risk, and, in doing so, he will be unsparing of his life “on the grounds that living is not at all
worthwhile” (1124b8–10). However, as long as no opportunity presents itself for the statesman
to intervene, his overweening concern with his own worth culminates in a sort of sloth.50 Susan
Collins concludes that because the magnanimous man views only great enterprises as worthy of
his action, “the ‘activity’ of magnanimity … could be described most simply as the
magnanimous man’s self-contemplation of his own great virtue.”51
Chapter 9 presents the solution to the twofold difficulty of the statesman’s “νούς-like”
capability being directed toward political action and of the lack of opportunity that the
magnanimous statesman may have to contemplate his own great virtue. Aristotle not only
indicates that the philosopher will obtain pleasure from witnessing the noble acts of his friend,

Thomas W. Smith, Revaluing Ethics: Aristotle’s Dialectical Pedagogy (Albany: State University of New York
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but he makes clear that by actualizing the potential of his friend, the friend also becomes aware
of his own existence. Aristotle writes, “Existing is … a choiceworthy thing because of a
person’s perception that he is good, and this sort of perception is pleasant on its own account.
Accordingly, one ought to share in the friend’s perception that he exists” (1170b8–12). The
philosopher, Aristotle explains, becomes aware of his own existence by sharing in the friend’s
perception (συναισθάνομαι) that he exists. By actualizing his friend’s potential, both the
philosopher and the statesman become aware of their own goodness together.
How does this joint-perception of existence occur? It is in his explanation of this process
that Aristotle finally makes clear that the friendship between the philosopher and the statesman
will have political consequences. Aristotle explains, “This [joint-perception of existence] would
come to pass by living together and sharing in a community of speeches and thought—for this is
what living together would seem to mean in the case of human beings, and not as with cattle,
merely feeding in the same place” (1170b12–14; square brackets added). Aristotle indicates that
it is through the establishment of a “community of speeches and thought”—i.e., through the
establishment of a polis—that the philosopher can share in his friend’s perception that he exists.
Thus, in the same way that the philosopher’s potential is actualized by witnessing the noble acts
of his friend—acts of which he is the proximate cause—so the statesman’s potential is actualized
by perceiving the regime that he has founded. With the help of the philosopher, the statesman
will be able to form “a community of speeches and thought” and will become aware of his own
virtue by looking at and deriving enjoyment from the regime he has helped to establish.
By linking the magnanimous statesman’s ability to perceive his own virtue with the
establishment of a regime, Aristotle resolves the difficulties that had initially appeared to
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complicate his depiction of the magnanimous statesman’s prudence. The perception involved in
φρόνησις is no longer oriented simply toward political activity, such as noble acts of valor, but is
instead engaged in for its own sake. The magnanimous man perceives the regime he has formed,
and, through this perception, he becomes aware of his own existence and his own virtue. The
statesman’s ultimate activity—the activity that is done for its own sake—consists in a pure
onlooking. In addition, Aristotle obviates the difficulty posed by opportunity. The magnanimous
statesman was initially beset by awareness of his own greatness, which caused him to refrain
from acting. Unless a worthy opportunity presents itself, the magnanimous man will not act. As
a result, in the depiction of the magnanimous man in Book IV of the Ethics, the life of the
magnanimous man appears to be a joyless quest for opportunities worthy of his effort. By
pointing to the magnanimous man’s ability to perceive the regime that he creates, Aristotle
shows that the magnanimous statesman’s ability to contemplate his own virtues need not be
limited to those rare opportunities in which he can exercise his virile virtues.
In the Politics, Aristotle provides little justification as to why the polis emerges. It will
be recalled that while the household and the village are sufficient to deal with the necessities of
life, Aristotle nonetheless traces the emergence of the polis from several villages and argues that
it is ordered towards the good.52 In Book IX of the Ethics, Aristotle indicates that friendship is
the cause of the city’s coming-into-being. Specifically, it is the friendship between the
philosopher and the statesman that leads to the formation of the city. While it is not incorrect to
say that Aristotle’s intention in the Ethics is to direct the statesman toward a higher form of life,
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the form that this life takes is not the life of philosophic contemplation, as many scholars have
indicated.53 Instead, it is the life of perception, which seems to be somewhat analogous to the life
of philosophic contemplation.54 Aristotle directs the gentleman to take an active role in the
creation of a just and noble state such that he may then perceive his creation, and through that
perception might become aware of his own goodness and take delight in his own existence.
Together, the philosopher and the enlightened statesman are co-creators of the polis and are able
to order it toward the good. It is their friendship—a friendship in which wisdom and power
come together—that is the formal cause of the polis.

Self-Sufficiency and Actualization
Aristotle’s arguments concerning the need for friendship make clear that friendship between
those who are good is a mutually beneficial arrangement for the magnanimous philosopher and
the magnanimous statesman, and that it will have beneficial political effects. Indeed, the
philosopher and the statesman actualize each other’s potentiality, such that both become aware of
their own good and take pleasure in that awareness. However, if their innate capacity to become
aware of their own existence lies dormant until it become actualized through the other’s actions,
would this not imply a certain deficiency? Indeed, as Sarah Broadie notes, the motion from a
See e.g., Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates; Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship;
Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics.
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Toward the end of the Ethics, Aristotle writes that the political and warlike actions are “without leisure and aim at
some end … whereas the activity of the intellect [νούς], because it is contemplative [θεωρητικὴ], seems to be
superior in seriousness” (1177b17–21). On this basis, some have concluded that the life of philosophic
contemplation is the only life that is happy in the primary sense. However, “θεωρητικὴ” can also mean “able to
perceive.” Liddell and Scott, Greek English Lexicon, 797. Thus, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that both the life
of the enlightened statesman and that of the philosopher are characterized by leisure.
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state of potentiality to actuality “essentially arises from its subject’s lack. The subject moves or
is moved into a new condition because the latter is better than its previous states.”55 If it is true
that the statesman and the philosopher play an actualizing role for each other—each actualizing
the other’s potential for pleasure—then Socrates’ view of friendship would seem to be
vindicated: all friendship would have its basis in deficiency, lack, or need. However, as I hope to
make clear, Aristotle is eminently aware of this difficulty, and he confronts it directly in his final
account of pleasure in Book X.
Aristotle’s final account of pleasure in Book X begins in chapter four and is similar to his
earlier treatment of pleasure in Book VII.56 In both accounts, Aristotle argues against the
common opinion that pleasure is a process, or a coming-into-being. However, his method in
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Despite many similarities, significant differences remain between the two accounts of pleasure. Perhaps the most
significant discrepancy is that Aristotle seems to provide different definitions of pleasure in the two accounts. In
Book VII, he concludes that pleasure is an “unimpeded activity” of “the characteristic that accords with nature”
(1153a13–14). In contrast, in Book X, we are told that pleasure “completes the activity, not as a characteristic that
is already inherent in it, but as a certain end that supervenes on it” (1174b33–34). These seem to be contradictory
understandings of what pleasure is. As a result, some scholars have concluded that these two accounts are
incompatible. According to this interpretation, Aristotle’s description of pleasure in Book X is simply hortatory,
while his account of pleasure in Book VII contains his more complete treatment of pleasure. See, Smith, Revaluing
Ethics, 233–45; Aristide Tessitore, “A Political Reading of Aristotle’s Treatment of Pleasure in the Nicomachean
Ethics,” Political Theory 17 (1989), 247–65.
However, it is not the case that these accounts of pleasure are necessarily contradictory. If we view Book
X not as providing a definition of the nature of pleasure, but instead as a description of the way in which we
experience pleasure, the two accounts are perfectly compatible. Indeed, in Book VII, the definition that pleasure is
an “unimpeded” activity suggests that the nature of pleasure—that is, pleasure in its most pure, active form—is the
pleasure of contemplation practiced by the god. Given our status as embodied creatures, Aristotle had indicated that
our capacity to enjoy such pleasures is limited. As I made clear earlier, this pure, active form of pleasure is
presented by Aristotle as a sort of pattern, or model on which we may model our own lives. In Book X, we are told
how one may pursue that pattern or model. By suggesting that pleasure “completes the activity, not in the manner of
a characteristic that is already inherent in it, but as a certain end that supervenes on it,” Aristotle indicates that it is
by pursuing whatever activity accords with our nature that we will experience pleasure. In this way, Aristotle’s
description of the manner in which we experience pleasure is carefully stated. Thus, while Aristotle’s account of
pleasure in Book X is hortatory in the sense that it compels people to pursue what is good, it is not therefore false or
incompatible with his account of pleasure in Book VII.
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each account is slightly different. In Book VII, as part of his rebuttal of the contention that
pleasure is simply a process, Aristotle emphasizes pleasure’s status as an activity. In contrast, in
Book X Aristotle instead focuses on the wholeness and completeness of pleasure. In support of
this contention, Aristotle contrasts pleasure with motion; while motion is never complete, as the
entity in motion changes position over time, the form of pleasure “is complete at any moment”
(1174b4–8). Furthermore, in contrast to motion, which we can experience only over time, we
can experience pleasure in an instant. At any distinct moment in which we undergo the
experience of pleasure, that experience is whole and complete. Why does Aristotle emphasize
the completeness of pleasure and its status as being independent of time? The reason is that he is
attempting to point out that our inability to experience pleasure continuously is not a deficiency.
Because pleasure is something that is whole and complete and “resides in the ‘right now’”
(1174b9), our human incapacity to experience this pleasure continuously in the manner of the
god or First Mover does not imply a deficiency on our part.57
Furthermore, in both accounts of pleasure—the accounts in Book VII and Book X—
Aristotle makes mention of the fact that there are distinct pleasures and activities that are
appropriate to different individuals. Thus, he intimates that while the activity of contemplation
and its accompanying pleasures may be best for some, it is not necessarily best for all. In fact, in
Book VII, Aristotle notes that “some of the base motions and processes seem to be base
unqualifiedly, whereas for a particular person, they are not such but are even choice worthy for
him, while some are not choice worthy for him but are such only on a given occasion and for a

In Book I, Aristotle writes that “the good will not be good to a greater degree by being eternal either, if in fact
whiteness that lasts a long time will not be whiter than that which lasts only a day” (1096b3–4).
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short time, though not unqualifiedly” (1152b29–32). Aristotle thus subtly indicates that the
activities bound up with courage, or perhaps even violence—which in the absence of some sort
of necessity would be base—may appear good to some people. According to Aristotle, different
individuals choose different activities and pleasures that correspond to what is most authoritative
in them. At various points of the Ethics, Aristotle points out that we are the part that is most
excellent and authoritative in us. Thus, by perceiving the ultimate particular thing—the moment
that he can engage and bring a task to completion—and then acting upon that perception by
undertaking noble deeds of valor, the statesman engages and gratifies his most authoritative part.
Similarly, by contemplating the outermost bounds of abstract thought, the philosopher engages
and gratifies his most authoritative part. The pleasure that the statesman and the philosopher
receive from engaging in their respective activities is whole and complete, even though they are
incapable of being practiced continuously.
Aristotle’s description of pleasure in Book X as something whole and complete is meant
to show that our human incapacity to experience pleasure continuously does not imply a
deficiency on our part. While it is true that we cannot experience pleasure in the manner of the
god—i.e., continuously—this is not indicative of any deficiency on our part, because pleasure is
something whole and complete. However, Aristotle does not end his analysis of pleasure with
this insight. Instead, he turns to address the specifically human element of our existence,
namely, our capacity for sensation. He writes, “Every sense perception is active in relation to the
thing perceived, and it is active in a complete way when it is in a good condition with a view to
the noblest of the things subject to sense perception” (1174b14–16). Thus, after having
explained that there is nothing deficient about our inability to experience divine pleasure
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continuously, Aristotle explains that a proper consideration of our existence as embodied human
beings must take into account our material surroundings as well.
Aristotle continues by noting that the specifically human aspect of our existence is also
capable of experiencing pleasure: “When both the thing perceived and that which perceives are
of this most excellent sort, there will always be pleasure” (1174b30–32). While Aristotle is
somewhat cryptic in his description of the pleasure that accompanies perception, in light of his
comments concerning friendship, it appears that what he has in mind is the pleasure that
accompanies a friendship based on the good, specifically, the delight that one derives from
perceiving the order and beauty that one has created. Thus, friendship is necessary as it
completes, or activates, our existence as human beings.
Again, the fact that friendship is necessary to complete our existence as human beings
may seem to vindicate the Socratic contention that all friendship is based on a metaphysical lack
or need. However, because Aristotle has consistently maintained that we are defined by what is
authoritative in us, he forestalls this conclusion. The fact that friendship completes or activates
our existence as human beings does not imply any deficiency on the part of the magnanimous
statesman or philosopher. Indeed, neither the magnanimous statesman’s capacity to perceive the
ultimate particular thing and engage in noble courageous acts nor the magnanimous
philosopher’s godlike capacity for contemplation requires actualization from another. As a
result, Aristotle is able to maintain that while friendship completes our existence as human
beings, we do not need a friend to complete the most authoritative part of us. Aristotle resolves
the Socratic paradox concerning the good man’s need for friendship by recognizing our
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limitations as human beings but refusing to acknowledge that we are defined by those
limitations.
Aristotle makes clear that the limitations posed on us as human beings do not define us
when he depicts the life of contemplation. After describing the superiority of the contemplative
life to the life of political action, Aristotle points out that this contemplative type of life exceeds
what is human. He writes, “It is not insofar as he is a human being that a person will live in this
way, but insofar as there is something divine present in him” (1177b27–28). Nevertheless,
Aristotle concludes:
One ought not—as some recommend—to think only about human things
because one is a human being, nor only about mortal things because one
is mortal, but rather to make oneself immortal, insofar as that is possible,
and to do all that bears on living in accord with what is the most excellent
of the things in oneself. (1177b32–1178a1).

Thus, Aristotle recognizes that while the material, corporeal aspects of our existence ought to be
of concern if we are to attain our full potential as human beings, one ought not to attend to these
human concerns at the expense of our most divine capacities. While the perception of his friend
and the political regime he founds may be pleasurable and necessary for the magnanimous
philosopher’s completion as a human being, he ought not devote himself to these pleasures at the
expense of his more divine capacity of philosophic contemplation. Similarly, while the
magnanimous statesman may derive pleasure from undertaking noble (and necessary) actions
pertaining to politics and war, these pursuits should not be all encompassing, or be pursued at the
expense of his more divine capacity for perception.
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This exhortation is echoed in the form of a warning at the conclusion of Aristotle’s
discussion of pleasure. He points out that the pleasures that complete the activities bound up
with thinking differ from pleasures related to sense perception, and similarly the pleasures that
accompany the various sense perceptions differ from another. He continues by stating that while
the pleasures that properly correspond to the activity act as an aide in the completion of the
activity, pleasures foreign to the activity have the effect of impeding the activity. Thus, he
writes, “Those who love the aulos are incapable of paying attention to speeches if they overhear
someone playing the aulos, because they take greater delight in the art of aulos playing than they
do in the activity before them” (1175b2–6). The delight that one derives from music can
interfere with other more rational activities. This example is intended to show that lower-order
pleasures, or pleasures associated with lower-order activities, can impede our ability to utilize
our higher capacities. Thus, just as the pleasures of music can interfere with our capacity to
engage in rational activity, so the lower-order sensory pleasures can interfere with our theoretical
(θεωρητικὴ) capacities. When this occurs, Aristotle seems to say, our lives become all too
human.

Aristotle as Advisor
Having established the importance of friendship, while also warning his readers of its dangers,
Aristotle devotes the last chapter of Book X to explaining precisely how the statesman and the
philosopher can order the regime toward the good, or how they may transcend mere nature.
Aristotle notes that while all the relevant topics have been discussed—virtue, friendship, and
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pleasure—the inquiry is not yet complete, as the end in matters of action consists not simply in
contemplating and understanding things, but in doing them. To this end, Aristotle proposes to
investigate the manner in which one may “possess the virtues and make use of them” (1179a3).
As I hope to make clear, Aristotle believes that possessing and making use of the virtues is
dependent upon good laws, as it is through the habituation engendered by the law that a person
may come to be capable of reasoned debate and persuasion. However, Aristotle also deals with
the difficulty that attends the lack of public care for the laws, explaining how one can become
good in the absence of good laws. Aristotle posits private education and friendship as the
method of reforming the law in such a situation. In this way, he reveals that the Ethics is a
handbook both to establish and maintain public order. Viewing the Ethics in this way,
establishes its relationship with the Politics and explains Aristotle’s reserve in the Politics.
Speeches and rhetoric alone are insufficient, argues Aristotle, to make the majority of
people decent.58 The use of reasoned persuasion is, in most cases, inadequate without a certain
level of pre-rational education. In order for the majority of people to be capable of listening to
reasoned advice, the “soul of the student must be prepared beforehand by means of habits”
(1179b25–26). Here, Aristotle agrees with Plato’s method of education: habituation must
precede rational education. A correct upbringing in which one is taught what he ought to love
and what he ought to dislike is necessary if he is later going to be open to reasoned persuasion.
However, Aristotle notes that correct habits are difficult to obtain without proper laws. While
people may have the potential to develop habit and thereby acquire a second nature, they are not
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disposed to to act in a moderate manner before this potential is actualized. Left in their untutored
state, most people are prone to act immoderately and in an uncontrolled manner. Because most
people “obey the governance of necessity more than of speech, and of punishments more than of
what is noble” (1180a4–6), Aristotle concludes that life as a whole is in need of law.
Despite the necessity of law in the formation and habituation of the citizens of the polis,
Aristotle observes that most cities utterly neglect the law. What occurs in most cities is not the
rational imposition of law, but instead the “command characteristic of a father” (1180a19).
According to Aristotle, the problem inherent in this “command method” of order is that it leads
to resentment; people begrudge those who impede them in their pursuit of their untutored
desires. In contrast, the impersonal character of the law avoids this resentment and is not viewed
as invidious. The rational, orderly, application of the law, Aristotle indicates, is superior to the
personal, perhaps tribal approach to justice that characterizes the pre-political realm.
Unfortunately, argues Aristotle, what holds sway in most cities is not the reason of the
law. Quoting a line from Homer’s Odyssey, Aristotle indicates that what happens instead is that
each father “‘lay[s] down the sacred law for children and wife’ in the manner of the Cyclops”
(1180a28–30). Aristotle’s invocation of the Cyclops—a race of bloodthirsty cannibals—is
notable for two related reasons. First, Aristotle, suggests that untutored nature is nasty, brutish,
and short. Without the imposition of the impersonal framework of the legal system most
individuals will fail to acquire the virtue necessary to ensure that life is pleasant, orderly, and
good, and will instead act in the brutal manner of the Cyclops. In addition, the Cyclops spurned
technical innovation, trusting instead in the forces of nature, or providence. In the Odyssey, in
the line prior to the one invoked by Aristotle, we are told that “the Cyclopes neither plant nor
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plough, but trust in providence.”59 By trusting in providence or fortune alone, the Cyclops live a
savage and bloodthirsty life. Nature, Aristotle intimates, is nasty and brutish.
How, then, can one rise above the severity of nature? Somewhat paradoxically, Aristotle
indicates that the cure lies within nature itself. Indeed, he states, “when cities utterly neglect the
public care, it would seem appropriate for each individual to contribute to the virtues of his own
offspring and friends” (1180a30–33; emphasis added). In the following paragraph, Aristotle
paints a glowing portrait of the way in which a father’s actions can come to influence his
children:
For just as it is the laws and customs that hold sway in cities, so also it is
the speeches and habits of the father that do so in households—and these
latter to a greater degree, on account of the kinship and benefactions
involved, for from the outset household members feel affection for one
another and are readily obedient by nature. (1180b4–8).

It may seem odd that Aristotle would point to private education and the care for one’s own
offspring and friends as the means of transcending the severity of nature after having just
compared that approach to the life of the Cyclops. How can the love of one’s own be
characterized both as the cause of a harsh cycloptic existence and as the method by which man
transcends that existence? Aristotle’s Janus-faced depiction of paternal authority and friendship
suggests that fortune or chance will never be completely conquered. In contrast to Socrates and
Lysander, both of whom sought to conquer fortune altogether by subverting the established
order, Aristotle suggests that one still needs to work with the material that nature provides, such
that it may be molded in the manner best conducive to human flourishing. As the examples of
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Socrates and Lysander show, attempts to confront fortune directly, without respect for prevailing
conditions, will result in failure.
So, how does one accommodate oneself to nature, or that which is given, so that the
cycloptic existence of pure nature might be transcended? Throughout the Ethics, Aristotle has
subtly indicated that the answer lies in the phenomenon of friendship—that is, the natural forces
of potency and actuality. As noted above, the actuality of a rational agent can come to bear on
the potentiality of another rational agent, thereby cultivating and actualizing the other’s innate
potentiality. In this last chapter of the Ethics, Aristotle indicates that friendship—and by
extension the forces of potentiality and actuality—are natural, pre-political forces that exist both
in family life and in friendships. These natural forces, Aristotle contends, both can and should
be cultivated when public care and education have broken down. When the established order is
in a state of dissolution, fathers and friends ought to act as informal lawgivers and educate those
in their care privately.60
The primary difficulty in establishing private education, however, is that if it is to be
effective, the educator himself must already be properly formed. If the lawgiver is to institute
(informal) laws that are conducive to the cultivation of virtue, he must be cognizant of the end at
Richard Bodéüs argues that Aristotle’s primary purpose in this passage is to align the private education with the
public education of the regime. He writes, “Aristotle’s injunction upon the heads of household should be understood
primarily as providing a way to align children’s education, via paternal authority, with the principles of the laws
which determine the development of the political community to which the children belong. Thus is removed the
possible discontinuity between the household regime and the political regime.” Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s
Ethics, 56. Bodéüs continues in a footnote, arguing that Aristotle’s point is “not to enact rules of conduct allegedly
better than the norms implicitly recommended by the laws, in contradiction with the ends of the constitutional
regime in force.” Ibid., 166 n. 26. Bodéüs’s interpretation does not adequately take into account the context in
which this injunction concerning private education is given. Aristotle makes clear that private education ought to be
undertaken “when cities utterly neglect the public care” (1180a30–31). This suggests that Aristotle’s injunction is
not primarily a way of aligning paternal authority with the public education of the regime but is instead a way of
reforming a regime that has fallen into a state of disrepair.
60
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which these laws are aimed, and he must himself be oriented toward that end; in sum, the
educator or lawgiver must—to a certain degree—already be virtuous. Aristotle had indicated
earlier in the chapter that in the absence of the requisite laws, it is difficult for someone to obtain
a correct upbringing leading to virtue. As a result, he seems to be in the position of a catch-22.
On the one hand, when the city neglects the public care, it requires individuals to undertake
private education so as to reform the public order. On the other hand, private education itself
requires the pre-existence of an individual that has been properly educated, which in turn
depends on good laws.
Nevertheless, Aristotle notes, even in the absence of a formal system of public care, it is
not impossible for select individuals to be self-taught on the basis of experience alone:
Nothing prevents someone—even someone without scientific
knowledge—from exercising a noble care for an individual, provided that
he has, through experience, contemplated in a precise way the results for
each, just as even some people seem to be their own best doctors but are
unable to aid another at all. (1180b16–19).

Aristotle concedes that certain individuals are capable of being self-taught via experience.
However, he immediately follows this concession by noting that this experience is, on its own,
insufficient for educating others; self-taught individuals are “unable to aid another at all”
(1180b19). He notes that if such a self-taught individual had the desire to educate others, he
would have to concern himself with science, and “proceed to the universal and become also
acquainted with this to the extent possible” (1180b21–22). Thus, if one wishes to become an
educator, experience alone is insufficient; rather, one needs at least some level of acquaintance
with universal, scientific, principles.
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Aristotle next turns to the question concerning the source from which the legislator may
attain the requisite scientific knowledge that is necessary for one to become an educator or
skilled legislator. The legislative skill, he argues, is different from that of the other sciences or
capacities that people may develop. The other arts and sciences operate on a sort of
apprenticeship system, where an individual who practices the art also transmits that capacity to
others. However, in politics—of which the legislative art is a part—this does not seem to occur.
Echoing Socrates’ observation in the Gorgias, Aristotle notes that skilled politicians do not make
“their own sons or any of their friends into skilled politicians” even though this would be a
reasonable thing to do (11801a5–7). Aristotle observes that instead it is the Sophists who profess
to teach “the political art” and how to “make men good citizens” (Prot. 319a4; NE 1180b35–
1181a2). And, like Socrates, Aristotle seems to be dismissive of their claims. In general, he
notes “they do not even know what sort of a thing [the political art] is or with what sorts of
things it is concerned: otherwise they would not have posited it as being the same thing as
rhetoric—or even inferior to it” (1181a13–16).
In elaborating upon the Sophists’ failure properly to teach the political art, Aristotle does
not dismiss their claims of knowledge completely. Instead, he insinuates that their art is
incomplete. He writes that the Sophists’ view of legislating is that it consists simply of “putting
together a collection of the well-regarded laws” (1181a17). However, on its own, this collection
is insufficient because the selection of which laws to implement is not an easy task but requires a
particular skill. The Sophists, he concludes, fail to recognize that “selection [is] a part of the
comprehension involved, and [act] as if the correct judging of them were not the greatest thing,
just as it is in music” (1181a17–19). Aristotle’s critique of the Sophists seems to be aimed not at
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their lack of scientific knowledge, but at their belief that this scientific knowledge is sufficient by
itself and that the act of implementing that knowledge is an easy task.
Founding a regime and establishing good laws, Aristotle suggests, is not simply an
endeavor that entails scientific knowledge or an intellectual grasp of the truth about eternal
principles. Instead, these tasks require the full range of man’s dianoetic capacities. In addition
to an intellectual grasp of the outermost bounds in the direction of the most general universality,
founding a regime requires an intellectual grasp of the ultimate particular thing as well. The
former capacity belongs, of course, to the philosopher. The philosopher has the capacity to create
treatises and “collections of well-regarded laws” based on an intellectual grasp of eternal
principles. The latter capacity—a capacity to grasp the ultimate particular thing—belongs to
those politicians or statesmen who have the relevant experience: “Those with the relevant
experience in each thing,” he writes, “judge the works involved correctly, and they comprehend
through what or how the works are brought to completion” (1181a20–23). It is not the
philosopher, but statesmen with political experience who have the capacity to observe a given
political situation and discern the first instance or opportunity where they may intervene to bring
a particular action to completion. Of course, in establishing the rule of law the philosopher and
the statesmen are not creating ex nihilo, but are instead building on, and bringing to completion,
what is already inchoately present in nature.61
Aristotle makes clear in the last chapter of the Ethics that forming or reforming a regime
requires not only the scientific capacity of the philosopher, but also the practical reason of the

Pol. 1253a30-31: “Accordingly, there is in everyone by nature an impulse toward this sort of community. And
yet he who first founded one is responsible for the greatest of goods.”
61
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statesman. The last chapter sheds much light on the purpose of the Ethics as a whole. The
capacity of the magnanimous philosopher and of the magnanimous statesman are necessary for
the formation of a polis that is ordered toward the good. While both types of magnanimous
individuals are capable of bestowing great benefits on the community, their awareness of this
fact also causes them to be a danger to their community. Aristotle shows that friendship of the
good—that is, friendship between two magnanimous individuals who are self-sufficient and
aware of their own greatness—can cultivate the public benefits that magnanimity can provide
while avoiding its attendant dangers. In this way, Aristotle solves the classic dilemma posed by
political philosopher: friendship can attain the coincidence of power wisdom and power that
ensures that the regime and the public order are directed toward the good.
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CONCLUSION. FRIENDSHIP AND THE PRACTICE OF POLITICS

Reading the Socratic dialogues on friendship in conjunction with books VIII and IX of
Aristotle’s Ethics reveals a significant and sustained difference in understanding between
Socrates and Aristotle. As I have sought to show throughout this dissertation, Socrates views all
friendship as based on a metaphysical lack, or need, in which a friend is seen as a sort of
“phantom friend” who fills this void. According to Socrates, people naturally desire the good,
and friendship simply acts as an impediment to man’s ability to access the good. The political
implication of the Socratic understanding of friendship is that all political relationships—to the
extent that they are based on friendship (or “phantom friendship”)—are obstacles to man’s desire
for the good or for metaphysical completion. Indeed, Socrates’ own way of life is devoted to
questioning and undermining the standards of justice that are the basis for political friendship.
He takes a negative and abstentious approach to the political realm because the friendships it
fosters are, according to him, obstacles to man’s ability to access the good and are therefore
unjust.
In contrast, Aristotle articulates an understanding of friendship that is based on an
awareness and appreciation of another’s goodness. True friendship, or a friendship of the good,
is not based on any kind of metaphysical lack but instead on self-sufficiency and a recognition of
another’s goodness. Aristotle deftly responds to the aporia that Socrates confronts, namely, why
someone who is self-sufficient and good would have any need for a friend. According to
Aristotle, each individual is good and self-sufficient in his own nature. By finding a positive
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basis for friendship, Aristotle also finds a positive basis for politics. Aristotle is keen to
reconcile philosophy with politics, and it is through the friendship between two magnanimous
individuals who are similar, yet different in some key regard, that he accomplishes this goal. By
affirming the self-sufficiency of both the magnanimous statesman and the magnanimous
philosopher, while at the same time leading each of them to recognize the virtues of the other,
Aristotle attains the coincidence of power and wisdom that is necessary if philosophy is to have a
guiding impact on the political realm.
My argument has largely held up Aristotle’s understanding of friendship as a positive and
sound basis for our own orientation toward politics in contrast to Socrates’ conception of
friendship. Aristotle’s writings on friendship pave the way for an appreciation of the practice of
politics and man’s political nature that avoids viewing politics as merely a realm of injustice or
as something that we enter into solely on account of our individual deficiencies. Aristotle’s
conception of friendship provides a level of dignity to politics. Despite the broad disagreement
between the Socratic and Aristotelian conceptions of friendship and politics, Socrates and
Aristotle agree that friendship is unable to provide completion for man. Neither would endorse
the notion that a friend is one’s “other half.” Such an understanding of friendship, described in
Aristophanes’ speech in the Symposium, views man as, on his own, incomplete and in search his
“other half.” According to Aristophanes, those who discover their other half, “are wondrously
struck with friendship, attachment, and love, and are just about unwilling to be apart from one
another even for a short time” (Symp. 192b9–c2). If they were capable of fusing into one,
Aristophanes argues, they would choose to do so, and thereby be made whole. The Aristophanic
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conception of ἔρος views friendship as a source of completion that can satisfy the desire that
people have for completion, or wholeness.
Socrates is emphatic in the Lysis that friendship is incapable of providing completion in
the manner described by Aristophanes. While Aristotle explicitly disagrees with and critiques
the Socratic conception of friendship in Books VIII and IX of the Ethics, he nevertheless agrees
that friendship is incapable of providing completion in the Aristophanic sense. Rather, the
highest and most divine activity of which man is capable is the activity of contemplation. In
fact, Aristotle warns that the pleasures associated with friendship may interfere with the activity
of contemplation. While the philosopher’s perception of his friend and of the political regime he
founds may be pleasurable and necessary, he ought not devote himself to these pleasures at the
expense of his more divine capacity for philosophic contemplation.
That Socrates and Aristotle both deny that friendship can provide metaphysical
completion for man suggests that we need to remain wary of any political movement that seeks
to ground man’s metaphysical completion either in friendship or the polis itself. It is certainly
true that Aristotle’s conception of magnanimity and friendship provides a level of dignity to the
political life—a dignity that Socrates denies. Furthermore, friendship may go some way to
providing an antidote to the sense of anomie and isolation that many scholars claim is pervasive
in modern political societies. Nevertheless, Aristotle denies that friendship itself is able to
provide for man’s metaphysical completion. For Aristotle, man’s highest activity and, therefore,
his most complete end, consists in philosophical contemplation.
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While Aristotle’s project lends dignity to politics and is able to go some way toward
combatting some of the social ills facing modern political society, we may well ask what the
practical political implications of his project might be. Aristotle’s understanding of friendship
and magnanimity may seem somewhat far removed from our understanding and practice of
politics. We may justly ask, What concrete, practical implications does Aristotle’s treatment of
magnanimity and friendship have for us? At first glance, it may seem that his account of
magnanimity and friendship has little relevance for us: The very notion of magnanimity as a
virtue seems out of vogue today.1 While the lack of recognition we afford to the magnanimous
philosophers who have worked behind the political scene and away from the public eye may be
entirely as Aristotle would wish, it would seem that today the meritorious claims of the great
statesmen of the western tradition, such as George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, or Winston
Churchill often go unrecognized as well. Indeed, Paul Carrese notes that “political science and
democratic theory in America for over a century have eschewed issues of character and virtue in
favor of new conceptions of democratic leadership,” premised largely on democratic and
progressive values.2
It may be argued that this irrelevance of magnanimity gives evidence of the health of the
current state of politics. The notion of an enlightened statesman, together with the aid and advice

1

Paul Carrese notes that this is increasingly true of modern academics and historians. He argues that academic
portrayals of statesmen who have historically been depicted as principled leaders with noble and austere characters
have been subject to a “subtle demotion-via-contextualization.” He goes on to posit that while the purpose of this
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of a magnanimous philosopher, taking the polis in hand and formulating policy at will seems
threatening to modern liberal democracy’s devotion to egalitarianism and the rule of law.3
Perhaps our failure to recognize the magnanimity of bygone statesmen is, in some sense, a
testament to the success of these statesmen. For example, upon exiting the Constitutional
Convention, Benjamin Franklin is famously reported to have said in response to the question of
what sort of government had been created, “A republic, if you can keep it.”4 It is not unfair to
surmise that the greatest danger to the newly-formed republic would be some overly ambitious
character such as a Napoleon or a Cromwell. The hunger for rule that sometimes accompanies
great statesmen, coupled with the desire of the populace for a hero, was a potential threat to the
fledgling American republic’s success. It is to George Washington’s great credit that he rejected
overtures from the people to seize power and retain the office of the presidency as a life-time
appointment, not once, but twice.5 Thus, viewed from a particular perspective, the absence of
recognition of the virtue of magnanimity can seem almost salutary. Republicanism—or at least
democracy—seems to be alive and well.
Nevertheless, before we congratulate ourselves and celebrate the demise of magnanimity,
we would do well to reflect on Aristotle’s account of magnanimity as well as on the related
phenomenon of friendship to examine whether the loss of these concepts truly signals an
advance. In what follows, I will make three claims concerning the continued relevance of
Carson Holloway writes, “The democratic societies of the modern world are largely predicated on a belief in the
fundamental equality of all human beings. In contrast, the very idea of magnanimity seems to be inseparable from
an aristocratic affirmation of inequality: the magnanimous man is better than his fellow citizens.” “Introduction” in
Magnanimity and Statesmanship, ed. Carson Holloway (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008), 1.
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magnanimity and friendship in modern democratic politics. The first claim will center on
Aristotle’s insistence on complementarity in friendship, and the way that this may come to bear
on politics, even in relatively prosaic periods in the life of democratic societies. Second, I will
briefly analyze Aristotle’s discussion concerning the benefits, as well as the limits, of the rule of
law. Aristotle’s discussion serves, I think, as a useful reminder that law is not the embodiment of
either reason or the purpose of politics but always remains simply an imitation of these things.
To the extent that law remains only an imitation of reason and the purpose of politics, Aristotle’s
discussion concerning the limits of law reminds us that we may at times require the political skill
of statesmanship to reform the law. The last point I will make is that Aristotle’s writings
concerning magnanimity, friendship, and law contain a warning against the false but dangerously
alluring belief that laws and institutions have a permanent character.
As I have framed it, Aristotle’s account of friendship—in particular his friendship of the
good—is one of complementarity. True friendship can exist only between individuals who are
both good and differ from one another in some fundamental respect. I have argued that Aristotle
has in mind the friendship between the statesman and the philosopher: the wisdom of the
philosopher, coupled with the courage and conventional nobility of the statesman, ensure that
wisdom is able to have a constructive impact on the political realm. Does Aristotle’s view of the
matter deny the possibility of friendship between statesmen, or friendship between philosophers?
Would this interpretation not put Aristotle’s theory of friendship at odds with what we see in our
everyday life? Is it not plainly the case that it is precisely philosophers who join together in the
pursuit of truth, or statesmen who together struggle to achieve political objectives? John von
Heyking points out that some of the most profound and consequential friendships are those that
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exist between great statesmen.6 He points to the friendship between Winston Churchill and
Franklin D. Roosevelt as being not only a deep friendship, but also one that had profound
consequences in turning the tide of the Second World War. Similarly, the political friendship
between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson was instrumental in the establishment of the
American Republic. If Aristotle’s approach takes such friendships off the table, is his
understanding of friendship at odds with the phenomena?
It is important to remember that Aristotle’s theory of friendship is not exhausted by the
type of friendship I have been describing in the previous chapters. Friendships of utility and
pleasure, while not friendship “in the authoritative sense,” are nonetheless still friendships, albeit
of a lower degree. In fact, Aristotle indicates that these friendships are much more common than
are friendships of the good, insofar as people who are good (or magnanimous) are rare. Thus,
Aristotle does not deny that friendships between two statesmen or between two philosophers
may occur. Instead, he simply claims that the basis of such a friendship will not be on account of
the similarity of the two individuals; instead, it will be based on either pleasure or utility.
Furthermore, to point out that the basis of such friendships is utility or pleasure is not to
trivialize these friendships. As Aristotle makes clear in his discussion concerning justice,
necessity can provide a strong basis for unity. In fact, it is necessity more than anything else that
“holds people together as if they were some single entity” (NE 133b7–8). It is not beyond the
realm of possibility to surmise that absent the dire threat posed by the Third Reich, the friendship
between Churchill and Roosevelt would not have been nearly as strong as it was. While not
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comprising the most developed and highest form of friendship, friendships based in utility or
need can provide a strong—albeit, perhaps temporary—basis for friendship.
Furthermore, while I have noted above that Aristotle’s account of friendship ought to be
understood primarily as a sort of guide for situations in which public order has broken down, its
use is not limited to such situations. Aristotle’s account of friendship contains insights that are
applicable also to periods characterized by relative stability and ordinary day-to-day politics. For
example, Aristotle stresses the complementarity that characterizes friendship. He does so in
large part because such friendships can lead to the establishment or profound reorganization of a
political regime. Nevertheless, such complementarity can be beneficial (and perhaps necessary)
also in ordinary day-to-day operations of the political regime. A friendship between those of
different and complementary strengths may be beneficial to the polity in small but important
ways. For example, the technical skills of a policy analyst, combined with the rhetorical skills of
a politician, can serve to enhance the political and financial well-being of a regime. Thus, while
Aristotle’s description of friendship is, at its height and in its greatest splendor, the friendship
between two individuals with the ability to confer “the greatest benefits” on the regime, his
understanding of friendship has implications for ordinary, everyday politics as well.
In fact, not only does Aristotle’s insistence on complementarity in friendship remain
relevant, but it also contains an important reminder for the practice of politics today. Aristotle
labored to establish the credibility and importance of philosophy among the powerful and
established political gentlemen (καλοικάγαθοι) of his day, who viewed philosophy with
suspicion. While Aristotle’s primary rhetorical concern in the Ethics is to convince these noble
gentlemen of the insights and benefits that philosophy and science can bring to the political
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realm, his secondary aim, is to convince the philosopher of the necessity and dignity of the
practice of politics. In contrast to the political conditions facing Aristotle, today we witness
great optimism concerning the benefits of science (επιστήμη) to solve our present political
problems. This trend, beginning with the political philosophy of Hobbes, sought to place politics
on what seemed to be the sound foundation of science and institutions,7 rather than in man’s
fickle passions.8 The dangers posed by those who fail to recognize the necessity and claims of
science seem to be mild in comparison to the hostility displayed toward science in Aristotle’s
day. Instead, the greater danger facing today’s political climate is a misplaced optimism
concerning the power of science, combined with what amounts to a depreciation of the political
insights possessed by virtuous statesman. Indeed, today the practice of politics has fallen into a
sort of disrepute, such that the very term “politics” is viewed with a certain level of disdain.
Given the current deprecation of politics and the optimism concerning the benefits and
capacity of science, Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy and politics
contains important insights for our expectations of philosophical speculation. His description of
man’s νούς-like capacity as two-fold, comprising not only the capacity of the philosopher to
comprehend and grasp the most abstract, scientific truths, but also the capacity of the statesman
to perceive and recognize the ultimate particular, seems to be a particularly relevant insight in
today’s context. Aristotle’s political philosophy contains a useful reminder that we must

Leo Strauss writes that “Hobbes’ break with tradition was doubtless the result of his turning to mathematics and
natural science.” The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis, trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1936), 136. Strauss later revised his thesis and argued that Machiavelli, not
Hobbes, was the founder of modern politics
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recognize the claims of what is overtly political. As Aristotle presents it, the political sphere is
the sphere of the particular, and it is ultimately the statesman who has the capacity to perceive
the specifics of a particular situation, and to decide what laws are suitable for the character of the
people and the material conditions of the polis. The statesman thus has a hand in forming the
values or purpose of the polis, or what the polis will esteem.
Aristotle’s recognition of the dignity and claims of politics, brings me to my second point
concerning the importance of his understanding of magnanimity and friendship; the limits of the
rule of law. While Aristotle emphasizes that the complementary friendship between the
philosopher and the statesman can confer great benefits on the city, particularly when such
friendship ensures that “well-regarded laws” are implemented in the correct manner (NE
1181a13–24), he also points out that the rule of law has certain limitations. Indeed, as Aristotle
presents it, law is an artifice or convention that is meant to embody—to the extent possible—the
νούς-like capacities of the statesman and the philosopher. However, at a number of different
points in the Politics, Aristotle makes clear that the law is only an imitation of the correct reason
or intellect of the statesman and the philosopher, and that the law can never fully capture either
the intellect of the statesman or the purpose of the regime.
Aristotle’s recognition of the limits of the rule of law are first hinted at in the second
book of the Politics. In a passage in which he is commenting on and critiquing previous
contributions that have been made to the study of political science, Aristotle raises the question
as to “whether it is harmful or advantageous for cities to change traditional laws, if some other
one should be better” (Pol. 1268b27–29). His principal advice is to remain cautious about
changing the law, due to the fact that the law obtains its power from habituation and established
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usage. Because people obey the law out of a sense of habit that is created over a period of time,
“the easy alteration of existing laws in favor of new and different ones weakens the power of law
itself” (1269a20 – 22) and ought to be avoided. As a result, Aristotle’s overall advice is to avoid
changing the laws unnecessarily, due to the instability this would engender.
Nevertheless, immediately prior to his conclusion that one should avoid the unnecessary
alteration of law, Aristotle emphasizes that progress in the law is attainable. As evidence, he
points to the “simple and barbaric” nature of the laws that existed in ancient times (1268b39–40).
In fact, Aristotle even goes so far as to ridicule the “ancient ordinances [that] still remain” as
being “altogether silly” (1269a1). He follows this up with the observation that “in general, all
seek not the traditional but the good” (1269a4–5). Thus, Aristotle’s conclusion seems to be that
while laws serve to maintain a certain stability, they are not an end in and of themselves. While
the law seeks to reify reason and the values or purposes of the regime, it never fully succeeds in
doing so but remains an imperfect imitation of reason, purpose, and value.
This point is underscored in Book III of the Politics in a passage devoted to the topic of
kingship. Aristotle explicitly raises the question of whether it is better to be “ruled by the best
man or by the best laws” (1286a9–10). On the one hand, he notes that rule by the best man
would seem to be more advantageous than the rule of law, as laws are limited by the very fact
that they are framed with a view to universality. In contrast to the rule of an enlightened
statesman, laws are unable to take into account the particular, or situations that lie outside the
norm. In some circumstances, the application of a general law of justice may be unwise, and
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perhaps even be unjust or conflicting with the purpose of the regime.9 In such situations the
prudent statesman or the political man on the spot who is familiar with the particulars is capable
of rendering justice that reflects the standards and values of the city in a way that the generality
of law is unable to do.10 On the other hand, Aristotle notes that there are benefits to the rule of
law as well. The rule of law, in contrast to human rule, is dispassionate. There is no fear that
law, carried away by passion, will rule with partiality, or with its own interests in mind. Thus,
this section seems to reiterate Aristotle’s qualified respect for the law. While the rule of law is
marked by sobriety, there are some things that it simply is unable to judge well.
Aristotle’s observations concerning the rule of law point not only to the limits of the rule
of law, but also to its impermanent character. This becomes clear when we set Aristotle’s
thoughts concerning the limits of the rule of law in relief against his famous statement made
towards the end of Book III of the Politics concerning the individual of superlative virtue.
Aristotle indicates that when an individual arises who is so outstanding in virtue that he is
preeminent over all others in the city, the only natural course that remains “is for everyone to
obey such a person gladly, so that persons of this sort will be permanent kings in their cities”
(1284b32–34).11 Here, Aristotle suggests that in such a situation the best and most just regime
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would be the absolute rule by the individual of superlative virtue. Is Aristotle’s final claim that
the rule of law is ultimately second to the absolute rule of an enlightened statesman?
Scholars have struggled to make sense of Aristotle’s remarkable—albeit, brief—praise of
absolute rule, particularly because it seems so at odds with the republican character of much of
the rest of the Politics. Waller Newall posits that while Aristotle recognizes the enlightened
statesman’s claim to rule as rational and correct, he mutes this claim because it would undermine
the claim of “the self-governing political community that is at the forefront of his political
philosophy.”12 According to Newall, Aristotle views both monarchy and the self-governing
political community characterized by the rule of law as being sanctioned by nature. Newall
avoids the obvious contradiction involved in this assertion by pointing to Aristotle’s Physics,
where natural phenomena are “understood both in terms of spontaneous self-movement and as
being analogous to the rational precision by which an artist produces things.”13 Newall explains
that if we extend “this understanding of nature to political life, the natural realm of politics is
accordingly a mixture of the self-government of political communities and the skills of
monarchical statecraft through which prudent rulers ‘make people better.’”14 As Aristotle writes
in Book I of the Politics, “there is in everyone by nature an impulse toward [the city]. And yet
he who first founded one is responsible for the greatest of goods.” (Pol. 1253a30–31). The idea
seems to be that although the city naturally comes into being on the basis of a certain necessity, it
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is through enlightened statesmanship that the city obtains a form or purpose beyond the simple
countering of necessity.
Newall’s explanation of Aristotle’s puzzling assertion in favor of absolute rule is
congruent with my own interpretation of the Ethics. The matter of the regime—i.e., the
people—has the natural capacity to become virtuous, but it is up to the enlightened statesman to
activate that capacity. However, the question that remains is under what conditions ought the
city embrace self-government and the rule of law, and under what conditions ought it entrust all
power and authority to the skills of monarchical statecraft? Aristotle remains silent about this.
The most he states is that the city ought to entrust absolute rule to the monarch when such an
individual’s superlative virtue becomes evident.
The question of when the city ought to entrust governance to an absolute monarch is
dependent upon when the superlative virtue of an outstanding individual becomes manifest.
Such pre-eminence will likely become evident in the rare situation in which the values and
purpose of the regime have been forgotten. When the regime and the people in it have forgotten
their very purpose and the public care is utterly neglected, a statesman, with the advice of a
philosopher, might distinguish himself and renew the city’s sense of purpose. (NE 1180a30–
b28). Of course, as shown above, these magnanimous individuals who are capable of bestowing
the greatest benefits on the city by giving it a sense of purpose are potentially dangerous.15 Thus,
it may be that Aristotle chooses to devote the majority of his writings in the Politics to extolling
the virtues of the self-governing community, while muting the claim to rule on the part of
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individuals of superlative virtue because the situations in which absolute rule is necessary are
rare, and the dangers that are associated with absolute rule are great. Nevertheless, the fact that
Aristotle merely mutes the claim of such individuals of superlative virtue rather than
extinguishing them completely, suggests that the institutions and procedures that allow for selfgovernment and the rule of law are not permanent but are subject to decay.
Viewed from this perspective, Aristotle’s political philosophy is an endorsement of the
rule of law with the important qualifier that law itself is neither the embodiment of reason nor the
embodiment of the fundamental character of the regime. At a time when there is strong belief in
the power of the scientific administration of politics and a belief that all political problems can be
solved by better laws, superior institutions, and more sophisticated procedures, it is useful to
remember that law is only an approximation of the fundamental character or purpose of the
regime. Part of what it means to be human, according to Aristotle, is to be a political being.
Thus, when the institutions that are meant to reflect the fundamentally political concepts of
human existence such as purpose, value, and reason fail to do so, a significant aspect of human
existence—we may even say the human aspect of existence—is removed as a possibility for
man. The attempt to resolve all problems through the use of abstract sciences and institutions
that no longer reflect their original purpose or value is, in the end, a dehumanizing of man’s
existence.
The above statements are not intended to suggest that modern liberal democracy has
reached the point at which it is necessary to abandon self-government and the rule of law in
favor of absolute rule. However, Aristotle’s warnings concerning the limits and impermanence
of the rule of law suggest that it is important to maintain a recognition of the virtue of
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magnanimity and an awareness of what can be accomplished by the friendship of magnanimous
individuals. Indeed, if modern political societies lose a sense of what magnanimity is, they may
be incapable of recognizing the magnanimous man when he is most needed. Or, perhaps worse
yet, the failure to recognize magnanimity may instead culminate in the public acclamation of a
demagogue who merely appears magnanimous. There is the very real danger—a danger that is
particularly acute in democracies—that a demagogue, upon seizing power, is capable of
transitioning into a dictator. Maintaining an appreciation for the virtue of magnanimity, the
friendship of magnanimous men, and for the magnanimous statesmen of the past avoids not only
an excessive trust in the power and permanence of laws and institutions, but it also enables us to
distinguish true magnanimity from its dangerous simulacrum.
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die Zeitfolge der ächten Gespräche zu bestimmen. Leipzig: Weidmann, 1816.
Arora, N. D. and S. S. Awasthy. Political Theory and Political Thought. New Delhi: Har-Anand,
2007.
253

Bacon, Francis. “Of Friendship.” In Francis Bacon: Essays and New Atlantis. Edited by Gordon
S. Haight, 109–19. New York: Black, 1942.
Bartlett, Robert C. “The ‘Realism’ of Classical Political Science.” American Journal of Political
Science 38, no. 2 (May 1994) 381–402.
Batten, Alicia J. Friendship and Benefaction in James. Atlanta: SBL Press, 2017.
Benardete, Seth. “On Plato’s Lysis.” In The Argument of the Action: Essays on Greek Poetry and
Philosophy. Edited by Ronna Burger and Michael Davis, 198–230. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2000.
————. The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1991.
Bodéüs, Richard. Aristotle and the Theology of Living Immortals. Translated by Jan Edward
Garrett. New York: State University of New York Press, 2000.
————. The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s ‘Ethics.’ Translated by Jan Edward Garrett.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993.
Broadie, Sarah. Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Burger, Ronna. Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates: On the Nicomachean Ethics. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2008.
Burkert, Walter. Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical. Translated by John Raffan. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.
Carrese, Paul. “George Washington’s Greatness and Aristotelian Virtue.” In Magnanimity and
Statesmanship. Edited by Carson Holloway. 145–70. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008.
Cartledge, Paul. Alexander the Great: The Hunt for a New Past. New York: Overlook Press,
2004.
Collins, Susan. Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006.
Cooper, John. Reason and the Human Good in Aristotle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1975.
Corcoran, Clinton DeBevoise. Topography and Deep Structure in Plato: The Construction of
Place in the Dialogues. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016.
Descartes, René. Meditations, Objections, and Replies. Edited and translated by Roger Ariew
and Donald Cress. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2006.
Digeser, P. E. Friendship Reconsidered: What It Means and How It Matters to Politics. New
York: Columbia University Press, 2016.
254

Dodds, E. R. Plato Gorgias: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1959.
Duncan, Roger. “Philia in the Gorgias.” Apeiron 8, no. 1 (May, 1974): 23–26.
Ehrenberg, Victor. Alexander and the Greeks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938.
Euripides. Orestes. Translated by E. P. Coleridge. Vol 2 of The Complete Greek Drama. Edited
by Whitney J. Oates and Eugene O’Neil, Jr. New York: Random House, 1938.
Feaver, Douglas D. and John E. Hare. “The Apology as an Inverted Parody of Rhetoric.”
Arethusa 14, no. 2 (Fall, 1981): 205–16.
Gargin, Michael. “Socrates’ ‘Hybris’ and Alcibiades’ Failure.” Phoenix 31, no. 1 (Spring, 1977):
22–37.
Gauthier, René Antoine. Magnanimité: L’Idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et
dans la théologie chrétienne. Paris: Vrin, 1951.
Gibert, John. “Euripides’ Antiope and the Quiet Life.” In The Play of Texts and Fragments:
Essays in Honor of Martin Cropp. Edited by J. R. C. Cousland and James R. Hume, 23–
34. Leiden: Brill, 2009.
Grote, George. Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates. Vol. 2. London: John Murray,
1867.
Halper, Edward C. The One and the Many in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: The Central Books. Ohio,
IN: Ohio State University Press, 1989.
Hanley, Ryan Patrick. “Aristotle on the Greatness of Greatness of Soul.” History of Political
Thought 23, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 1–20.
Hardie, W. F. R. “‘Magnanimity’ in Aristotle’s Ethics.” Phronesis 23, no. 1 (1978): 63–79.
Hegel, Georg W. F. The Philosophy of History. 1837. Translated by John Sibree. Mineola, NY:
Dover, 1956.
————. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by E.S. Haldane. Vol. 1, London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955.
Heidegger, Martin. Plato’s Sophist. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996.
Hoerber, Robert G. “Plato’s Lysis.” Phronesis 4, no. 1 (1959): 15–28.
Holloway, Carson. “Aristotle’s Magnanimous Man.” In Magnanimity and Statesmanship, edited
by Carson Holloway, 13–27. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008.
255

————. “Introduction.” In Magnanimity and Statesmanship. Edited by Carson Holloway, 1–
10. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008.
————. “Shakespeare’s’ Coriolanus and Aristotle’s Great-Souled Man.” Review of Politics
69, no. 3 (Summer, 2007): 353–74.
Homer. Iliad. Translated by A. T. Murray. Vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1924.
————. Odyssey. Edited by Louise Ropes Loomis. Translated by Samuel Butler. Roslyn, NY:
Black, 1944.
Howland, Jacob. “Aristotle’s Great-Souled Man.” Review of Politics 64, no. 1 (Winter, 2002):
27–56.
Inwood, Brad. The Poem of Empedocles. Translated by Brad Inwood. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1992.
Irwin, Terence. Plato’s Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Jaeger, Werner. Paedeia. Vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943.
Jaffa, Harry V. Aristotelianism and Thomism: A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on
the Nicomachean Ethics. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979.
Kateb, George. “Socratic Integrity.” Nomos 40 (1998): 77–112.
Kidd, Thomas. Benjamin Franklin: Life of a Founding Father. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2017.
Kierkegaard, Søren. On the Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates: Together
with Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures. Edited and translated by Howard Vincent Hong
and Edna Hatlestad Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.
Konstan, David. Friendship in the Classical World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997.
Klosko, George. “The Refutation of Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias.” Greece and Rome 31, no. 2
(October 1984): 126–39.
Laertius, Diogenes. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Edited by James Miller. Translated by
Pamela Mensch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Lamb, W. R. M. Introduction to the Lysis. In Plato. Vol. 3, Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. Loeb
Classical Library 166. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1925.
Lambert, Gregg. Philosophy after Friendship: Deleuze’s Conceptual Personae. Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2017.
Liddell, H. G. and R. Scott. Greek English Lexicon. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
256

McKim, Richard. “Shame and Truth in Plato’s Gorgias.” In Platonic Writings, Platonic
Readings. Edited by Charles L. Griswold, Jr. New York: Routledge, 1988.
Mews, Constant J. and Neville Chiavaroli. “The Latin West.” In Friendship: A History. Edited
by Barbara Caine, 73–110. New York: Routledge, 2014.
Modesto, Filippa. Dante’s Idea of Friendship: The Transformation of a Classical Concept.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015.
Montaigne, Michel de. “Of Friendship.” In The Complete Essays of Montaigne. Translated by
Donald Frame. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976.
Morgan, Teresa. “Rhetoric and Education.” In A Companion to Greek Rhetoric. Edited by Ian
Worthington. West Sussex, UK: Blackwell, 2010.
Nagel, Thomas. “Aristotle on Eudaimonia.” Phronesis 17, no. 3 (1972): 252–59.
Nehamas, Alexander. On Friendship. New York: Basic Books, 2016.
Nichols, Mary. Socrates and the Political Community: An Ancient Debate. New York: State
University of New York Press, 1987.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer. Translated
and edited by Duncan Large. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Nightingale, Andrea. “Plato’s ‘Gorgias’ and Euripides’ ‘Antiope’: A Study in Generic
Transformation.” Classical Antiquity 11, no. 1 (1992): 121–41.
Newall. Waller R. Tyranny: A New Interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013.
Pangle, Lorraine Smith. Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003.
————. “The Anatomy of Courage in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.” Review of Politics 80,
no. 4 (2018): 569–90.
————. “Friendship and Self-Love in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.” In Action and
Contemplation: Studies in the Moral and Political Thought of Aristotle. Edited by Robert
C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins, 171–202. Albany: State University of New York Press,
1999.
Penner, Terry, and Christopher Rowe. Plato’s Lysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005.
Pickard-Cambridge, A. W. “Tragedy.” In New Chapters in the History of Greek Literature. 3rd
series. Edited by J. U. Powell, 68–155. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933.

257

Plato. Apology. In Four Texts on Socrates: Plato and Aristophanes. Revised edition. Translated
and edited by Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1998.
————. Euthyphro. In Four Texts on Socrates: Plato and Aristophanes. Revised edition.
Translated and edited by Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1998.
————. Euthydemus. Translated by Rosamond Kent Spague. In Plato: Complete Works.
Edited by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997.
————. Gorgias. Translated and edited by James H. Nichols Jr. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1998.
————. Greater Hippias. Translated by David R. Sweet. In The Roots of Political
Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues, edited by Thomas L. Pangle. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1987.
————. Lysis. In Plato’s Dialogue on Friendship: An Interpretation of the Lysis with a New
Translation. Translated and edited by David Bolotin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1979.
————. Phaedrus. Translated and edited by James H. Nichols Jr. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1998.
————. Protagoras. In Plato: “Protagoras” and “Meno.” Translated and edited by Robert C.
Bartlett. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.
————. Republic. In The Republic of Plato. Translated and edited by Allan Bloom. New
York: Basic Books, 1968.
————. Symposium. Translated by Seth Benardete. Edited by Allan Bloom and Seth
Benardete. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
————. Thaeatetus. Translated by M. J. Levett. Revised by Myles Burneat. In Plato:
Complete Works. Edited by John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett, 1997.
————. Theages. Translated by Nicholas D. Smith. In Plato: Complete Works. Edited by John
M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997.
Plutarch. “Alcibiades.” In The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans. Translated by John
Dryden. Revised by Arthur Hugh Clough, 233–62. New York: Random House, 1864.
————. “Lysander.” In The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans. Translated by John
Dryden. Revised by Arthur Hugh Clough. 525–45. New York: Random House, 1864.
Price, A. W. Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
258

Rhodes, James. “Platonic Philia and Political Order.” In Friendship and Politics. Edited by John
von Heyking and Richard Avramenko, 21–52. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2008.
Rider, Benjamin. “A Socratic Seduction: Philosophical Protreptic in Plato’s Lysis.” Apeiron 44,
no. 1 (2011): 40–66.
Robinson, David B. “Plato’s ‘Lysis’: The Structural Problem.” Illinois Classical Studies 11, no.
1/2 (Spring/Fall, 1986): 63–83.
Ross, David. Aristotle. 6th ed. London: Routledge, 1995.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. Translated and edited by Victor Gourevitch.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Scott, Gary Allan. Plato’s Socrates as Educator. Albany: State University of New York Press,
2000.
Sidgwick, Henry. Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers. Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett, [1886], 1902.
Smith, Thomas W. Revaluing Ethics: Aristotle’s Dialectical Pedagogy. Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2001.
Sophocles, “Ajax.” In The Complete Greek Drama. Translated by R. C. Trevelyan. Edited by
Whitney J. Oates and Eugene O’Neill, Jr. New York: Random House, 1938.
Stauffer, Devin. “Socrates and Callicles: A Reading of Plato’s Gorgias.” Review of Politics 64,
no. 4 (Autumn, 2002): 627–57.
————. The Unity of Plato’s ‘Gorgias’: Rhetoric, Justice, and the Philosophic Life.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Stewart, J. A. Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892.
Strauss, Leo. On Plato’s “Symposium.” Edited by Seth Benardete. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2001.
————. The City and Man. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964.
————. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis. Translated by Elsa M.
Sinclair. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936.
Tan, Seow Hon. Justice as Friendship: A Theory of Law. New York: Routledge, 2015.
Tessitore, Aristide. “A Political Reading of Aristotle’s Treatment of Pleasure in the
Nicomachean Ethics.” Political Theory 17, no. 2 (1989): 247–65.
————. Reading Aristotle’s Ethics: Virtue, Rhetoric, and Political Philosophy. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1996.
259

Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner. New York: Penguin,
1972.
Villa, Dana. Socratic Citizenship. Princeton University Press, 2001.
Vlastos, Gregory. Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1991.
Voegelin, Eric. Order and History. Vol. 3. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957.
von Heyking, John. The Form of Politics: Aristotle and Plato on Friendship. Montreal: McGillQueens University Press, 2016.
Ward, Ann. Contemplating Friendship in Aristotle’s Ethics. Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2016.
Wecklein, N. “Die Antiope des Euripides.” In Philologus, 79 (1923): 51–69.
Xenophon. Memorabilia. Translated and annotated by Amy L. Bonnette. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1994.
Zeller, Eduard. Socrates and the Socratic Schools. Translated by Oswald J. Reichel. London:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1868.
Zuckert, Catherine. Plato’s Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2009.

260

VITA
John Boersma is a native of Langley, British Columbia, Canada. He received his B.A.
from Ave Maria University in the Fall of 2011 with a major in Political Science. Upon
graduation, John entered the joint degree program at St. John’s University earning a J.D./M.A. in
Political Science in 2015. He entered the PhD program at Louisiana State University in the Fall
of 2015, where his primary research has been ancient political theory. He anticipates graduating
in May of 2019.

261

